God and Gödel’s Theorem of Incompleteness

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God and Gödel’s Theorem of Incompleteness

Disclaimer: 

Before I start, I would like to say that to the best of my knowledge, this argument is original to me and that I intend to publish it eventually. Other theists feel free to use this argument in private settings, but please be honest and source me (and allow me to publish it eventually. This argument has taken me quite some time to assemble.) Also please inform me if it is actually not original. 

Oh, atheists, I am posting this here to see how this argument stands up to something approaching real scrutiny. I'm just as much after valid criticisms as anything else (and if this argument is a doozy, I would like to know that, too and why.) 

Also, this argument isn't a "proof of God" so much as it is an argument against the alternative.
 

Sources: Wikipedia (for initial drafting purposes only) and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online) Considering how famous Gödel’s Theorems of Incompleteness are (and how differently different sources phrase them) feel free to note that this work is improperly cited. The only reason I don't cite from the horse's mouth is that I can't read German (I've read that Gödel was reluctant about several translations of his own work.)\

OUTLINE:

Part 1: The Argument

Introduction

Section 1: Gödel’s First Theorem of Incompleteness

Section 2: Gödel’s Second Theorem of Incompleteness

Section 3: Applying "God" as a Completion of Physics and Logic


Part 2: Foreseen Criticisms and Rebuttals:

Section 1: Preventing Ad Infinitum Regressions

Section 2: Is the Application of Gödel’s Theorem to Physics/Logic a Valid Application?

Section 3: Can Quantum Mechanics Create an Exception?

 

Introduction 

If the observable universe was created by non-teleologically based forces, then it follows that our own reason would be self-attesting. I have argued (at length) with Todangst over this point. Likewise, if the universe itself were a collection of forces acting with no teleological intention, it follows that those forces themselves are self-attesting. 

By contrast, IF the observable universe was created by a force with teleological intention, it follows that neither logic, nor the forces of the universe itself would be self-attesting. 

Begin with the following assertion assumed to be true "Physics itself is complete [regardless of the state of our understanding of it.]" also known as Leplace's Demon.

 

Section 1: Gödel’s First Theorem of Incompleteness:

 

"If [system] P is ω-consistent, then there is a sentence which is neither provable nor refutable from P." (From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 

Starting from this, we see that in terms of formal provability, neither the functions of logic nor the forces of the universe can account for themselves. Assuming that all that is is physical, then in the realm of logic, we see that logic will produce true statements that are not provable within logic itself. Ergo far from being "self-attesting" logic cannot even prove all statements it regards as true to be true (and is therefore incomplete.)

 Things do not improve when this is applied to the physical forces. Again, we can see that there will be statements regarded as true that cannot be proven as true within the realm of the physical forces.

But, if all that is is physical, then it is impossible for a true statement to not be provable by the forces of physics. There is no higher axiomatic system to invoke given monistic materialism.

 

 Section 2: Gödel’s Second Theorem of Incompleteness

 

 "If P is consistent, then Con(P) is not provable from P." (from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 Applying this to logic and physical forces, it can be seen that it is logically improper to even use logic or the forces of physics as their own proof-system. They are incurably incomplete.

(This can be seen even more clearly with the Wikipedia wording.)

 

 Section 3: Applying "God" as a Completion of Logic and Physics

For the sake of argument, define "God" as "a substance that has no place, mass, charge, or other means of direct physical influence, y exerts physical effects."

 

Importing "God" into Logic allows logic to function consistently; under the pretext that logic itself is understood to be incomplete. The same holds true for physical forces. Statements that were true, but could not be proven in either system can now be proven by importing "God." Indeed, a view of either physics or logic without "God" (or an analogous feature) is inescapably either incomplete (the first theorem of incompleteness) or is inconsistent (the second theorem of incompleteness.)

 

 

Part 2: Foreseen Criticisms and Rebuttals

 

 

Section 1: Preventing Ad Infinitum Regressions.

 

"God" completing logic and physics is all well and good, but what system will complete the axioms that "God" cannot possess? Is there an axiomatic system higher than God, even?

 

In this feature, this argument is analogous to the first cause argument, with the definite exception that a stop is possible in this case. There are at least two solutions that both stop Gödel’s Theorems from applying to everything in sight. One is that "God" Himself has a multiplicitous nature; the other is that "God" is not able to be logically probed.

 

Assuming "God" has a multiplicitous nature, then we are not looking at a singular entity, but rather several peer entities. Assuming that no one entity of God has a total axiomatic solution, then it follows that the statements that cannot be proven in one entity are provable in the other and vice-versa. This solution is admittedly circular, but both Gödel’s Theorem and "God's" finality are satisfied.

 

Conversely, it is possible that "God" is just not logically able to be probed. This solution explains that Gödel’s Theorem no longer applies to "God," but gives no specific mechanism on how it no longer applies.

 

 

Section 2: Is the Application of Gödel’s Theorem to Physics/Logic a Valid Application?

 

The wikipedia entry on Gödel’s Theorems of Incompleteness has an entry that reads as follows:

 

"Stanley Jaki followed much later by Stephen Hawking and others argue that (an analogous argument to) Gödel's theorem implies that even the most sophisticated formulation of physics will be incomplete, and that therefore there can never be an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles, known for certain as "final".

 

I have not traced the citations given to credible citations:

 

Jaki: http://pirate.shu.edu/~jakistan/JakiGodel.pdf

Hawking: http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/strings02/dirac/hawking/

 

Given that Gödel’s Theorem explicitly applies to any system that involves arithmetic (beyond "the most trivial systems&quotEye-wink it follows that all symbolic mathematics (including logic) follow suit. It also follows that physics itself follows suit insofar as it is modeled via mathematics.

 

Presently I see no reason why it should not apply, so I see no reason to compartmentalize my understanding of the universe.

 

 

Section 3: Can Quantum Mechanics Create an Exception?

 

All this "Importing 'God" business is complicated, not to mention suspicious. Is it possible that we can invoke quantum unpredictability to assert that the universe itself is inconsistent within bounds?

 

Quantum mechanics is not "inconsistent within bounds" it is not predictable beyond probabilities. It is still computable and, like all the other laws of physics discussed here, modeled with mathematics on the assumption of consistency.

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

Fixing the world, one dumb idea at a time.


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Strafio wrote:Given that you

Strafio wrote:
Given that you agree that "physics itself" is defined within a system, you agree that it is a model itself.
So how would it differ from the "physics as we understand it" model?

I actually disagree that "physics itself" is a model at all. Both scientific/logical models and linguistic models are human attempts to understand things. "Physics as we understand it" is a model, and our understanding of "physics itself" is a model, but "physics itself" is itself not a model, but a system that we try to describe with models both as itself and as a system.

Quote:
Maybe, as you seem to be suggesting, the ideal physics model will use differing language and discoveries.
However, I doubt that these changes will ever be enough to allow a Godel Sentence and here's why:

Whatever model we have it will be a description of reality and our descriptive use of language doesn't involve self referencing or anything else that would allow for a Godel sentence.
So unless you were to provide a revolution in linguistic philosophy that showed that a Godel sentence could crop up in our descriptive use of language then I don't think that you can make a case for them appearing in physics either.

In other words we need to have a specific language before we can say for sure whether or not Godel sentences apply?

I would disagree, and I think that it fundamentally underestimates Godel's Theorem of Incompleteness because that would assert that it can only apply to cases of the liar paradox. I (and my sources) assumed that Godel's Theorems are far more inclusive than just the liar paradox aspect which served as it's intuitive source.

