LOL...

Principally, your failing was arguing that "it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist". Identity is the antecedant to coherent existanceL

Common Counter-Argument: Just because there is no identity does not mean it does not exist!

This fundamentally misses the point of the argument. The point is not to demonstrate that it does not exist, but rather that there is no “it” to speak of! Otherwise, the corollary of this exclamation is the simple question “What is it that you speak of “existing”? Make up a word. Does this word have meaning? Well, you may have proposed that the word refers to an concept that suggests existence, ie the word denotes a real-world concept. But suppose you have not, but you still hold that this word should denote. In this case would you ask whether or not the referred to something that existed? Not yet. First, you have to ask “what is it that we speak of existing”? Identity is the antecedent to existence. It is meaningless to speak of existence without identity, since that requisite is axiomatic and any attempt to argue against it would refute its own premise, as I have already established.

In what sense are we referring to existence in this context? What sense is there of speaking of existence without identity? There is none. To exist is to exist as something. But this particular proposition is unique in that there is no coherent established property by which we have identity, there is only an eliminative lack of it. If God has no identity, then there is no entity, for how can speak of entity in this case? In what sense is it an entity? The “non-physical” sense? This is unhelpful because it simply returns us to the question above, we still have no identity for the entity in question, thence what sense is there speaking of it existing? It is rather like claiming that my computer on which I am typing could “exist” without plastic, silicon and liquid crystal. Well, then, in what sense does it exist? In the non-plastic, non-silicon, non-liquid crystal sense? You can see how the reductio ad absurdum is generated. How is it that people can operate under the delusion that they can reference “God” without identity, the satirical eliminate fashion in which I defined “my computer” above is simply an elimination of existential identity. That’s exactly what the word “supernatural” is. There is no difference between saying “God is supernatural” and saying a boat “exists” as “not a boat”. To exist is to exist as something, I cannot "exist" as "not a something"/

The trick card up your sleeve is "higher being".

You haven't given your proposition any identity. 

But now your definition is simply ad hoc and is not in concordance with the theistic description of the "supernatural", forthermore, you are forced into making an unclarified special pleading fallacy which would seem to indicate you are stealing attributes from entities about which we do have a posteriori knowledge except that you are begging the question by asserting that it is contigent to say that your supernatural being may have these attributes despite being in a different category. This is rather like a pick-and-mix child's game of "if you could have superpowers, what would you like to do?", "Well, it would be rather nice if I could shoot heat rays? Hang on, I thought you just said you wanted to be cold-blooded, you'd have no method of Homeostasis? "Damn. Well, I'll just pretend that I have some hitherto unclarified method of keeping temperature stasis so I can do both simultaneously".

Similarily, your proposition is subtly requisiting that you project your coherent understanding of our universe, that in which we live, to something you claim is outside it. You cannot defend this proposition on grounds of the possibility that there might be "other models" describing the a priori nature of the thing in question, like time, because then you're just playing pick-and-mix again! You might as well just admit your whole proposition is appeal to ad hocism. Once you start appealling to ideas like "the personality of this agent" and "consciousness", you are abandoning all pretense of metaphysical propositions, and adding empirical propositions into the fray whenever you please!

And you still haven't given me the identity of the entity in question. I don't want to know what this mysterious thing can do. Theists tell me that all the time with their threats of damnation! I want to know what the thing is. It is propositionally unhelpful to say "my computer is an "agent" capable of performing calculations and hooking me up to the the internet". Rather, my computer is a device constructed out of liquid crystal, plastic and silicon where silcon chips are arrayed in parallel circuitry slotted into containing locks inside the laptop clustured around a large silicon chip called a motherboard.

I'm sorry for the delayed reply Deluded; now I think I may have something satisfactory.

After considering your replies, I agree that my argument failed and fell victim to the identity issue; or in other words, my argument was too ambitious. I feel that my argument should primarily focus on the concept of 'supernatural' in its simplest terms and leave out God (for now). Perhaps we may find that the issue involves attaching 'supernatural' to a controversial being, and not 'supernatural' itself. This is what I will attempt to explain.

'Supernatural' as a Predicate Noun

Stemming from my definitional view of 'supernatural' I would like to explore the possibility of 'supernatural' conceived of in the following example. Consider the space shuttle when it was first launched. While watching the space shuttle launch, a spectator may exclaim "that's amazing!" In this setting, I would illustrate my conception of 'supernatural' as being expressed similar to "amazing" i.e. "that's supernatural!" Granted, this may not be what most people say at the sight of an "amazing" thing or event, but it seems that when most people say "amazing" you could plausibly substitute "supernatural".

Now how my conception of 'supernatural' would apply to the space shuttle analogy is this: the space shuttle appears to exceed the normal laws of nature. The sight of a huge metal vehicle being thrust into the air, and eventually passing outside of our atmosphere, would seem quite an extraordinary event. "Extraordinary" is my key emphasis on this point. The conception of 'supernatural' that I am supporting has everything in common with 'extraordinary'. This is so because 'supernatural' in my conception merely means 'something that greatly exceeds the normal course of nature'. Therefore, in the case of the space shuttle analogy, the space shuttle would be "greatly exceeding the normal course of nature." Which obviously would allow me to insert 'supernatural' in place of its definition resulting in: The space shuttle launching out of the atmosphere would be something supernatural.

I hope Deluded, that I did not make the same error that I did before dealing with th axiom of identity. If I have made an error in my argument, I at least hope that it is a new one. I concede that if what I have described is correct, then I may have an impossible task of applying 'supernatural' coherently to the idea of 'God'. However, I am not dissatisfied by that prospect. I look forward to your criticisms.

