ubuntuAnyone,

I am actually going to bow out of this discussion for now because I am working on a much more complicated and sustained argument, which I may post on these forums when I have time.

IC XC

David

MoL,

Doesn't the fact that people have written books claiming to understand this being you call God provide counterexamples for your "something outside our understanding" claim?

The writers of the Bible and Koran, for example, claim that we can understand God by reading their words. How can this be if he/she/it is "beyond out understanding"?

It strengthens my question to you also - If people could write books claiming about their gods and how those gods wanted you to live - how can these beings be outside of thought?

Thanks for clarifying.

The argument is for the existence of an ontological notion (the referent)  based on an an epistemic notion (the concept).  This does not prove the existence of the referent--It simple defines it. If this is the case, all one needs to do is select any notion that exists outside of thought and define it as such for that object to exist. But this basically makes the referent a figment of one's imagination rather than saying anything about its ontological status--that is does it exist or not. In short, this is putting epistemology before ontology-- that is trying to define something into existence rather than define something that already exists.

A side note: If you are going for some sort Kantian idealism, don't. Your argument dies if all minds die because it is not longer grounded according to Kant. But if you go for a modified Kantian idealism that attempts to ground things in an eternal mind, then I think you'll end up question begging with any sort of proofs for such things.

I do not see anything wrong with making the epistemic leap from ideas to things.  Apply it elsewhere and it does not seem problematic at all.  Let's say that your friend just adopted a dog but tells you that this particular dog is not a Canidae.  You can disprove him simply by invoking the concept itself, even if you have yet to observe this actual dog.  Otherwise, your friend has a dog that is not a dog. 

Likewise, our knowledge of God's existence need not trade on an actual experience of his presence.  Any claim of God's non-existence can be disproven by simply invoking the God concept and pointing out that God, as understood by the theist, does not meet the aforementioned criteria for non-existence.  If it were possible for God to meet such criteria, then the God that an atheist would accept as real would not be God.

My thesis is simple:  If you cannot deny the existence of God without self-contradiction, then God exists. 

It works the same way with anything else: If you cannot deny that a dog is a Canidae without self-contradiction, then a dog is a Canidea.  If you cannot deny that Obama is our president without self-contradiction, then Obama is our president.  If you cannot deny that Tom Hanks is Forrest Gump without self-contradiction, then Tom Hanks is Forrest Gump.

For any proposition x, if x cannot be denied without self-contradiction, then x is true.

P.S.

I am not a transcendental idealist. 

Transcendental idealism, which is the view that space/time is based upon our minds and constitutes the means through which we structure our experience of the outside world, seems to trade on theories of space and time superseded by General Relativity, which show that space, time, and matter are all correlated.  Beyond the idealism, Kant's vision of space was probably the Newtonian vision of space as being purely three dimensional and infinitely large.  Special Relativity shows that time is a fourth dimension of space and General Relativity shows that space is equally dependent upon the distribution of matter for it to be stretched out. 

I think Kant would have rejected his idealism had he been aware of the theory of relativity and of Darwinian evolution, under which he could argue for the usefulness of morality without invoking religion.  Had Kant lived long enough, he probably would have become an atheist.

I do not think it is special pleading because if anything, including a chimera, was such that its existence could not be denied without self-contradiction, then I would say that this thing exists. 

As I recall, later on in the conversation between me and Nigel, I did not explicitly deny the existence of a chimera, I just simply could not affirm it because such a being's non-existence could be accounted for under one of the three qualifications that I've listed, namely that the existence of such a being is dependent upon conditions of the world.  Theoretically, a chimera is a material thing.  Material things, first of all, require space and time in order to exist.  Second, material things are forms under particular arrangements of matter, in which case you'd have to ask, "Why this form instead of some other?"  As such, a chimera would not be self-existent.  Based on those properties assigned to a chimera, you could not evaluate its existence in the same way that you'd evaluate the existence of God.

The main difference is that the existence of a chimera can be denied without self-contradiction.  If I deny the existence of a chimera and a chimera ends up existing in some part of the world that I have not observed, my proposition was then not falsified a priori by the law of non-contradiction, it was falsified a posteriori by the state of the world, which can only be done if its existence is dependent upon the state of the world, which it is. 

It does not just stop at being immaterial.  Functionally, we can say that electrons are immaterial (I know they are not, but I'm strictly speaking at a functional level here) because we can never observe them, yet their existence is still dependent upon conditions of the world. 

In Christianity, some angels are immaterial, but they were created by God. 

As such, you can deny their existence without self-contradiction.

Are fairies also self-existent, fully actualized, immutable, eternal, and indivisible?

The same applies with this example.  

I may make some further revisions to the argument so as to incorporate the epistemological issues that are tied in with the argument.  My argument is a corollary of the modal ontological argument, but I figured that an argument structured in this way would be much easier to understand.