Godel, Escher, Bach page 17 wrote:
All consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions.

Assuming this to be the case, then it follows that we don't need to know the specific language of a system we are describing to determine whether or not Godel's Theorem applies. We just need to know whether or not it involves number theory and axioms.

Now, if "physics itself" did not involve number theory and axioms, then there are two possibilities: either every instance of number theory and axioms are unfounded (and hence useless) OR physics itself is able to derive axioms and number theory, in which case the rules of number theory and axioms would apply.

In either the later above case or that "physics itself" involves axioms and number theory, Godel's Theorem will apply.

In short, we don't need the language to know if Godel's Theorem applies. We need it to find the specific instance.

 

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

Fixing the world, one dumb idea at a time.


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Sir Valiant for Truth

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I actually disagree that "physics itself" is a model at all. Both scientific/logical models and linguistic models are human attempts to understand things.

Not just that - logical/linguistic models have to be in place before any kind of understanding/meaning is possible.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
"Physics as we understand it" is a model, and our understanding of "physics itself" is a model, but "physics itself" is itself not a model, but a system that we try to describe with models both as itself and as a system.

Um... what do you mean by system?
You mean an axiomatic system like maths?
So rather than being the facts of reality as we perceive it, it's a system of rules like Maths is?
Explain what you mean by 'system' here and what this system has to do with physics at all.
Also, in your last post you talked about scientific truths that were derivable purely by logic. Examples please.
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
In other words we need to have a specific language before we can say for sure whether or not Godel sentences apply?

Yes. Godel's sentences used certain grammatic tricks in order to create the necessary paradox for his proof to work.
These grammatical tricks are not ones that we use when describing things.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I would disagree, and I think that it fundamentally underestimates Godel's Theorem of Incompleteness because that would assert that it can only apply to cases of the liar paradox. I (and my sources) assumed that Godel's Theorems are far more inclusive than just the liar paradox aspect which served as it's intuitive source.

I know that there is more to the Godel Theorem than the liar paradox, that the liar paradox is just the intuitive example.
There was also the proof that came from the self-halting problem. (which also used self reference!!) There are others as well.
The thing is, the Godel sentences are still pulling grammatical tricks using self-reference or refering to special abstract objects with special properties, none of which will occur in our normal language for describing the world.

Godel, Escher, Bach page 17 wrote:
All consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Assuming this to be the case, then it follows that we don't need to know the specific language of a system we are describing to determine whether or not Godel's Theorem applies. We just need to know whether or not it involves number theory and axioms.

Now, if "physics itself" did not involve number theory and axioms, then there are two possibilities: either every instance of number theory and axioms are unfounded (and hence useless) OR physics itself is able to derive axioms and number theory, in which case the rules of number theory and axioms would apply.


Physics doesn't derive number theory. The axioms of number theory are not physical propositions.
Whatever made you think that number theory had to be grounded in physical fact in order to be useful?
I've told you already that mathematics can be seen as a game - we simply have some rules and see what the consequences are.
Why is mathematics useful?
Because some questions in life are asked in language with similar rules, so they can be translated into mathematical language.
Number theory is simply a 'game' that mathematicians play.
It turns out that some propositions in this game translate to descriptions of the physical world.
However, because of the nature of descriptive language, this will place a limit on which mathematical propositions have relevance to physics.
Godel's sentences twist grammar in a way that our descriptive language doesn't - ergo they don't translate to descriptive propositions and bear no relevence to physics.


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Someone's trying to use

Someone's trying to use Godel's first theorem to prove the existence of God again?

 


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Sir Valiant for Truth seems

Sir Valiant for Truth seems to be using the idea of "physics itself" to refer to ultimate underlying reality. "Physics", as normally used refers to a particular branch of science, namely: the branch of science concerned with the nature and properties of matter and energy. The subject matter of physics, distinguished from that of chemistry and biology, includes mechanics, heat, light and other radiation, sound, electricity, magnetism, and the structure of atoms.
 As such, it is no more to do with 'axioms' as per formal mathematics, etc than any other branch of science - it is as intrinsically empirical, ie based on acquiring and analysing physical observations, as any other. It might be argued that its subject matter is closer to the ultimate nature of reality, ie matter and energy, but only in terms of the most basic 'building blocks' of nature, Other areas are just as important, since they study the nature of complex structures which have attributes and behaviours which physics is completely blind to. The particular properties of electrons and quarks don't provide us any insight into the laws governing complex systems, including possibly the ultimate complex systems, life and mind/brain. To give a simple example, physics tells us how to design and build semiconductors and the other components of computers, but provides us no assistance in designing the programs we run on them. The study of 'physics itself' would involve either the Philosophy of Science or perhaps Sociology, Psychology, depending whether one is interested in the methodology, or the behaviour of the people involved.

 

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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Strafio wrote:Um... what do

Strafio wrote:
Um... what do you mean by system?
You mean an axiomatic system like maths?
So rather than being the facts of reality as we perceive it, it's a system of rules like Maths is?
Explain what you mean by 'system' here and what this system has to do with physics at all.
Also, in your last post you talked about scientific truths that were derivable purely by logic. Examples please.

In this context, by the word "system" I mean an algorithmic set of very specific rules that are not in any way specifically attached to human language, understanding, or formulation. Think of the system that eukariotic cells use for DNA processing to remove introns from extrons: the system was working as itself long before any human understood it, and it follows a very specific set of rules, the fact that it is reasonably well understood now does not change the fact that the system itself is not attached to what humans understand.

Now, of course you can deflect this kind of system by asserting that a system must be formalized by a human into a human language to be a "system," but that misses the point. Besides, what was that human formulating in the first place if it wasn't a system before then? Obviously what exists is not so restricted to only what a human can understand and formulate.

Quote:
Physics doesn't derive number theory. The axioms of number theory are not physical propositions.
Whatever made you think that number theory had to be grounded in physical fact in order to be useful?
I've told you already that mathematics can be seen as a game - we simply have some rules and see what the consequences are.
Why is mathematics useful?
Because some questions in life are asked in language with similar rules, so they can be translated into mathematical language.
Number theory is simply a 'game' that mathematicians play.
It turns out that some propositions in this game translate to descriptions of the physical world.
However, because of the nature of descriptive language, this will place a limit on which mathematical propositions have relevance to physics.
Godel's sentences twist grammar in a way that our descriptive language doesn't - ergo they don't translate to descriptive propositions and bear no relevence to physics.
(emphasis added)

I'm disappointed that I actually must post such an obvious syllogism.

IF number theory is not derived from physical propositions (in any way) AND the human brain is a purely physical machine, THEN the human brain cannot understand or use number theory.

As that the human brain almost instinctively grasps number theory, it's a pretty safe bet that one of the starting propositions is incorrect.

Besides, what are these "physical propositions" of which you speak? Are these propositions in a language? If so, could they be constructed into Godel sentences? Could it be that "physics itself" is just the whole system of "physical propositions?"

