Lexicon limitations and suggestions for clarity in debate

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Lexicon limitations and suggestions for clarity in debate

I just listened to Sapient's interview on the Texas AM radio show and shortly afterward read the Collins / Dawkins debate in Time magazine.  I know that when theists and atheists debate, very often problems arise over how we define words...  Especially the word Faith. 

 

M-W.com lists 3 (actually Cool definitions of the word which are entirely adequate for all its uses.

 

From Mirriam Webster:

Faith 

1 a : allegiance to duty or a person : LOYALTY b (1) : fidelity to one's promises (2) : sincerity of intentions
2 a (1) : belief and trust in and loyalty to God (2) : belief in the traditional doctrines of a religion b (1) : firm belief in something for which there is no proof (2) : complete trust
3 : something that is believed especially with strong conviction; especially : a system of religious beliefs <the Protestant faith>

 

Definitions 1a and 1b are loyalty or fidelity and I don't believe that this use of the word faith is the cause of much confusion.  In casual conversation, faithfull or faithfully are understood to be this definition.  Definition 1a(2) does not cause much confusion in debate either, so I'll move onto the next.

Definition 2a(1) and 2a(2)  should be said simply as "religion" or "religious beliefs" for clarity.

When someone says "I'm a scientist on a space shuttle and I have faith that I'm going to get home", they are using definition 2b(2), which means complete trust.  They trust their crew to do the necessary safety checks before departing, they trust the pilots skill, they trust the people on the ground who are tracking them, et cetera.  This example in particular may not be so good because in practice astronauts do not have complete trust in the idea that they will get home.  Any astronaut that doesn't realize that it may be the last time he sees them when kissing his family goodbye before getting on the shuttle has something wrong with him... and/or complete trust.  They can possibly have complete trust in all the thousands of people working on the shuttle mission to do their jobs to the best of their ability, but they can not have complete trust that they will return home....  When speaking of faith in the sense of definition 2b(2), the words "complete trust" should be used in it's place.

Definition 2b(1), firm belief in something for which there is no proof, is the definition of most interest to atheists, and the most confused by theists. It is this confusion, or overlap of the definitions of the word "faith" that are the primary errors of theists' understanding of it.

I propose that when debating, any time the word faith is used, it should be shown that there are several definitions which are sometimes confused.  And it should be agreed upon that the speakers intention when using the word faith should be clarified in every instance where it could be ambiguous. 

For example to avoid confusion, when one means definitions 1a or 1b, say loyalty or fidelity instead of faith.

When one means definition 2a(1) or 2a(2) say religion instead of faith.

When one means definition 2b(1) say FAITH because this is exactly the only definition that contains that meaning....besides delusion, but I digress...

When one means definition 2b(2) say complete trust instead of faith.

When one means definition 3, say strong conviction, or just conviction instead of faith.

 I think that just by the exercise of understanding the definitions of faith and how they can be distinguished or confused in a conversation, sheds light on the error of using this word too liberally.

 

Thoughts?

Anyone want to tackle the word "Belief" next? 

Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.
Thomas Jefferson


buster
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How about the differences

How about the differences in how we define evidence...  and why some conclusions, lines of thinking, and people are rational or not.

 

I'm brand spanking new here.  If this topic has been covered before, could someone please direct me to it? 

Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.
Thomas Jefferson


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buster wrote:How about

buster wrote:

How about the differences in how we define evidence... and why some conclusions, lines of thinking, and people are rational or not.

 

I'm brand spanking new here. If this topic has been covered before, could someone please direct me to it?

 The only reason this is debated is because theists like the person you are discussing are ignorant of the basics of the debate.

Please note: none of this is directed to you, but to theists 

 There can be no debate about what theistic faith is: it is unjustified belief. Non contingent or theistic faith. Only ignorance or embarrassment keeps theists from conceding this. It is a fallacy of equivocation to turn to other colloquial definitions in the dictionary, because those other definitions do not pertain to supernatural beliefs.