I do not commit to naturalistic empiricism, as I do not accept that empirical observation is the only way that truth can be known.  The existence of a chimera is couched with empiricism because a posteriori truths, such as the existence of a chimera, deal specifically with contingent things.  You observe whether or not such a being exists because you have an unspoken presupposition that the world has to be a specific way in order for this being to exist.  Otherwise, there would be no need for you to make the investigation because the existence of this being would not in this way be qualified.  God is non-contingent and therefore is not a proper subject of empirical investigation.  The existence of God cannot in this way be qualified or else you are claiming that God is contingent.  If a chimera is non-contingent, then these same standards would apply to a chimera.

The answer is that you need to stop being a naturalist, it's a self-refuting position to have, since the truth of naturalism itself does not show up in the world.  Therefore, it cannot be the case that you deny the existence of anything until it shows up in the world.

At the very least, you need to address my premises and explain how the concept of God, if not meeting the criteria for non-existence previously mentioned, can possibly not refer to something outside of my thoughts.

I know they are material, but I can't think of how a human being could possibly observe an elementary particle, even under a microscope.

Angels are created by God.  As such, they are contingent beings and it is possible for them not to exist.

That's fine, but it is not my position that the existence of any immaterial thing cannot be denied without self-contradiction.

Hi David.

There is no Christian doctrine, that I know of, which states that God is known only through revelation. 

St. Thomas Aquinas, probably the greatest Christian apologist of his time, stated that while certain truths can only be known through God's revelation, his existence can be known just through reason (Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, Q2):

"The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated."

In the article, Aquinas specifically cites Romans 1:20, which states, "For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse."

In 1 Peter 3:15, which states, "Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect", we are called upon to defend the faith, using reason. 

There is a sense in which reason and nature constitute a revelation from God, since God is the ultimate source of reason and nature.  However, this would fall under the category of general revelation, whereas I presume you were talking about special revelation.  If not, then I think you've misunderstood the nature of God's revelation to humanity because, under the Christian understanding, it allows for us to reason to God's existence and, if general revelation is true, then the existence of God should be known a priori.

If God is not within the scope of logic, then there is no reason to believe in him.  God must be subjected to the same logic as everything else.  Everything has a modality, including God.

"Today within evangelicalism there is a new epidemic spread by thinkers who argue that since God is a higher order of being from us, real contradictions may be resolved in his mind-- that God is not bound by the human rules of logic.  Such a view sounds pious, but it effectively undermines the entire biblical revelation.  If contradictions can be reconciled in the mind of God, then we cannot trust a word of Scripture, for in God's mind Christ might also be the antichrist (RC Sproul, Defending the Faith)."

In that same book, RC Sproul separates faith into three levels.  There is the level of content, which is knowing exactly what it is that you are being asked to believe (i.e. the existence of God, the resurrection of Christ, original sin, etc.)  Then there is the level of intellectual assent, which is affirming the content.  Finally, there is the level of a personal relationship with God, which is accomplished only through the work of the Holy Spirit.  Providing the content and intellectual assent, however, is the task of apologists and this requires one to defend the faith using a solid logical foundation.  Faith itself involves an affirmation of various propositions, which are not treated in Christianity as things that we should accept blindly.

We know what God is, we just simply cannot know what God is like or what it is like to be God.  According to the Bible, God shares our qualities.  Like us, he is intelligent, moral, acts without constraint, and experiences emotions.  The difference is that he possesses these qualities in an infinitely greater sense than we do.  Under the parameters of our own finitude, then, we can have somewhat of an idea about such qualities because we experience them in limited instances, i.e. though none of us are omnipotent, we've experienced examples of limited power being exerted over something.  In essence, the terms describing the qualities are analogical.  They mean similar things when applied to God, but are not identical in meaning.

I was showing that I have no reason to commit to one epistemology over another, and if this is the case, I have no reason to accept your epistemology. That being said, you're asking me then to arbitrarily select one implicitly or otherwise. In that case I choose naturalistic epistemology, so the object in question is absurd. So in short, you're asking me to believe an absurd object exist so my existence is not self-contradictory. But at the same time you're asking me to use an empirical epistemology one place and another in another place. Why can't I use one for both cases...at least this way I'm consistent. If I adopt a naturalistic epistemology, the idea of an immaterial being collapses into absurdity. To me, this is special pleading...

I think Decartes and the other aforementioned existentialistic philosophers realized the uncertainty of such and rejected it for something else.

I think you need to expound on this. What do you mean by "the truth of naturalism itself does not show up in the world"? Because as far as naturalists are concerned, it shows up everywhere. I could speculate as to what you are getting at, but I'll let you flesh this out.

I was supposing not that the concept exist outside of thought, but for a given epistemology the concept is absurd. But according to the argument, I have to embrace an absurd idea so my existence is not contradictory.

Observation, when detecting particles etc, is not limited to microscopes. There are numerous ways to detect elementary particles. Google the development of the Bohr model of the atom. I know you were wanting to study physics..

That does not explain how though...