BobSpence1 wrote:

Sir Valiant for Truth seems to be using the idea of "physics itself" to refer to ultimate underlying reality. "Physics", as normally used refers to a particular branch of science, namely: the branch of science concerned with the nature and properties of matter and energy. The subject matter of physics, distinguished from that of chemistry and biology, includes mechanics, heat, light and other radiation, sound, electricity, magnetism, and the structure of atoms.
 As such, it is no more to do with 'axioms' as per formal mathematics, etc than any other branch of science - it is as intrinsically empirical, ie based on acquiring and analysing physical observations, as any other. It might be argued that its subject matter is closer to the ultimate nature of reality, ie matter and energy, but only in terms of the most basic 'building blocks' of nature, Other areas are just as important, since they study the nature of complex structures which have attributes and behaviours which physics is completely blind to. The particular properties of electrons and quarks don't provide us any insight into the laws governing complex systems, including possibly the ultimate complex systems, life and mind/brain. To give a simple example, physics tells us how to design and build semiconductors and the other components of computers, but provides us no assistance in designing the programs we run on them. The study of 'physics itself' would involve either the Philosophy of Science or perhaps Sociology, Psychology, depending whether one is interested in the methodology, or the behaviour of the people involved.
 Considering how hideously you (plural) are doing at protecting the "empirical evidence only" model of physics, I would say that this argument is working, and pretty well at that. "Number theory isn't derived from physical propositions." (**Sighs**)

 

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Number theory is not derived

Number theory is not derived from physical propositions. The idea of 'number' is derived from our experience, but Number Theory is derived from applying logic to axiomatic definitions of 'number'. Our physical understanding of number determines the particular set of starting axioms/definitions we select, but the subsequent theorems we derive from those definitions 'merely' show what follows from those axioms, and are not in any way dependent on the 'truth' of physical propositions.

The sorts of calculations that our observations in physics lead us to use a lot may have some influence on the direction in which number theory develops, but not on the actual validity of its conclusions.

If it turns out that somehow the idea of number does not quite match physical reality, number theory remains valid. It may suggest some variant of number theory incorporating a modified set of axioms which encapsulate in some way whatever 'anomaly' we come across. All hypothetical, of course.

Any Godel problems arising in number theory do not invalidate physics, they warn us that, to the degree that a particular physical calculation may be mappable to a Godel expression, we should treat it with caution. It may mean we have to reformulate the calculation to avoid the 'gotcha'.

EDIT: It occurs to me that the argument implies that because there may be some unprovable statements in a formal system, we cannot trust ANY statements in that system. So because we can formulate a Godel statement in math, we can no longer trust that '1 + 1 = 2' ????

All that is being shown here is that if a theory of physics can be shown to rely on the results of some other theory or statement of physics that itself assumes the validity of the first theory, we have a problem of circularity. This can be checked on a case-by-case basis, and the idea that physics, or indeed even truly formal systems, must be 'consistent' to be of value, is unwarranted.

Surely the basic Godel idea is that statements in the system of concern are EITHER Provable or not. As long as we CAN prove most statements within the system, there is no problem for practical application of that system, especially if we make a point of avoiding self-referential statements.

In the realm of scientific investigation, such as physics, as long as we are aware that there exist undecidable/unprovable statements within the mathematical and logical tools we use, and what can produce such statements, namely some self-reference or circularity, and we are not requiring absolute proof, there is no practical problem.

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:Number

BobSpence1 wrote:
Number theory is not derived from physical propositions. The idea of 'number' is derived from our experience, but Number Theory is derived from applying logic to axiomatic definitions of 'number'. Our physical understanding of number determines the particular set of starting axioms/definitions we select, but the subsequent theorems we derive from those definitions 'merely' show what follows from those axioms, and are not in any way dependent on the 'truth' of physical propositions.

"Numbers are derived from experience?" Eh?  I have never experienced number theory, could you please show it to me? (annoying joke)

In all seriousness, however, this amounts to nothing more than asserting that the derivation of number theory from physical propositions is through an indirect manner. Rather than being from physical propositions directly to number theory, you have physical propositions controlling both the mind of a human and the environment around that human. The human then invents the concept of number to help make sense of its surroundings and experience.

The end result is the same, even if the path is more complex: physical propositions (eventually) lead to the concept of number theory. The only problem is that by using such a convoluted route in getting there you've managed to forget that it's physical propositions that got you to the idea in the first place.

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

Fixing the world, one dumb idea at a time.


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Sir Valiant for Truth

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

BobSpence1 wrote:
Number theory is not derived from physical propositions. The idea of 'number' is derived from our experience, but Number Theory is derived from applying logic to axiomatic definitions of 'number'. Our physical understanding of number determines the particular set of starting axioms/definitions we select, but the subsequent theorems we derive from those definitions 'merely' show what follows from those axioms, and are not in any way dependent on the 'truth' of physical propositions.

"Numbers are derived from experience?" Eh?  I have never experienced number theory, could you please show it to me? (annoying joke)

In all seriousness, however, this amounts to nothing more than asserting that the derivation of number theory from physical propositions is through an indirect manner. Rather than being from physical propositions directly to number theory, you have physical propositions controlling both the mind of a human and the environment around that human. The human then invents the concept of number to help make sense of its surroundings and experience.

The end result is the same, even if the path is more complex: physical propositions (eventually) lead to the concept of number theory. The only problem is that by using such a convoluted route in getting there you've managed to forget that it's physical propositions that got you to the idea in the first place.

Wow... this is akin to saying that number theory is derived from a pencil because it can be written down.


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Sir Valiant for Truth

In this context, by the word "system" I mean an algorithmic set of very specific rules that are not in any way specifically attached to human language, understanding, or formulation. Think of the system that eukariotic cells use for DNA processing to remove introns from extrons: the system was working as itself long before any human understood it, and it follows a very specific set of rules, the fact that it is reasonably well understood now does not change the fact that the system itself is not attached to what humans understand.

 

Now, of course you can deflect this kind of system by asserting that a system must be formalized by a human into a human language to be a "system," but that misses the point. Besides, what was that human formulating in the first place if it wasn't a system before then?
This is just "current model" vs "ideal model".
You say that the 'System' or "Ideal Model" hasn't been thought of by humans yet so it's not understood by humans.
The fact is, it's still a model - just not the one we're thinking of right now.
Your DNA example - you talk of a physical process (you describe it) and say that it was there before human beings understood it.
But when you talk about this process 'existing' apart from human knowledge, you are describing a world where this process happens and where people don't understand it.
You are just putting forward a model that these people inside don't have.

There's two possibilities:
You're either making a description about reality (i.e. a model) or you're not.
If not, then what are you talking about?

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Obviously what exists is not so restricted to only what a human can understand and formulate.

Actually it is.
To say "X exists" requires you to put X under the concepts of 'being' and 'existence'.
You've already put it into terms of human understanding.
When you say 'exists' you either mean how we usually use it and apply it to things within understanding, or you're using the same word to talk about something completely different.
You're doing a classic example of the fallacy of the stolen concept.
You want to use words such as 'existence' but you also want to place them outside all the bounds and context that made them meaningful in the first place.
That is why "physics itself" is incoherent.
I put forward the same criticism towards Kant with his theory of 'things in themselves'.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I'm disappointed that I actually must post such an obvious syllogism.

IF number theory is not derived from physical propositions (in any way) AND the human brain is a purely physical machine, THEN the human brain cannot understand or use number theory.

As that the human brain almost instinctively grasps number theory, it's a pretty safe bet that one of the starting propositions is incorrect.


That's actually wrong.
The correct syllogism would be:
IF number theory can not be described by physical propositions (in any way) AND the human brain is a purely physical machine, THEN the human brain cannot understand or use number theory.
I have no problem with physics describing following rule based systems such as first order logic and number theory.
And yes, it can also describe the construction of Godel sentences.
The thing is, the language of physics will only ever evaluate whether the description is correct.
So it would be evaluating whether the description of the Godel sentence was a true description of the real world.
The language of physics would not evaluate the truth of the Godel sentence it was describing.