The dictionary captures theistic faith in 2b. All the other definitions have nothing to do with theistic faith.

Here's a key point that theists, who cite the dictionary, miss:

Dictionaries exist to provide definitions of words. They provide ALL the common definitions that people might use. dictionaries do not provide a rigorous philosophical justification for how each word should be used, and in which context.

Citing definition 1, in matters of theology, is an equivocation fallacy.

Why must this be so? Several reasons.

1) If 'faith' is merely another word for knowledge, then why use the word at all? Why does your bible prize faith specifically, and at times, even question the value of knowledge, if faith is knowledge?

2) The theist has a need for non contingent belief, as there can be no inductive grounds to support a belief in the supernatural. Induction assumes causality. The supernatural is acausal. Therefore, there is an impassable gap between 'evidence' and 'god'... Kierkegaard called this the 'leap of faith'

So the theist has no choice here.

3) St. Paul himself makes it clear that faith is hope - i.e. not evidence.

Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

Hebrews 11:1.

 

If you read the entirety of this chapter, Paul gives a series of examples of how faith works:

11:2 For by it the elders obtained a good report. 
11:3 Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear. 
11:4 By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts: and by it he being dead yet speaketh

 

Here Paul states, clearly, that through faith one can move from what we see, to what we cannot see. (Again, look at Kierkegaard's analysis)

Through faith, the bible patriachs were able to do their works, and through faith, amazing miracles occurr:

11:5 By faith Enoch was translated that he should not see death; and was not found, because God had translated him: for before his translation he had this testimony, that he pleased God.

Without faith, one cannot believe in a god, or trust that this belief will be rewarded:

11:6 But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.

Now let's look at the book of Romans

8:22 For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now.

8:22 refers to the fact that there unsaved people.

8:23 And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.

8:23 Even the saved feel pain, and struggle... so there are often reasons to reject this christian belief.

BUT

Romans 8:24-25: “For we were saved in this hope, but hope that is seen is not hope; for why does one still hope for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we eagerly wait for it with perseverance.” (NKJV)

Here Paul states plainly: despite the fact that there are reasons to doubt, we hold to our hope. Why would one hope, if one had evidence?

 

In fact, we often don't really even know what we should be wishing for:

 

8:26 Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.

 

So basically, faith is unjustified belief, and it clearly has to be unjustified, otherwise, why are we still hoping for something that we know to be true?!

 

It's painfully obvious that faith is unjustified belief.

 

Please also note: it's the atheist citing the bible.....! Again!

 

"Hitler burned people like Anne Frank, for that we call him evil.
"God" burns Anne Frank eternally. For that, theists call him 'good.'


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buster wrote:How about

buster wrote:

How about the differences in how we define evidence... and why some conclusions, lines of thinking, and people are rational or not.

We define evidence the same, I believe. The problem is that nothing natural can point to the supernatural, ergo there can be no inductive evidence for a god. There can only be arguments from ignorance - and even some theists concede that the process must be negative.

As for assumptions, and the fact that all systems of 'thought' rely on them, here is how naturalistic assumptions differ from theistic assumptions, and why the two sets of assumptions are not equivalent.

There are two types in my estimation: axiomatic knowledge, and basic assumptions that are not defended through retortion.

Axioms of reason would include the axiom of existence, identity and sentience.

Unfortunately, these axioms don't tell us anything about the 'world' around us, other than that 'something' exists, that whatever exists, exists as one thing and not another, and that these deductive truths demonstrate that we, the gleaner of these axioms, must be aware, seeing as we are aware of these axioms. If all we wanted out of life was a very basic metaphysic grounded in bedrock certainty, we would be content. If we want more, we must move past these axioms, and risk error.

And this is where a naturalist foundationalist would move to basic assumptions: self evident 'first principles' - beliefs that any natural being seems forced to make in order to operate in the world.

(Note: not all naturalists are foundationalists, see how complex this discussion really is?)