The reason I'm pushing for this, is that the only way to deny such things is a priori. But that being said, no matter how internally contradictory or consistent the necessary immaterial being may be, you're arguing that it must exist for me to exist without self-contradiction. In any case, at some point one has to do plead ignorance or reject the notion outright.

The whole purpose of this argument is to provide a solid epistemological foundation for the existence of God.  By presenting the argument, I am giving you a reason.  It is not arbitrary.  I'm presenting to you an actual criteria, which I presume you would accept for anything else.  If I asked you why you believe a chimera does not exist, you would more than likely cite the fact that evolution and natural selection have not provided the sufficient conditions for such a being to come about.  If I asked you why a married bachelor does not exist, you'd probably cite the fact that it is a contradictory concept.  If I asked you why the a perfect circle does not exist, you'd probably cite the fact that it is an abstract idea.  In the case of a chimera, such a being may exist, but given the non-existence of a chimera, you would probably account for it in the way that I've cited. 

If God does not exist, what is the reason?  Has he not been caused?  Or is the concept logically contradictory?  Or is it an abstract idea? 

If you cannot give me an answer, then simply invoking empiricism is not good enough, as this would pull the rug right out from under empiricism.  We are then able to know that something exists without having to observe it.

A subset of naturalism is logical positivism, which is what you are endorsing here.  At the heart of logical positivism was the principle of verification, which states that only those statements which can be empirically verified are meaningful.  The problem is that the principle of verification fails to meet its own criteria.  The principle itself cannot be empirically verified and therefore, by the logic of logical positivists, it has no meaning.

Again, one of the purposes of arguments for the existence of God is to pull the rug out from under epistemologies which state either that such a being does not exist or that the existence of such a being cannot be known.  To address the argument, you cannot cite a worldview.  Rather, you'd have to justify your worldview in light of the argument being presented.  Do you disagree that statement about non-existence are meaningful only if they are understood in terms of ideas not having referents?  If not, can you offer any other option which could account for the non-existence of God?

Ok.  I'll retract my previous statement about us not being able to observe an electron.

I cannot go into the mechanics of how God does the things that he does.  My knowledge of God, as you know, does not come strictly from empirical observation.  And my guess is that even if I was to empirically observe God in action, I would still not understand how he does what he does.  I would only know that he does it. 

I disagree.  Thoughts are immaterial and if I asked someone, "Are you thinking what I'm thinking?" and she said, "No", then I will have affirmed, as much as something can be affirmed a posteriori, that an immaterial thing does not exist. 

I understand that from your perspective, you probably regard thoughts as being material things, but if you are trying to represent my worldview, then I could conceive of ways to deny a posteriori that immaterial things exist.  Of course, the existence of God is of a completely different ilk and I will grant that the existence of God cannot be denied strictly on empirical grounds.

However, you could empirically disprove Christianity.  If you were to dig up Jesus' corpse, then you have empirically proven that Jesus never resurrected and the whole foundation for Christianity collapses.

Meaning_Of_Life,

Please do not interpret my brevity as impatience.  I do not have time to respond to your points in the detail they deserve, but I will list a couple of salient points for your consideration:

We need to draw a distinction between Reason and reasons.  I am sure you will agree that the former refers to a faculty of the soul that is analytical and conceptual.  But a person can have reasons for action or belief that do not stem from rational processes; I suppose these refer just to what impels him to act or believe and not to the process of analysis itself.  I affirm that believe can be reasonable in the sense that a person has reasons (even good ones) for belief, but I reject on principle the notion that the existence of God and an enumeration of His properties can be derived from reason alone.

Perhaps you are unfamiliar with this doctrine, but a core tenet of my Church is that the essence of God is incomprehensible (beyond the scope of reason and logic) and ineffable, or incapable of verbal expression.  It seems to me that your view would only gain traction if we assumed that there is analogy between essence of God and our essence, but I reject this assumption.  It is because God is beyond the scope of reason and logic, though by no means contrary to it, that all terms that refer to "What He Is" are nonsense.  God is not identified as omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent (so these cannot be debated from a rational perspective) but these are properties which He does manifest through His Divine Actions.  I am not committed to Thomism and reject Aquinas' interpretation of Romans 1:20 for the much older, Christocentric exegesis of St. Ambrose of Milan, which connects the "invisible qualities of God" to the works of Christ (see On the Mysteries III:.  Likewise, St. John of Damascus quotes the Evangelist in Exact Exposition Of the Orthodox Faith, that "No one has seen God at any time; the Only-begotten Son, Which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him" (Jn 1:18). St. John then goes on to add that "The deity, therefore, is ineffable and incomprehensible" (De Fide Book I, Chapter I).  I believe incomprehensible means that reason cannot comprehend it.  I will flesh out my arguments later.  More anon.