It's a bit like how the language of physics could describe a horrific scene, but would only evaluate this scene as true or false, fact or fiction.
It would not evaluate the scene as horrific - that's a different use of language for a different evaluation.
Horrific actually has no meaning in the language of physics.
(Well, it could describe people using the word 'horrific' but you know what I mean... 'horrific' would be merely described rather than 'used' in the language of physics.)

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Besides, what are these "physical propositions" of which you speak? Are these propositions in a language? If so, could they be constructed into Godel sentences?

Nope. And the reason why is because these propositions are purely descriptive.
And descriptive langauge doesn't allow self reference and other weird grammatical combinations required for a Godel sentence.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Could it be that "physics itself" is just the whole system of "physical propositions?"

If that's what you mean by physics itself then all my criticisms of "stealing the concept" go out of the window - you wouldn't be stealing the concept at all.
However, "physics itself" would just be the "ideal model" that I've been doing on about since a several posts back.
It would still be a model and would still hold the same constraints as a model.
My point is, either you treat physics as a model or you steal the concept. I can't see a way around it.


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Strafio wrote:Actually it

Strafio wrote:
Actually it is.
To say "X exists" requires you to put X under the concepts of 'being' and 'existence'.
You've already put it into terms of human understanding.
When you say 'exists' you either mean how we usually use it and apply it to things within understanding, or you're using the same word to talk about something completely different.
You're doing a classic example of the fallacy of the stolen concept.
You want to use words such as 'existence' but you also want to place them outside all the bounds and context that made them meaningful in the first place.
That is why "physics itself" is incoherent.
I put forward the same criticism towards Kant with his theory of 'things in themselves'.

[tangent]

I hope you realize that by asserting this, you've effectively killed any possibility of any further "evidence" being used. I've invoked something as evidence that my own epistemological understanding can clearly define as being algorithmic, and you assert (based on your own epistemological model) that it is a "process." The fact that the only real difference is connotation aside, this means that, unlike I said on the last post of the prior page of this thread, there is a possibility that what I say doesn't become nonsense: if it can be rationalized. Rather than allowing yourself to see where my interpretation leads, you force your own onto it and effectively end the usefulness of any further physical or statistical evidence by forcing this discussion to become a metaphysical one.

The irony, of course, is that I'm the one with a concept of metaphysics in the first place.

In all honesty, the same could likely be said of me as well, in that I haven't followed your lines of reasoning neutrally as far as I could, but the effect remains: further use of empirical evidence is useless.

[/tangent]

The issue you address would be a problem, of course, if I had not previously drawn a distinction between my understanding of "physics itself" and "physics itself" itself. The former is a model, the latter is not.

I would also say that your statement is a fundamental confusion of substances. The statement "X exists" does not create a model of "X," it is a statement that X has a physical substance that is quite distinguishable from the substance used in the mental modeling of it. Obviously, this is an epistemic position, however, and yours will be notably different as that an atheist proper cannot invoke mental substances as being apart from physical substances.

In fact, come to think of it, an atheist can't invoke mental substances at all, which leads me to the next part:

Quote:
It's a bit like how the language of physics could describe a horrific scene, but would only evaluate this scene as true or false, fact or fiction.
It would not evaluate the scene as horrific - that's a different use of language for a different evaluation.
Horrific actually has no meaning in the language of physics.
(Well, it could describe people using the word 'horrific' but you know what I mean... 'horrific' would be merely described rather than 'used' in the language of physics.)....

And the reason why is because these propositions are purely descriptive.
And descriptive langauge doesn't allow self reference and other weird grammatical combinations required for a Godel sentence.

Hmm. That would matter if your position could adequately explain what "language" is and what it conveys in the first place. Do try to do that without invoking mental substances.

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sir Valiant for Truth

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

I hope you realize that by asserting this, you've effectively killed any possibility of any further "evidence" being used.

... in your version of the world, which is what Strafio was trying to illustrate.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Rather than allowing yourself to see where my interpretation leads, you force your own onto it and effectively end the usefulness of any further physical or statistical evidence by forcing this discussion to become a metaphysical one.

Holy shit - do you and Paisley go to the same school of "duck and weave" apologetics? If talk of physics doesn't work, claim that physics is a "philisophical position" and then blame your interlocutor for turning the discussion towards philosophy? Unreal. Just unreal.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
The issue you address would be a problem, of course, if I had not previously drawn a distinction between my understanding of "physics itself" and "physics itself" itself. The former is a model, the latter is not.

I'm just assuming a typo. Are you making a distinction between "reality" and "the physical model of reality"? Because that would be easier to understand.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
In fact, come to think of it, an atheist can't invoke mental substances at all

Oh come on. Mental substances? Are we back to Descartes with this? Have you ever seen a PET scan?

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Strafio wrote:
And the reason why is because these propositions are purely descriptive.
And descriptive langauge doesn't allow self reference and other weird grammatical combinations required for a Godel sentence.

Hmm. That would matter if your position could adequately explain what "language" is and what it conveys in the first place. Do try to do that without invoking mental substances.

Honestly? You can't defend your position on the use of a Gödel sentence, so we have to go back to defining language? Gödel had a context in mind, he wasn't sitting there cackling madly because he had disproven any and all thought. If you want to talk Gödel, at least you picked someone who's well read on the subject (Strafio). It might be a good idea to either

A) Learn what you can from Strafio, since he's tackled some of Gödel's really difficult material, or

B) Read Gödel yourself before engaging in this mental flailing

No one's going to think less of you for learning. So what if Gödel's not the answer to your apologetic prayers? If God's there, your position can only be strengthened. Help me out and find some new apologetics.

Saint Will: no gyration without funkstification.
fabulae! nil satis firmi video quam ob rem accipere hunc mi expediat metum. - Terence


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Strafio wrote:To say "X

Strafio wrote:
To say "X exists" requires you to put X under the concepts of 'being' and 'existence'.

You've already put it into terms of human understanding.
When you say 'exists' you either mean how we usually use it and apply it to things within understanding, or you're using the same word to talk about something completely different.
You're doing a classic example of the fallacy of the stolen concept.
You want to use words such as 'existence' but you also want to place them outside all the bounds and context that made them meaningful in the first place.
That is why "physics itself" is incoherent.
I put forward the same criticism towards Kant with his theory of 'things in themselves'.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I hope you realize that by asserting this, you've effectively killed any possibility of any further "evidence" being used.

Not at all. When further evidence arises it will be in a form within human understanding.

Quote:
I've invoked something as evidence that my own epistemological understanding can clearly define as being algorithmic, and you assert (based on your own epistemological model) that it is a "process."

You were talking about DNA 'doing things' so it was a process.
Algorithmic systems don't 'happen' - systems are what we model with, not the model themselves.
It is what these words mean.

Quote:
The fact that the only real difference is connotation aside, this means that, unlike I said on the last post of the prior page of this thread, there is a possibility that what I say doesn't become nonsense: if it can be rationalized.

Rationalized? You mean put within a system of meaning?
Fine. Then it becomes a model.
If not, what do you even mean by 'rationalized'?

Quote:
Rather than allowing yourself to see where my interpretation leads, you force your own onto it and effectively end the usefulness of any further physical or statistical evidence by forcing this discussion to become a metaphysical one.