Note: I understand that in today's world, and maybe even the world during the time that the space shuttle was first launched, it may not be accurately described as 'greatly exceeding the natural course of nature'. For example, physicists can show how the space shuttle merely has the required force and velocity to thrust it out of the atmosphere; which is something completly "natural" to a scientist. However, this objection appears inapplicable when we concieve of putting ourselves in a spectator's shoes from during that time period. The true thought or concept that would concievably be in that spectator's mind while witnessing the space shuttle thrust smoothly into the air is apparently accurate to that of "that' supernatural!" Alas, if you feel that this example does illustrate a failing to my argument, then please explain how that may follow. I imagine that the failing of my argument maybe a fallacious appeal to the ignorance of the spectator and his incorrect labeling or misunderstanding of a completely natural event. However, would this deem my conception of 'supernatural' incoherent and/or incorrect? Or would it merely show that my example does not apply to my conception?

So, does the argument for the incoherency of the concept of 'supernatural' not apply if 'supernatural' is not used as a metaphysical proposition? 

You think I'm a swindler! I am hurt. Nevertheless, and all joking aside on my part, I do see your point. I take you to be saying, that when I use 'supernatural' in the completely non-related to the metaphysical sense it is a coherent term. However, this in no way helps to lead towards my end goal of attaching the concept 'supernatural' to God.

As of this point then, I would have to concede that my argument, as far as I have described it, does not successfully address what it set out to address: the incoherency of the (metaphysical) concept of 'supernatural'. Would you say that this is an accurate summation of what I've laid out Deluded? Oh and I meant criticism in the purely academic sense, not in the ad hominem sense.

Note: I could envision someone saying that 'supernatural' can be conceded as possibly used in a non-metaphysical sense (i.e. purely physical sense) and retain coherency (in the non-trivial way of an exclamation or mere saying-of-speech). However, on that point, I would definitely agree with you Deluded that this move would be unnaccetable, and as of yet, unargued. And just so you know, I will reattempt to formulate an argument which would lead to acheiving a successful reply to T.D.'s paper. Although, It may be a while before I come up with something.

This is most certainly not what my thesis was attempting to establish, and if it is what is being inferred, I need to clarify. My proposition was not that existence is the necessary antecedant to identity, but rather identity is the necessary antecedant to existence. It is propositionally coherent to speak the following:

Unicorns exist

Coherence theory of truth has largely been abandoned, but that not mean it cannot be employed, even if truth statements cannot be derived from it.

What I was not entailing, as you seem to be suggesting, was Fido-Fido theory, for when I speak of referents, I am not referring to the necessary entailment of existence, but rather identity, such that for any proper name p has description D entails that there are certain properties associated with p, this does not mean that p exists, that it has direct referent in the external world. It may not, but that is irrelevant. I am not Millian, to me, the sentence

Unicorns Exist

Is perfectly meaningful because it imbues certain recognized quantities onto the predicate. It's a white animal with a horse's body and a long horn. These predicates do not have to exist directly, in reality, no such animal exists, but that is irrelevant, it is still perfectly conceptually coherent. The word may attempt to refer to an existent thing, but I think my principle description was unclear. I was not suggesting that it is entailed that the description d need to refer to some existent entity, but rather, for there to be such an entity, we should be able to give it referents. It doesn't necessarily entail that what is refers to actually exists, but since I am unconcerned with the truth value of the proposition, that was not what I was focusing on. What I was advocating was denotation as apposed to Millian Descriptivism.

Although denotation works tidily for certain concepts lke "blue" or "lamp" it breaks down when we consider words which don't denote anything, like "hello". When I speak of denotation, it does not entail necessarily that the thing in question exists in the real world, but it should have conceivable property nonetheless. What I was suggesting was that certain words, by their nature, needed to . I was not concerned in any way with whether or not this referred to something in the real world, or whether it was a true statement, my principle and only concern was whether the entity had identity.  That is my litmus test (It's actually Quine's, but meh)

I think, then we are working with tow different senses of referent. TO me, in this case, a referent does not entail existence in the actual world, because that would make numerous either false statements on those propogating imaginary concepts unclear, when they are not. Rather, the predicate in question should be denoted, because speaking of the "supernatural" does not appear to be coherently speaking of any actual concept, ie it does not appear to denote a thing which could possibly have identity, because it appears to be solely defined in a negative universe of discourse where it is not coherently established what it means to refer to something as only: ~N, where N stands for "natural". We can define objects by their opposites so long as we are aware what is left over, ie

"This number is not even"

which is coherent because it is established what remains, odd numbers. THis means that since there is something left in the universe of discourse, we can coherently define it. It has not been established what, if anything, is left over or what we mean when we say "supernatural", and it does not appear to have any identity attached to it (see the "pencil case universe" suggestion at the bottom).

Principally, I was not concerned whatsoever with the truth value of the utterance, it is impossible to speak of a something being "true" when you don't even know what it is conceptually expressing.

Anyway, I needed to revise that paper, since I'm trying to finish drafting something on Multiple Realizability, I had ignored that one for a while.

Supernatural is not appropriately defined as ~N. If this premise of your argument is removed, then your argument against my position dissapears.

This concession further supports my position concerning the rentention of the coherency of 'supernatual' if we define it as "above the normal course of nature" and not "outside of nature." It is quite feasible to see how the concept would retain coherency even we can merely denote its properties, yet not have an object in existence which can be referred to as 'supernatural.'

Argument from Analogy

The properties of a Unicorn would be:

white animal, with a horn, and a horses body.

The properties of something (existent or not) supernatural would be:

Speed: Super fast!

Power: Super power!

Intelligence: Super smart!

etc.

The only difference between the unicorn and the properties of 'supernatural' is level or quantity; not the actual properties themselves. I could add the following properties to the unicorn analogy:

Normal Unicorn:

white