ubuntuAnyone,

Up to this point I have accomodated myself to the language of these forums, but here is some food for thought.  Either someone (or something) is contingent or noncontingent, right?  The problem here is not really with the terms, contingent and noncontingent, but with the concept of God as noncontingent being.  In fact, God is not a being.  If we are to get technical about it, He does not even "exist" -- if that term is taken to refer to the realm of being, then God "exists" in completely different mode, one that is inaccessible to humans, except through His divine revelation.  The idea is not original to me but is an ancient Christian tradition that has been preserved in the 21st century.  A central tenet of the Christian faith is that God in Himself is incomprehensible and ineffable, and that the full revelation of God is in the person of Jesus Christ, but if someone is essentially incomprehensible and ineffable, then at that point all language -- as a tool of reason -- breaks down and is inapplicable.  This when we speak of attributes or properties we need to be careful not to identify these with some abstract impersonal essence or a definition of God or a delineation of the divine essence.  In the earliest texts there is an indication that no one -- not even angels -- can penetrate to the divine essence and that all we know about God is revealed through actions which manifest said properties.  I will dig up some documentation later, but no this is not unique to me.

IC XC

David

But the points he makes here are a pretty good summation of what many christians believe. It's a useful position from the christian point of view because it puts itself beyond human reason and beyond comprehension and utterly beyond debate. The challenge for me is that while we are told we must accept this unknowable thing, we are then told that we can know, and the place we can have full revelation of divine essence is in our feelings about jesus. Our feelings of human love for jesus because he died for us. From the rationalist's perspective this makes the unravelling of feelings an interesting exercise.

As part of this, what I wonder is whether people like jesus David and Meaning of Life came to their faith on bended knee arguing with themselves about contingent beings and the ineffability of an exo-universal non-being. Or whether they just came humbly to jesus with tears in their eyes after some pointed sermonising spiced with ad homs and threats that convinced them, finally, of their failings and filled them with a fear of the potential punishment they were now convinced they deserved. And upon accepting jesus had died to absolve them of these sins and thus saved them from god's unknowable but somehow comprehensibly perfectly just wrath, were subsequently filled with a feeling of human love and deep gratitude towards jesus.

I think the latter is the case and the enormously complex strengthening process came after. You could not go on bended knee to a non-being that is beyond verbal expression, and beg him to save awful, worthless, hateful you, could you? 

Then there's jesus David's suggestion that god's divine essence is only to be known through actions which manifest given properties. But this is a contention that carries a negative weight as well as a positive. It's hard to imagine a divine essence having anything to do with what's going on around here. Or coming up with the bizarre course of events which have led to this place. The mythology of the bible is not helpful.

As I follow this thread through all its twists and turns, nothing new is revealed, there is only the cementing of ancient opinions, the warming up of old threats, and the trundling out of swathes of jargon in place of facts. The great truth, we are told, is that that facts are worthless and the real truth about god can only be known subjectively in the human mind. Given that gods are really only represented on earth symbolically, through signs, or through acts undertaken by 'representatives on earth', I guess none of this should come as any great surprise. 

My contention with epistemology was not over your epistemology, but over epistemology in general. In other words, there is no reason I cannot arbitrarily choose one because this is putting epistemology before ontology. Typically, things work the other way such that ontology grounds epistemology.

But I'm not even sure you're projcet can get off the ground a priori, because I think it requires empiricism to understand. That is, to say something is "immaterial" semantically requires knowledge of the material, and part of the reason I've been pushing such things. It is similar to the notion of "atheism": the notion is contingent upon the existence of "theism". If idea theism didn't exist, then we'd all be defacto atheists, but the idea of atheism would be nonsensical.

But at the same time, one needs not invoke god idea such as yours to understand being. String theory provides simpler explanation for my existence to be non-contradictory, therefore it should be preferred.

That commits about 10 fallacies...need I name them? Fallacy of composition, a genetic fallacy, a red herring...

Methodological naturalism does not necessarily embrace the principle of verification as the positivist did, that is as an a priori principle. There are mitigated forms of this, and for most naturalist, these are best. To say otherwise would require one to be omniscient. The mitigated principle is verified empirically to the degree of ever decreasing probabilities. This is question begging, but when faced with a Münchhausen Trilemma, those who embrace such things choose question begging because one would have to be omniscient other, and we're certainly not....

What I was doing was showing a weakness in your argument, in that it supposes epistemology before ontology, which does not ground anything that you say in any reality, unless of course you want to start question begging then...If that's the case, any epistemology is fair game. Also, don't confuse a worldview (that is one's epistemology and ontology) with epistemology alone....

From an ontological point of view though, string theory seems to provide a competing explanation.

This is (a) a punt to ignorance as I mentioned that one eventually must do, and (b) is precisely why some embrace methodological naturalism for epistemology because because a "how" exists.

If all brains ceased to exist, then do ideas exist? The only way you get that is if you have some sort of immaterial brain. If you press for this though, then I think you will end up begging the question.

The abstraction of such things is a plaything for philosophers...but the mechanics of such things are purely biological for human beings. There's work to done here....

MoL, I know why you don't reply to me and that's fine. I read enough of your early posts to appreciate you place no value in naturalistic empericism and it was obvious my position would be of no interest to you. Regardless, Ubuntu, Nigel and co's core opinions are no different to mine.