You said it yourself that your position stands upon your 'epistemological model'.
If you epistemological model is incoherent then it is very relevent and one that needs addressing.

Quote:
In all honesty, the same could likely be said of me as well, in that I haven't followed your lines of reasoning neutrally as far as I could, but the effect remains: further use of empirical evidence is useless.

Still no. The difference between 'physics as it is' and 'as we understand it' is not that one's a model and one isn't.
Both are models but 'physics as it is' has considered all the 'possible evidence' while 'physics as we understand it' only contains the evidence we know now.
When I say 'possible evidence' I mean all true perception.
'The truth' is the model that one has if one has had every possible perception of the events that have happened.
(i.e. seen every event from every angle)
It is still a model within its descriptive framework.

 

Quote:
The issue you address would be a problem, of course, if I had not previously drawn a distinction between my understanding of "physics itself" and "physics itself" itself. The former is a model, the latter is not.

Yes, but I already showed you the consequences of denying the latter one as being a model - you end up denying the groundwork required for your words to have meaning.
It also seems that you are stuck with the common use of model - the word we use when we are talking about representations of physical things.
That is not how mathematicians and physicists use the word 'model'.
Your argument here seems to be based on a misunderstanding of mathematical language.

Quote:
I would also say that your statement is a fundamental confusion of substances. The statement "X exists" does not create a model of "X," it is a statement that X has a physical substance that is quite distinguishable from the substance used in the mental modeling of it.

Mentality is irrelevent to the concept model.
The model is a description.
Before you can say 'x exists', you need to know what 'x' is.
X must be described. That's why claims about X must be within some kind of model.

Quote:
In fact, come to think of it, an atheist can't invoke mental substances at all, which leads me to the next part:

Hmm. That would matter if your position could adequately explain what "language" is and what it conveys in the first place. Do try to do that without invoking mental substances.


You want a physical description of what language is?
Before we go on, you've brought the conversation onto new territory and asked me to explain a lot of things.
I'm fine with this. Let the topic follow our line of enquiry.
It looks like it's my turn to take on the burden of explanation now.

Your challenge is an interesting one - can language be explained in purely physical terms?
Perhaps a physical account would go as follows:
By the laws of physics, chemical reactions have eventually led to the devellopment of things we call 'living creatures' and these living creatures interact.
Language is a complex form of this interaction.

Maybe language can be defined that way... I'm not sure where I stand on that one.
I certainly disagree that the physicalist has to define language that way and I certainly don't believe that the alternative requires mental 'substances'.
Maybe mental concepts but certainly not mental substances.
As it happens, I agree with Descartes' observations on how we apply mental concepts - they are not spacial in structure.
I disagree with physical reductionism.
However, I am still an ontological physicalist, that everything that exists is physical.

Now I'll try and explain how all this works.
An ontological physicalist believes that the world can be described in purely physical terms.
A person's behaviour is caused by the biological mechanisms, acting in accordance with the laws of physics.
Such a language wouldn't include concepts such as 'desire' and 'love' but it would be sufficient to describe every event and every cause.
If all humans needed was a description of the physical world then the language of physics would be all they'd need.

As it happens, we humans use language for more things than just technical descriptions.
We could start with obvious examples like jokes, or greetings like "Hello" or cries for "Help!!!".
We clearly have lots of uses for language.
So what use would the concepts of mind come under?
When we talk about beliefs, desires and decision making (i.e. the concepts of agency) we are talking about concepts connected with a resultant action.
We use this langauge to discuss, predict and explain action.
One might suggest that it evolved through the need of human societies to regulate it's action.
We have been brought up this language just as effectively as our language of description/explanation, perhaps even more so.
We apply these concepts naturally without even having to think about them.
So even though such a language isn't needed to explain anything about physical events and the entire world could be described without it, as human beings we do use this language and we do apply these concepts.

This language doesn't need to be reduced to physical language to be relevent.
Neither does it need to follow the same rules.
That's why mental concepts are non-spacial and non-deterministic compared to spacial and deterministic physical concepts.
(That's right, I also believe that we have libertarian free will, because the language that 'will' is defined in isn't deterministic.)
On the same note, 'substance' and 'existence' are concepts of the physical langauge that have no place in the language of mind.
That's how you can agree with Descartes' that mental concepts are not physical concepts while still denying that they entail some kind of mental substance.
So even if language isn't defined within the physical language, that doesn't mean that the ontological physicalist must give up its meaning.

Alright then... let your critique begin...


Sir Valiant for...
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Strafio wrote:Mentality is

Strafio wrote:
Mentality is irrelevent to the concept model.
The model is a description.
Before you can say 'x exists', you need to know what 'x' is.
X must be described. That's why claims about X must be within some kind of model.

OK, let me get this straight: To say "X exists" one must understand what X is, but to do that, one must describe X linguistically (even if the description isn't verbalized out loud.) If this model were consitently applied (which you aren't doing) you could only verbalize things that have already been conceptualized and vice-versa, or new verbalizations are impossible.

Let me put my own position bluntly:

Mentality = the conceptual model.  The conceptual model requires the mentality to exist in the first place, then the mind proceeds to model (or internally emulate, if you prefer) the natural world. The natural world is one thing. The mental models for it we have for it in our own minds are quite another. The two are separate realms, the one attempts to model the other.

So, assuming this position, how are our arithmetic axiom models applicable to the natural world itself? Well, if our models for the world are not known to be inaccurate at any particular point, then the standard method of inquiry is to extrapolate from what we know to what we don't based on our models to make a theory. I believe that this is how special relativity was arrived at: by visualizing light in a vacuum conceptually, then deriving the effects. Then take the results and empirically test them.

What I'm doing is just a logical extension of that. Instead of taking the models of physics and deriving things from them, I am taking the mathematical models we use to to model physics, and deriving its metaphysical implications. The only real difference between my work and Einstein's that I can tell -other than his was much smarter than anything I have done- is that his possessed a nature that allowed for it to be empirically tested, while mine does not. Regardless, the derivation does not change, so we are left with two possibilities: either my argument is correct, or the models I am basing it on (and are current, to the best of my knowledge) are fundamentally flawed, perhaps both.

On to the language section:

Quote:
By the laws of physics, chemical reactions have eventually led to the devellopment of things we call 'living creatures' and these living creatures interact.
Language is a complex form of this interaction.

Maybe language can be defined that way... I'm not sure where I stand on that one.

Well....Interaction is clearly a part of language, but it isn't the whole deal.

Quote:
An ontological physicalist believes that the world can be described in purely physical terms.
A person's behaviour is caused by the biological mechanisms, acting in accordance with the laws of physics.
Such a language wouldn't include concepts such as 'desire' and 'love' but it would be sufficient to describe every event and every cause.
If all humans needed was a description of the physical world then the language of physics would be all they'd need.

As it happens, we humans use language for more things than just technical descriptions.
We could start with obvious examples like jokes, or greetings like "Hello" or cries for "Help!!!".
We clearly have lots of uses for language.
So what use would the concepts of mind come under?
When we talk about beliefs, desires and decision making (i.e. the concepts of agency) we are talking about concepts connected with a resultant action.
We use this langauge to discuss, predict and explain action.
One might suggest that it evolved through the need of human societies to regulate it's action.
We have been brought up this language just as effectively as our language of description/explanation, perhaps even more so.
We apply these concepts naturally without even having to think about them.
So even though such a language isn't needed to explain anything about physical events and the entire world could be described without it, as human beings we do use this language and we do apply these concepts.