Hearing this, some might hold that since we must start with assumpotons, this somehow grants us a freedom to assume whatever we like. However, this is a ridiculous strawman of the situation. While there are no deductive proofs for naturalistic assumptions, this does not mean that they are accepted without any grounds at all! And this is the basic error in theistic claims for equity between their assumptions, and naturalistic assumptions.

Let's look at how wrong their claim is:

1) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would only justifies what is required in order to begin knowing the world.

If, for example, there is in fact a need to assume the existence of other first person ontology other than my own, this assumption only allows me to assume whatever is needed to unpack first person ontology, nothing more.

2) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world naturally would not justify ever holding to an assumption that fails to adequately account for reality.

This is where pragmatism enters into any foundationalist approach to justifying knowledge. No naturalist would continue to hold to an assumption that simply failed to work.

3) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would not justify making any assumption that violated what we know of the world through rational-empirical methods.

Consider Stephen Hawkings here, in his description of speculative cosmological theory:

There are cosmological models that have as much evidence going for them as astrology. They differ from astrology, however, in that they do not violate what we already know of the universe. - Universe in a Nutshell.

4) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would not justify any supernatural or 'transcendent' assumption. Why? Because these terms, "supernatural" andr 'transcedent are defined from the outset, in such a way that they preclude the possibility of holding to them as 'properly basic beliefs' because each definition is a negative definition, devoid of any universe of discourse.

To clarify further:

A negative definition requires a universe of discourse for it to be able to tell us 'anything'. For example, if I hold out a box with two objects, a penny and a pencil and rule out the penny as the object I want to point out to you, the universe of discourse (items in the box) provides you with information concerning what the object in question 'is" - the pencil.

However, a negative definition devoid of any universe of discourse is necessarily meaningless. There's 'nothing' left over for it to 'be', so the definiton cannot provide any ontological status. So, to go right to the heart of the matter, to say that the 'supernatural' is the antithesis of nature is to render the concept meaningless.

Review:

So, to review: a naturalist only assumes what is needed in order to active a particular system of thought, she drops any any assumption that is falsified*, she does not asume what appears to contradict what we know of the world, and she never assumes what violates basic ontology itself.

So, in finally answer the question: are these beliefs unjustified, I can say this: Yes, these beliefs are basic and they are unjustified in the epistemological sense in that there is no set of proofs or inductive evidence for them. But the claim that these beliefs are 'unjustified' in the colloquial sense of the word: that there's NO reason to hold to them! They are taken on faith!", is rendered nonsensical.

 

"Hitler burned people like Anne Frank, for that we call him evil.
"God" burns Anne Frank eternally. For that, theists call him 'good.'


buster
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Wow! I applaud you sir!

Wow! I applaud you sir! You've given me quite a bit to digest and boy is it tasty. I'm going to look up foundationalists, because I want to see exactly how complex the conversation is Smiling

Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.
Thomas Jefferson


todangst
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buster wrote: Wow! I

buster wrote:
Wow! I applaud you sir! You've given me quite a bit to digest and boy is it tasty. I'm going to look up foundationalists, because I want to see exactly how complex the conversation is Smiling

 

Glad to hear it. Just take a look at how different a naturalistic assumption is from a supernatural assumption: it shows how weak the claim for equity is...

 

As for foundationalism, take a look here:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundationalism 

Wiki's not the best site, but it's not a bad starting point. 

Theists assume that most naturalists are foundationalists... I don't know if that's true or not.

From the wiki site:

Alternatives to foundationalism

Alternatives to foundationalism, usually called Anti-foundationalism, include coherentism, reformed epistemology and reliabilism (though this has sometimes been construed as an unusual variant of foundationalism). Contextualism (or, in a stripped-down version, the blind posits theory) is the epistemological version of relativism; relativism is more often regarded as a theory of truth than as a theory of justification or knowledge. Also see Pragmatism.

 

"Hitler burned people like Anne Frank, for that we call him evil.
"God" burns Anne Frank eternally. For that, theists call him 'good.'