As for gaining your approbabtion, MoL, your position is so singular and so impossible to prove, the idea you would want to bandy facts with anyone is a laugh. You just maunder about with your philosophical assumptions all you like and I will continue to comment. I wouldn't want people to think your overweening confidence in your zero-proof model has a greater veracity than any other human fancy. 

Contrary to your opinion, I have a solid understanding of what the other side believes but I happen to think it makes absolutely no sense for that side to continue insisting they can rationally know the unknowable god. For you to suggest I should not ask for facts when you insist there can be no facts about god is an interesting underscore of your side of the argument. I can readily enough encompass the meaning of this argument and its importance to your case in the absence of actual proof, I just think it's ridiculous.

If you want to have a debate specifically about the development of human morality, feel free. There is no proof morality has been gifted upon humanity by god and every proof it's a cultural development with fundamental values for human survival. We see parents and teachers influencing the development of morality in children wherever we look. Do we see god dishing up human morality? We do not. Do we see that god was invested with human morality? Yes, MoL. We do.

Guys like MoL and David and elsewhere, freeminer, are thoroughly intelligent people.

It's a topic for another time but it seems more likely to me that hell won't be populated by evil men but by those of us with insufficient spiritual transcendence to suspend what we think of as reality.

It offends me that god people insist this variation in neurobiology comes down to a moral choice between following the teachings of jesus or living a life of complete depravity, with eternal immolation as its certain reward.

I agree with you about the circular argument. Trouble is, while we are bound to ensure our theories do not outrun our evidence, spirituality has no such constraints. Where we reach a point we must say we do not know, the god people say we are irrational and their theories take flight. 

Atheistextremist,

Of course I didn't debate noncontingency / contingency before "becoming a Christian."  My parents raised me Christian.  It is just as many atheists do not debate scientific paradigms and facts before they become atheists.  Some religion or preacher or Christian friend just sort of... screwed them over.  We all have our subjective reasons for belief, but when I flesh out what I have written here in a separate post (for, as you wrote, is it not apropos here) what will matter is the points I make, not whether or not I personally had tears in my eye walking up some aisle.

IC XC

David

Jcgadfly,

Do you dislike it when theists psychoanalyze your reasons for disbelief?  Or do you believe soundbyte polemic to be constructive to dialog?

IC XC

David

Adventures in missing the point.

Of course many people were raised to believe in a particular faith.  And many people become atheists purely subjective reasons for their disbelief in God - which is what the above example is supposed to show.  Irrationality is an equal opportunity employer, so I am suspicious of the (what seems to be) exclusive claim made by atheists that their belief is rational while theist belief must be based on some weepy willow experience they had as a young adult or something.  The point is, this is irrelevant to the truth of theism so I wish people would stop bringing it up.  I could offer mountains of anecdotal evidence from all the atheists I've encountered whose reasons for disbelief boil down to, I was raised in a Christian home but the man was just trying to bring me down.  Atheists need to disabuse themselves of the notion that their beliefs are not tied to subjective experience or that their subjective experience is privileged with "being rational" while the theist or Christian's is not; it's demonstrably false.  If you don't think it's constructive of me to tell you how many atheists simply have no better reason for their belief than some childhood grudge, despite their claims to rationality, then why do atheists do it me all the time?  There's a difference between criticizing based on anecdotal evidence and soundbytes on the evils / stupidity of religion, and making an argument.  The difference is, the former is not making an argument.  Not very rational, is it?

IC XC

David

jcgadfly,

If by "rational approach to theism," you mean to indicate that the deity can be approached through reason, then I reject this assumption.  If by a rational approach you mean an approach which fits within your particular framework of what constitutes "rational," then no, of course I do not have that kind of "rational approach" - why would I?  My belief starts with a personal God, yours starts (maybe) from the primacy of reason and probably a dose of naturalist empiricism.  To those who demand a rational evaluation of each side, both will appear to stem from arbitrary first principles.  Your point of reference has to start somewhere that cannot be proven and mine does too, but mine does not start where yours does so dialog is pointless unless it is a simple discussion of differences amongst beliefs or even points of reference.  If I believe that God provides a sort of "foundation" for reason, that means He is higher than reason - as its source - and hence I will not logically or chronologically begin with reason but prior to it.

An important point to keep in mind is that a belief does not need to be proven for it to be true and there does not need to be evidence for belief to be true.  Truth is independent of provability and evidence.  You may not personally believe something unless it is proven or there is evidence for the belief, but as a matter of pure logic a belief does not depend on being provable or evidenced in order to be true.  Once we pare down our beliefs only to those which can be proven via experience or deductive logic or demonstrated through evidence, then we have very beliefs at all.  Even the belief that things must be proven this way is not furnished by the very artifacts which are supposed to provide the "proof."  I hold on principled grounds that my belief in God is unprovable with rational satisfaction and that, if God could be proven to exist through the use of reason, then the Christian God would not exist.  It makes no difference to me that God cannot be proven to exist with rational satisfaction, since plenty of the beliefs I take for granted cannot be proven to exist with rational satisfaction.  By rational satisfaction I mean that it lays to rest all possible rational objections.  A person can argue with me that I have consciousness and that my brain is not just a bunch of neurons firing this way and that, but despite his argument he does not lay to rest all possible rational objections.  So for me it is more important to believe something that is true, but this does not require rational proof or evidence.  Furthermore knowledge itself does not require certainty via rational deduction or that my beliefs are evidenced.  There are more "reasons" to believe in, or say that one knows, something other than Reason.