This language doesn't need to be reduced to physical language to be relevent.
Neither does it need to follow the same rules.
That's why mental concepts are non-spacial and non-deterministic compared to spacial and deterministic physical concepts.
(That's right, I also believe that we have libertarian free will, because the language that 'will' is defined in isn't deterministic.)
On the same note, 'substance' and 'existence' are concepts of the physical langauge that have no place in the language of mind.
That's how you can agree with Descartes' that mental concepts are not physical concepts while still denying that they entail some kind of mental substance.
So even if language isn't defined within the physical language, that doesn't mean that the ontological physicalist must give up its meaning.

Alright then... let your critique begin...

Whew.  You didn't leave too many places for me to break a quote, now did you.

Firstly, my critique. I really can't see how you derive the concept of "concept" from purely physical terms. Sure this can be solved by invoking our own ignorance of our own brains, but that misses the point that it is epistemologically unfounded. We have everything being physical until the human mind comes along, which is suddenly able to use physical means to create a new substance of concept that didn't exist before.

If this isn't a problem, I don't think you explained it quite well enough.

EDIT: I have re-read what you wrote and...I actually don't see what you mean at all. It asserts what language is used for and that language need not be reducible to purely physical terminology (a blatant borrowing from the mentalist's position to avoid invoking identity theory: if all that is is physical, it makes no sense for anything that can be referred to as a "thing" to not be subject to physical description) but never actually tells me what language is. (Identity theory as in the position that all is still physical, and the mentalistic terminology of an event is a short-hand of sorts for the physical description.)[/EDIT]

 

My own position on language is rather straight-forward. When we are using language, we take neural patterns in one brain, convert them into sound waves, then the receiver converts those back into neural patterns. What this means is that we can effectively emulate communicating telepathically with an artificial bridge of sound patterns.

Language, then, boils down to patterns. Sound patterns may stand in for neural patterns, but they are all patterns, regardless. Patterns aren't defined in physical terms, however. They are defined in mathematical terms.

Now, part of Godel's genius was that he realized that the liar paradox is not limited to being expressed with normal human language. It can also be expressed mathematically. In other words, all language is one form or another of mathematics.

In other words, the human mind is a machine that works in terms of information, patterns, and relationships. Language is a mathematical substitution coding for information, patterns, and relationships.

Now here's the rub: If we are to assume that patterns and information are not universally true, but rather they are mental constructs to interpret the universe, then we are denying the very operating systems of our own minds. In effect, we assert that the mind itself doesn't work because it doesn't actually have anything to work upon.

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

Fixing the world, one dumb idea at a time.


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Okay... reading that I think

Okay... reading that I think we agree on a lot of things.
Before I answer your own points, I just want to share a bit more of my philosophical background to put my points in context.

Firstly I want to make a distinction between logical dependence and causal dependence.
It's like two different variations on the word 'because'.
"The flower pot fell because a pushed it" - This shows event "Flower pot falling" having a causal dependence on the event "I pushed it"
It gives an explanation as to why the event happened.
"You should boil an egg because you want to eat a boiled egg" - This shows a justification of boiling an egg from the person's desire to boil an egg.
It gives a justification for a belief or action.
"I believe Julius Ceaser invaded gaul because we have evidence for it" - This is an example where 'because' could mean either or even both.
The evidence could both cause and justify belief.

I think that a lot of confusion in metaphysics comes from people not seeing this distinction in the two types of because.
In physics we are looking for the ultimate causal dependences - what laws we can derive the whole behaviour of nature from.
In epistemology we are looking for the ultimate in logical dependence - what is the root justification our beliefs.
A good place to start is our understanding.
After all, before we can start separating true propositions from false ones, we need a framework of what truth and falsity is, we need to understand the propositions etc...
I take the root of a person's epistemology/understanding to be their natural grasp of language.

This is where the laws of logic come from.
Conjunction is pretty much a synonym for our word 'and' and negation for our word 'not'.
'Or' and 'if' have variable meanings in our common tongue, but atleast certain of their uses match disjunction and implication.
So the laws of logic are basically rules that we are following anyway in communicating - rules that must already be in place for any kind of debate to be possible.
Wittgenstein claimed that other words have logic built into them
e.g. why is something being wholly red contradicting it being blue?
It doesn't contradict it being large.
It's the rules for applying colour concepts
Where do these rules come from? A natural explanation is that they have gradually develloped, but that's not important right now.
What is important is that they are in place - otherwise debate/understanding etc just wouldn't even be possible.
Such explanations of how these rules came about are only possible with these rules, so it's understanding that's the root of justification, even if this understanding has a causal dependence elsewhere.

So what I am trying to nail here is that a priori truth is that we have understanding, and what follows from the rules that our understanding consists off.
(A priori truth being truth purely derived from reason, and given that our understanding being as it is is necessary for us to reason in this way...)
This means that although I am an ontological physicalist, in that I believe that everything 'that exists' is physical, that doesn't mean that I think that the understanding should be constructed from physical terms. I think that understanding has a physical cause but doesn't needed to be justified in physical terms.
(Maybe this causal explanation is what you're asking from me? I'll get onto that later.)

So Mathematics - we have our understanding of arithmetic, geometry, etc.
The axioms in mathematics are supposed to be the rules that summarize our understanding.
Mathematicians tried to find out which rules summed up what we do when we do maths.
You made a point about language being a form of maths - being picky, it's actually seen as the other way around.
Mathematics is a language that can sometimes translate into other sentences.
So our language for describing the the world can be translated into the language of mathematics.
Mathematics is a subject where we have spent a lot of study, working out clear logical consequences to propositions, so once we translate a proposition into mathematical langauge we have a whole wealth of logical consequences within easy calculation.

With physics, we are describing the world and it happens that our descriptive sentences can be translated into mathematical propositions.
However, not every mathematical proposition out there will translate into a descriptive sentence.
Description has a particular structure of grammar, the kind that doesn't allow the Godel sentences to form.
Metaphysical questions tend to be about features of our understanding, e.g. what do we mean by 'property', 'cause' or 'physical law'.
It's an exploration of the framework that determines the form of physical facts.

The ontological physicalist claims that everything that exists is physical.
As we claim that humans are biological constructs with understanding, they have to explain how understanding can occur in such creatures.
As understanding ultimately consists in rules following, (e.g. applying a word/concept requires you to follow rule x...)
So a biological being would merely need to have a process that could follow the correct rules for understanding to occur.
(Obviously it's a lot more complex than that, but the complexity of the rules followed would still mean that rules were followed and that a physical being could follow them)

So with that in place, I'll now put how it relates to the points you made:

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
OK, let me get this straight: To say "X exists" one must understand what X is, but to do that, one must describe X linguistically (even if the description isn't verbalized out loud.) If this model were consitently applied (which you aren't doing) you could only verbalize things that have already been conceptualized and vice-versa, or new verbalizations are impossible.

Not quite. Even if X hasn't yet been conceptualized it must be atleast potentially conceptualizable to allow for future conceptualization.
So the restraints I am trying to put on are what it necessary for that.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Let me put my own position bluntly:

Mentality = the conceptual model.  The conceptual model requires the mentality to exist in the first place, then the mind proceeds to model (or internally emulate, if you prefer) the natural world. The natural world is one thing. The mental models for it we have for it in our own minds are quite another. The two are separate realms, the one attempts to model the other.


