PLEASE MAKE
SURE TO
FOLLOW THE
RULES!
RULES
This is the
Kill Em
With
Kindness
Forum!
PLEASE MAKE
SURE TO
FOLLOW THE
RULES!
RULES
This is the
Kill Em
With
Kindness
Forum!
PLEASE MAKE
SURE TO
FOLLOW THE
RULES!
This is the
Kill Em
With
Kindness
Forum!
RULES
PLEASE MAKE
SURE TO
FOLLOW THE
RULES!
This is the
Kill Em
With
Kindness
Forum!
PLEASE MAKE
SURE TO
FOLLOW THE
RULES!
RULES
This is the
Kill Em
With
Kindness
Forum!
PLEASE MAKE
SURE TO
FOLLOW THE
RULES!
Gravity further relies on space and mass for the attraction between bodies to exist. These further rely on something else to exist...ect. until the First Cause.
Gravity is a net force only when space and matter exist. What put matter and space together in such a way that matter began?
Yours In Christ, Eternal Wisdom,
StMichael
Psalm 50(1):8. For behold thou hast loved truth: the uncertain and hidden things of thy wisdom thou hast made manifest to me.
I intend to reply in the next few days.
If 'know' is understood in a sufficient general sense (e.g. 'to possess and be able to utilize information' ), I am aware of no reason why a machine (like a brain or a computer) could not know all the bodies a mind can know.
It is not my position that the mind is a sense organ. My position is that the mind is what the brain does. The brain is not a sense organ and what the brain does is not identical with what the brain is.
If by knowing universals is meant the utilization of universals in cognitive processes, I see no reason why this should be beyond the abilities of a machine. If something more profound is meant by knowing, it becomes hard to show that the mind indeed 'knows' universals in such a sense.
An end can be posited for any phenomenon. It does not mean that everything is driven by an intelligence. We can distinguish between agent-driven phenomena and not-agent driven phenomena, and a rock falling is of the latter kind. The demarcation criterion is the one which I mentioned earlier: if the assumption of intelligence works as a cognitive shortcut for predicting the phenomenon, the phenomenon is driven by an intelligence.
Agency is synonymous with intelligibility through the intentional stance. The economy criterion does not merely indicate agency; it is a definition of agency.
Not less economic, but not more economic either. Contrast this with saying 'What is the time?' to a human. We can posit agency and make an educated guess about what he will do. This is much more efficient than trying to understand the person as a molecular machine, in which case we would spend the rest of our natural lives trying to figure out the neural impulses flowing through his brain and never get anywhere.
This is why a human's reaction to 'What is the time?' should be considered the act of an agent why the fall of a rock should not.
There is no reason to posit an intention because it would not help us anticipate the behaviour of the rock.
It is a strange definition of action indeed that does not assume change. Do you have any uncontroversial examples of actions without change?
Agents must process information and they must act. Stability per se does neither. Stability can therefore not be an agent.
Indeed they must correspond to reality. This is not a problem for materialism.
If positing a purple snarfwidget really made predictions which help one fry toast, the purple snarfwidget hypothesis would probably be onto something. But of course it does no such thing.
The existence of subjective preferences is scarcely controversial.
But you beg the question of how true ideas are true. If ideas are merely infectious material entities, there can be no ground even to determine what is more of less “fitness-increasing.”
For natural selection to take place it is not necessary for anyone to have a concept of fitness or of anything else for that matter. Natural selection had been going on for four billion years on this planet before we even got here with our words and ideas.
The terms hold no meaning and speech between agents would be impossible.
That does not follow. If two minds tend to conceptualize the same kinds of things, they can learn to recognize each other's concepts. When they do that, discourse becomes possible.
Perfect coincidence of concepts is not required for communication. It suffices to have some degree of overlap. This is evident when one thinks about foreign languages. For example, while the Japanese "水" (mizu) is not quite synonymous with the English "water", an English speaker who does not speak Japanese can avoid death by dehydration if he just assumes it means roughly the same as "water".
Setting aside the fact that the wording is yours and not mine, I am not making unfalsifiable claims. My claim "It makes no sense to ask 'is p true' if p is unfalsifiable" could be falsified by showing a criterion by which the veracity of unfalsifiable claims can meaningfully by evaluated.