IC XC

David

EDIT: Sorry this thread is getting off-topic, I will allow gadfly to respond more time and then respond either in a separate post or when I fully work out my case.

I'm not sure what you mean, but I'll assume that you are saying that existence is the grounds for knowledge, although I would not be exactly sure what you mean by that either.

If you mean that knowledge requires a knowing subject, then I would agree. 
If you are saying that a thing has to exist in order to be known by someone, then I would agree. 

If you are saying that no existing thing can be known unless it is empirically observed, then I disagree.  Simply asserting this is not going to defeat the argument.  In order to defeat the argument, you have to show how it is possible for something to not actually exist even when the existence of such a thing cannot be denied without self-contradiction.  If you cannot do that, then all the question begging in the world is not going to change the conclusion which necessarily follows.

All knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean that all knowledge is based on experience or that the truth values of all propositions are determined by experience.  For us, experience supersedes rational thought in the order of time, simply because our thinking is occurring through a physical medium, in this case, the brain.  However, logic itself is not based on experience; experience only serves to illuminate it.  For example, children may learn basic arithmetic by counting with their fingers, but that does not mean that the truth of "1 + 1 = 2" is based upon a child's fingers.  In this case, our experience of the world awakens us to the a priori truth of God's existence, which is not to say that the truth of God is ascertained first in the order of time, but it is to say that the proposition of God's existence is true in and of itself, regardless of when we come to affirm it.

What is string theory?

No it does not. 

A genetic fallacy would be if I said that because I know where your affirmation of the principle of verification originates, the principle is therefore false.  I never said anything like that.

A red herring would be if I changed the subject, which I did not do. 

A fallacy of composition would be if I said that parts of logical positivism are false and therefore the principle of verification must be false as well.  I never said anything like that.

I'm strictly challenging the principle of verification on the basis of it being self-refuting.  As far as I know, the principle itself is the essence of logical positivism and implicit in naturalism, which holds that everything has a natural explanation. 

Methodological naturalism does embrace an a priori principle.  It assumes, prior to experience (hence, a priori), that everything has a natural explanation.  As such, even if you were to give the methodological naturalist every reason to assume that something was supernatural, s/he would have to reject your proposal, simply because it goes against that particular methodology. 

But we are digressing here.  We should probably start a different thread about this.

Let's assume that my best friend is a brilliant engineer and, free of charge, builds me a computer.  I really do not care how he did it.  All I care about is why he did it  He did it in the spirit of our friendship.  That is what means the most to me and that is where I place the greatest value. 

Religion is not about the how.  It is about the why.  If how was important, then the Bible would have told us how God did it.

From my perspective, worldviews such as naturalism totally divest the world of any intrinstic value and words like "value" simply become meaningless labels which secular humanists attach to things in order to give the impression that the ramifications of their worldview are not really that bad.

But all of this is a topic for another thread.

I do not accept that thoughts necessarily require a brain.  Thoughts may be multiply realizable through several different mediums. 

I'm saying that what makes something true is whether or not actually exists--that is epistemology is grounded on ontology. What I'm supposing that if there is nothing to ground one's epistemology, then any possible epistemology is fair game. But if you suppose an ontology, I think you'll end up question begging, and the argument is little more than a rhetorical tautology--that is it is simply a definition rather than an argument.

There is nothing to prevent me from using whatever epistemology I prefer, and I supposed a naturalistic epistemology. Whether I'm committed to it or not is really not the issue. I was showing that if one opts for such things, then concepts like immaterial become nonsensical, and the idea in the second premise is incoherent. Basically then, one would be embracing incoherence to be coherent, but all in all, the whole system is incoherent.

There's no need for a special category for mathematics or logic. One could embrace such things as natural phenomenon on the same manner of thinking as one embraces other seemingly natural constants.

It's an attempt at a "theory of everything", one of the Holy Grail of physics. It attempts to unify the fundamental forces of nature into one understanding. In a nutshell, "strings" are one-dimensional entities that interact and such that the create "geometries" that create the dimensions that comprise the universe.

There's lots of good website out there on it, but here's one:

http://www.nuclecu.unam.mx/~alberto/physics/string.html

Genetic: Naturalist are wrong because the positivists were wrong because verificationism is self-refuting.