Okay...
I agree that there is a distinction between the 'world as it is' and the 'world as we understand it'.
The thing is, the 'world as it is' has to be conceptualizable, otherwise what are we even talking about?
Let alone can it bare any relevence to the world we experience - i.e. where our concept of 'reality' even derives from.
If you think about what separates 'reality' from our idea from it, we tend to have a model of what reality is and then recognise 'our idea of it' to be a differing model - therefore inaccurate.
If you try and deny reality to be a model altogether, you end up fudging up language and making your words meaningless.
So the only sense I can make of 'physics as it is' is to see it as the ideal model that one would have if one had access to every possible perception of what really happens.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
What I'm doing is just a logical extension of that. Instead of taking the models of physics and deriving things from them, I am taking the mathematical models we use to to model physics, and deriving its metaphysical implications. The only real difference between my work and Einstein's that I can tell -other than his was much smarter than anything I have done- is that his possessed a nature that allowed for it to be empirically tested, while mine does not. Regardless, the derivation does not change, so we are left with two possibilities: either my argument is correct, or the models I am basing it on (and are current, to the best of my knowledge) are fundamentally flawed, perhaps both.

It seems that one of our disagreements is the metaphysical consequences of mathematics.
As far as I can see, mathematics is a rule-based language/activity that happens to translate to many interesting problems we come across in life.
Where it relates to physics is that the descriptive language of physics can translate to certain mathematical propositions.
However, only the mathematical propositions that translate into these descriptive ones are relevent.
It was an idea worth exploring but I think it was ultimately based on flawed premises.
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I really can't see how you derive the concept of "concept" from purely physical terms. Sure this can be solved by invoking our own ignorance of our own brains, but that misses the point that it is epistemologically unfounded. We have everything being physical until the human mind comes along, which is suddenly able to use physical means to create a new substance of concept that didn't exist before.

Here's my answer:
Concept doesn't need to be explained from physical terms, just like other concepts of the understanding.
That is, even though the physicalist needs to provide a causal explanation as to how understanding arose in a physical world, understanding doesn't need to be justified in physical terms, that is it doesn't need to be derived from physical propositions. Understanding is the very root of justification.
This langauge/understanding has uses to us and we are not always using it to describe the physical world.
All the physicalist needs to is explain how such an understanding can occur in the physical world and such an explanation might be:
As language/understanding is rule following and physical objects can 'follow rules', the physical world can provide conditions for language/understanding to occur.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Now, part of Godel's genius was that he realized that the liar paradox is not limited to being expressed with normal human language. It can also be expressed mathematically. In other words, all language is one form or another of mathematics.

It's kind of the other way around. Maths is a language but doesn't necessarily cover all language.
Godel showed that a variant of the liar paradox could be translated into arithmetic, but as it happens the original cannot.
"This sentence is not provable" could be translated into arithmetic, but not "This sentence is not true"
'Provable' was translatable because 'proof' consisted of a computable function, so 'provable' could be defined in terms of this computable function.
Truth cannot be translated into mathematical language in the same.
'Truth' is restricted to the 'meta-language' instead.
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Now here's the rub: If we are to assume that patterns and information are not universally true, but rather they are mental constructs to interpret the universe, then we are denying the very operating systems of our own minds. In effect, we assert that the mind itself doesn't work because it doesn't actually have anything to work upon.

This is where my distinction between 'causal dependence' and 'logical dependence' is absolutely vital.

Your argument appears to be as follows:
1) If patterns are causally dependent on the mind rather than reality then they are not a part of reality.
2) If we accept that they are not part of reality then we are denying their truth and therefore denying the truth of what our minds put forward.
Conclusion) Patterns cannot be causally dependent on the mind without denying the mind as useless.

This is a valid argument and perfectly true.
However, my argument is that these patterns have logical dependence rather than causal dependence on our minds.
I think that many have confused the two types of dependence, so have mistaken the claim of logical dependence implying causal dependence also.
I think that this equivocation has been the cause of many problems in metaphysics.

I just wanted to finish by saying how much I'm enjoying this.
It's been a while since I've taken this issues on in debate and am really looking forward to what you make of my arguments.
Keep it up!! thumbs up


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Bump - I hope this will

Bump - I hope this will continue, even tho these 3 pages have given me a headache. I even made folder of this and was google-ing for hours, hoping to learn something, and I did, sort of  .....

     , and way cool Kurt Godel went nuts ! Damn reality ....

    The word "god" is the ultimate Equivocation ! ..... luv ya all .....   


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Strafio wrote:So what I am

Strafio wrote:
So what I am trying to nail here is that a priori truth is that we have understanding, and what follows from the rules that our understanding consists off.
(A priori truth being truth purely derived from reason, and given that our understanding being as it is is necessary for us to reason in this way...)
This means that although I am an ontological physicalist, in that I believe that everything 'that exists' is physical, that doesn't mean that I think that the understanding should be constructed from physical terms. I think that understanding has a physical cause but doesn't needed to be justified in physical terms.
(Maybe this causal explanation is what you're asking from me? I'll get onto that later.)

I see the dichotomy you are drawing, although I think that you take a bit too long to get there. I take it this is your rebuttal to Leibniz's statement:

Quote:
One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions...
(Monadology section 17. The real quote is pretty long, so I only gave the first part.)

Basically, you are not obliged to explain everything on purely physical terms because of emerging properties that are not causally reducible. Correct?

Needless to say, I am skeptical. Apart from mental fields, I have yet to hear of an example of such emerging properties of matter that are inexplicable by physical causal means. Assuming you cannot provide such an example, both of us are stuck defending opposite positions based on appeals to ignorance.

Quote:
I agree that there is a distinction between the 'world as it is' and the 'world as we understand it'.
The thing is, the 'world as it is' has to be conceptualizable, otherwise what are we even talking about?
Let alone can it bare any relevence to the world we experience - i.e. where our concept of 'reality' even derives from.
If you think about what separates 'reality' from our idea from it, we tend to have a model of what reality is and then recognise 'our idea of it' to be a differing model - therefore inaccurate.
If you try and deny reality to be a model altogether, you end up fudging up language and making your words meaningless.
So the only sense I can make of 'physics as it is' is to see it as the ideal model that one would have if one had access to every possible perception of what really happens.

I think that this is a classic example of over-thinking things. The important part is to see the dichotomy between what is and what is perceived (i.e. comprehend the limits of perceptions.) A specific mental model of "what is" isn't needed to comprehend this dichotomy. In fact, it is required to not be there, which is probably why this concept is so difficult: it requires seeing a dichotomy between two entities, only one of which is visible and understood.

In other words, this is the good old "what we know we don't know." It sounds like a contradiction, but really isn't.

Quote:
It seems that one of our disagreements is the metaphysical consequences of mathematics.
As far as I can see, mathematics is a rule-based language/activity that happens to translate to many interesting problems we come across in life.
Where it relates to physics is that the descriptive language of physics can translate to certain mathematical propositions.
However, only the mathematical propositions that translate into these descriptive ones are relevent.
It was an idea worth exploring but I think it was ultimately based on flawed premises.

I knew we had different ideas of what mathematics is all along. Your position that it "just happens" to solve real world problems far more distant than the everyday ones it was designed to work upon is almost a required position for any atheist.

My own position is that it does not follow that a system originally designed to solve absolutely trivial problems also can be used for the modeling of the cosmos unless the modeling of the cosmos itself is ultimately a trivial problem. (being deliberately cryptic and subtle.)