Red herring: It diverts attention to positivism, which is not the issue at hand....(see my comments below)

Fallacy of composition: Positivism may be a subset of methodological naturalism, and certainly not the only version of verification that exists... To think that tearing down one part of methodological naturalism defeats the whole commits the fallacy. As I recall you asserted that naturalism was self-defeating because verificationism was self-defeating, which is only true in the form given by the positivist.

I think you may need to expand your understanding of methodological naturalism. The hallmark of methodological naturalism is induction by empirical means, so there is very little room, if any at all, for any a priori truths. Some may goes as far to say that such a category does not even exist.  Even the position itself is held only because one at some point realized that he or she is learning by inductive means. But those who adhere to such things embrace a great deal of uncertainty about a great number of things.

This is why I said it was a red herring....

I think your analogy breaks down, because I can (if I wanted to) understand the "how" about the computer which I cannot do with what you're proposing, which is where I think the fundamental difference between what I was getting at in my objection concerning Nigel's chimera and the idea in premise 2 of your argument. (1) I have a "how" and (2) I'm being consistent in the treatment of the chimera and the idea in premise 2.

Gotcha.

The statement "what makes something true is whether or not it actually exists" has nothing to do with epistemology.  Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge.  Again, what is it that you mean when you say, "epistemology is grounded upon ontology"?  I've already mentioned several possibilities of what you may mean, but I'm still not sure.

You seem to have empiricism and naturalism confused with materialism.  Materalism is not an epistemology, it's a philosophy of ontology (or philosophy of existing things).  Empiricism and naturalism do not, by themselves, preclude immateriality.  Even under a materialist worldview, the concept of immaterial is not "nonsensical", it just does not refer to anything real. 

A logically contradictory concept is one that contains two mutually exclusive ideas.  If, according to the "God" concept, God was both material and immaterial, then you could argue that the idea is incoherent.  Likewise, if the idea of immateriality contained two mutually exclusive ideas, then you could argue that the concept is unintelligible.  Otherwise, I do not see where you are coming from.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you were claiming that because one has to learn things by experience before s/he can apply logical deduction (in this case, witnessing materiality before s/he can understand immateriality via logical deduction), it follows that those truths arrived at via logical deduction are based on experience.  I'm explaining to you why this is not necessarily the case, since the order of time has nothing to do with the order of justification. 

Okay.  Thank you.

But I should probably finish reading Physics for Dummies before I go into that.  I need to get the basics down.

That's not a genetic fallacy.  That is just a non-sequitur and it was not what I was trying to say.

What I'm saying is that naturalism is built on the same epistemology as logical positivism.  Naturalism is built upon an assumption that the only way truth can be known is through empirical observation.  It's implying the principle of verification.  Otherwise, you are claiming that there are a priori naturalistic explanations, which is impossible since a proposition can be a priori only if it its truth value cannot be otherwise (universal and necessary).  Naturalistic explanations are not universal and necessary.  There are possible worlds where different laws of nature exist.

You asked me to expound on my premise that the truth of naturalism does not show up in the world.  You asked the question and I gave an answer, so you cannot call it a diversion on my part.  Naturalism posits that everything has a natural explanation.  First of all, does the premise "everything has a natural explanation" also have a natural explanation?  Second, as I've already demonstrated, if every explanation is natural, then I really do not see how you cannot be endorsing the principle of verification, which I've already shown to be self-refuting.  How can you believe that the only explanations are naturalistic explanations and also believe that there are a priori truths?

What other versions of the principle of verification are there that are not self-refuting?

Naturalism is the belief that everything has a natural explanation.  In methodological naturalism, you are believing for the sake of a scientific investigation.  In other words, methodological naturalists are usually scientists who assume naturalism in the course of their scientific investigation so that they can avoid error, as they feel that allowing non-natural explanations into their methodology will not be practical.  Basically, they are not saying that naturalism is necessarily true, but they are assuming it to be true because assuming otherwise would increase the margin for error.  For example, they may presume that naturalism is true when they are trying to explain the origin of human life, but when they change the domain of discourse to morality, they can willingly let go of that presupposition.

Methodological naturalism is not really a worldview.  It is just a method.  As far as a worldview goes, you are either a naturalist or you are not.  The problem comes in when you apply this method in every domain of discourse.  You will obviously be a naturalist if you are going to reject every piece of evidence that does not fit with your presuppositions, for no other reason than that the evidence is supernatural.  If you apply methodological naturalism in this way, then there is no real difference between you being a methodological or metaphysical naturalist.

The point is, I am not concerned with how it was made and I'm not concerned with how God created the universe out of nothing.  Furthermore, you do not know that you cannot come to understand how God created ex nihilo.  Perhaps if you die and go live in the presence of God, then you'll come to understand it. 

Every theory of knowledge that I know about short of something like fideism derives knowledge from its relationship to ontology. The correspondence theory for instance holds that knowledge is the set of propositions that corresponds to reality. That is a statement about knowledge in relations to ontology, and the reason I think ontology needs to come first.

The objection I was making is that there is ontology to ground the definition so any epistemology because none are grounded. There is no reason then to think that any epistemology is better or worse than the other concerning actualized truth. I fear though that if you do suppose an ontology, then all your doing is question begging....

I'm supposing a naturalistic epistemology...that is not confusing such things like materialism (which is an ontology of sort). A naturalistic epistemology embraces induction through empirical means. It's pretty much a fore gone conclusion then that I have to use sensory perceptions to learn anything epistemologically speaking, which are material. Unless I have some sort of sense organ that can empirically sense the immaterial, any sort of knowledge about such things is categorically unobtainable, so it becomes rather nonsensical. At least with this sort of epistemology, there is a known limit to what one can obtain and call "knowledge"

When I say nonsensical, I'm referring to Chomsky's idea of nonsense, philosophically speaking. He asserted that sentences can be grammatically correct, but are otherwise non-coherent. His famous example, "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is grammatically correct, but communicates nothing intelligent. Under a naturalistic epistemology, something that is "immaterial" is like this.

No, I'm saying there is no need for special categories for logic and math...that is as axioms, transcendent ideas, or divine perfections or something like that. I was suggesting that such things are like seemingly natural constants like the gravitational constant, the electric charge of a electron, etc.

The logical fallacies were in response to this statement:

Now after have dialogued with you on this for a moment, I think I see how you arrived it it...and I think it is because you don't really understand how many who adhere to methodological naturalism understand the position.

Verification as put forth by the positvists asserted it more or less as an a priori position, but a mitigated form of this is possible in inductive means: that is to say that the things one is most certain of are the things that have been verified time and time again empirically. It is reasonable to believe (that is, it is inferred) then that the things that are verified time and time again are probably true. That is to say that verifcationism is verified empirically...It's a probabilistic understanding...nothing is assumed to be deductively true, rather held true until (a) it's falsified or (b) a better explanation comes along. This is a sort of question begging, but as I mentioned earlier when faced with a Münchhausen Trilemma, the one adhering to such things opts for a cohesivist perspective.

Gotcha.

EDIT:

Methdological naturalism is more or less the epistemological component of a naturalistic worldview. This does not necessarily mean that it is exclusive to naturalism as a worldview.

ubuntuAnyone,

My church has no doctrine as far as the Mac is concerned, but I have a personal dogma.  I won't quite say all fanboys are going to hell, but they sure make my life seem like one.

IC XC

David

I don't think that is necessarily the case. (1) I think a lot of empiricists, particularly the more radical variety couch those things that have been regarded as transcendental or a priori as things that are seemingly natural constants and (2) open to the possibility for knowledge from "beyond" so long as it's empirical.

When I was talking about theories of knowledge, I was referring to a more generic theory that could fit any number of various ontologies, because it is talking about reality. Reality, however, is defined differently by various different ontologies. Your statements like "All effects have a cause", "I exist", "Nothing can both be and not be", "Two and two equal four",  "The planets in our Solar System have eliptical orbits", "Light travels at 186,000 miles per second", and "All forces are equal", "E = MC^2" are all ontological statements and without an ototological referent are meaningless. If I say "chickafunks puddudle with chopweezles", I would be releuctant to call such a thing, "knowledge".

It simply define something independent of an ontological referent, which without does not create anything of meaning. If you suppose one, then you are likely begging the question.

It's not an analogy to Chomsky's statement, it is something of the same type under a certain epistemology. If you definition is removed from an ontological referent, the whole thing is meaningless. I'm not arguing for methodological naturalism or your epistemology. I'm saying that without a particular ontology then there is no reason to embrace one or the other. Making an ontological leap from epistemology into ontology creates circular reasoning if one supposes an ontology (that is one where "immaterial" is meaningful).

Why is the law of non-contradiction much more certain than empirical observation?

Also, what degree of certainty do you want? If something has been observed 100,000 times, and all 100,000 observers got the same result the certainty of that given observation is rather high.

The observation is a meta-observation concerning observations in general. Under your model. what makes you so certain about these statements: "All effects have a cause", "I exist", "Nothing can both be and not be", "Two and two equal four"?

The reason I think many people won't argue against the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is because one can demonstrate such things empirically, and has been show empirically over and over again. I also have reason to beleive that, "Yeah, addition works" too. Attempting to argue for a deity in deductive fashion and not showing it empirically is a much tougher gambit, especially when there's competing alternatives for non-contradictory existence (that is something like string theory) that is beginning to become detectable empirically.

My objection to your argument has nothing to do with the validity of the arguments, but the soundness of the argument. I don't know that you've missed it, but I challenged the ontological leap from epistemology to ontology (which you seem to be ok with) as being backwards and to do otherwise would be question begging. I don't think you've given me a compelling reason to show that this is not the case. If you uwant it more formally, here:

(1) Epistemological statments independent of ontology are meaningless.

(2) Arguments that suppose ontology and conclude something about ontology are question begging.

(3) Your argument makes epistemological statments independent of ontology or supposes ontology and concludes something about ontology.

(4) Therefore your argument contains something meaningless or is question begging.