Quote:
Concept doesn't need to be explained from physical terms, just like other concepts of the understanding.
That is, even though the physicalist needs to provide a causal explanation as to how understanding arose in a physical world, understanding doesn't need to be justified in physical terms, that is it doesn't need to be derived from physical propositions. Understanding is the very root of justification.
This langauge/understanding has uses to us and we are not always using it to describe the physical world.
All the physicalist needs to is explain how such an understanding can occur in the physical world and such an explanation might be:
As language/understanding is rule following and physical objects can 'follow rules', the physical world can provide conditions for language/understanding to occur.

I'm not too good at special pleading, but I'm pretty sure this is one. "Concept" is central to your epistemological model, but it is also immune from needing physical justification. To modify a quote from Dracula:

Quote:
Ah, it is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all, and if it explains not, then it says it need not explain...

For God's sake, the parting of the Red Sea could be explained away like this. I hope it goes without saying that such a position is quite dangerous to blinding the user to some quite obvious things. (But that isn't going to dissuade you from using it.)

Quote:
It's kind of the other way around. Maths is a language but doesn't necessarily cover all language.
Godel showed that a variant of the liar paradox could be translated into arithmetic, but as it happens the original cannot.
"This sentence is not provable" could be translated into arithmetic, but not "This sentence is not true"
'Provable' was translatable because 'proof' consisted of a computable function, so 'provable' could be defined in terms of this computable function.
Truth cannot be translated into mathematical language in the same.
'Truth' is restricted to the 'meta-language' instead.

As is always the case, when translating some information/nuance is lost. In Godel's case it couldn't really be helped.

My basic point, however, is that language is a pattern. How are patterns defined? Mathematically. As a result, language itself is defined within mathematical parameters, even if we can't convey all of the linguistic nuances into a mathematical form. Multiplication aside, I doubt Peano Arithmetic has a verb that means "To have sex with."

Quote:
This is where my distinction between 'causal dependence' and 'logical dependence' is absolutely vital.

Your argument appears to be as follows:
1) If patterns are causally dependent on the mind rather than reality then they are not a part of reality.
2) If we accept that they are not part of reality then we are denying their truth and therefore denying the truth of what our minds put forward.
Conclusion) Patterns cannot be causally dependent on the mind without denying the mind as useless.

This is a valid argument and perfectly true.
However, my argument is that these patterns have logical dependence rather than causal dependence on our minds.
I think that many have confused the two types of dependence, so have mistaken the claim of logical dependence implying causal dependence also.
I think that this equivocation has been the cause of many problems in metaphysics.

OK, I may be equivocating, granted, but still.... Assuming the universe works on causal dependence and the mind works on logical dependence, it's a non sequitor for the mind to work because of the different natures of systems involved. Even if it weren't, causal dependence operating in the external universe trumps the importance of any logical dependence inside the mind, so logic is a crutch of the mind and it's another non sequitor to apply to the universe.

...But the mind learned it from observing the universe, so for a logical dependence system to develop from observing a causal dependence system, is it possible (here we go again) that the causally dependent system is actually logically dependent, and is just modeled and understood in causal terms?

Is it actually possible for a logical dependence system to emerge from a causally dependent system that actually isn't based on a logically dependent system? If so, what on earth would the logically dependent system rely upon to order it's observations? Would it be able to make sense of observations at all?

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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All my answers here will

All my answers here will simply be reiterating the distinction between causation and justification.
Causation is simply a hypothesis on how something happened.
Justification is why we should believe it.
E.g.
"Evolution happened because the conditions were right for life to devellop" - Explanation
"Evolution happened because fossils, geology and all the major results in modern biology says so" - Justification

"I hit him because his insults made me angry enough to do so" - Explanation
"I hit him because he's a disrespectful jerk and needs to learn some respect" - Justification

So when it comes to justifying the belief that "x" is true, the justification will ultimately depend on our understanding.
Our understanding is the base. The understanding needs to be in place before justification is possible - cannot be justified and doesn't need to be.
Even if there is an explanation as to how the understanding came about, this explanation doesn't justify the understanding, it's the understanding that justifies the explanation.
Grasping this distinction is the key to understanding my position here.

 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Basically, you are not obliged to explain everything on purely physical terms because of emerging properties that are not causally reducible. Correct?

Nope. Going back to that golden distinction between causation and justification:
Understanding is the root and basis of all justification.
That is, if you have a concept/word that you understand, no further justification is needed.
The physicalist claims that physics is the root of all causation rather than justification.
Any model of physics will be justified through the understanding.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Needless to say, I am skeptical. Apart from mental fields, I have yet to hear of an example of such emerging properties of matter that are inexplicable by physical causal means. Assuming you cannot provide such an example, both of us are stuck defending opposite positions based on appeals to ignorance.

You're over thinking this.
I say that understanding is the root of justification, that our grasp of our language and the rules of it's use is what justifies and is not something to be justified.
Simple example:
"Hello"
We all understand what 'hello' means.
You don't need to justify 'hello' in terms of physical things or anything else - you know what it means and no further justification is required.
Is it an 'existing thing' with physical or non-physical properties?
No. It's simply a word we use in the context of greeting someone.
'Hello' doesn't refer to any 'thing', physical or non-physical, it is a different use of language than to refer to a 'thing'.
In the same way, the language of mathematics doesn't refer to 'things'.
When we are taught what one and two mean, we aren't shown 'things' to associate the words 'one' and 'two' with.
Instead we are taught to count - we are taught the rules of a game where we say the numbers in a certain sequence.
Again, there's a physical explanation as to how we came to use the language of numbers and of greetings, but this explanation is justified by the understanding rather than the other way around.

The physicalist claims that everything 'thing' that 'exists' and that affects the material world is physical.
However, the concepts/language of describing the world is only a part of our understanding.
We use lots of other words/concepts, just not to describe existing things.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I'm not too good at special pleading, but I'm pretty sure this is one. "Concept" is central to your epistemological model, but it is also immune from needing physical justification.

That's because our concepts are our understanding and our understanding doesn't need justification.
Understanding is the root of all justification.
Understanding is something we start with with no need to go further back.
Yes, the physicalist says that the understanding has a physical explanation, that is its causes are explainable in terms of physics.
However, this physical explanation will be justified by the understanding, because the understanding is the root of justification.

Strafio wrote:
It's kind of the other way around. Maths is a language but doesn't necessarily cover all language.
Godel showed that a variant of the liar paradox could be translated into arithmetic, but as it happens the original cannot.
"This sentence is not provable" could be translated into arithmetic, but not "This sentence is not true"
'Provable' was translatable because 'proof' consisted of a computable function, so 'provable' could be defined in terms of this computable function.
Truth cannot be translated into mathematical language in the same.
'Truth' is restricted to the 'meta-language' instead.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
As is always the case, when translating some information/nuance is lost. In Godel's case it couldn't really be helped.

Um... if something had been lost then Godel's proof would have failed.
'Lost in translation' is fair enough for the practical world where we make do with imperfection but logical proofs are to be absolute.
As it happens, Godel's sentence was a perfect translation of "This sentence cannot be proved", he just wouldn't have been able to have say "This sentence cannot be true" in mathematical language.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
My basic point, however, is that language is a pattern. How are patterns defined? Mathematically. As a result, language itself is defined within mathematical parameters, even if we can't convey all of the linguistic nuances into a mathematical form.

And mathematical form is a language.
I know what you're saying here, you could probably describe the patterns of langauge in a language, but that language would also be a language.
Mathematics is a particular use of language. An irreducible part of our understanding like all our other uses of language.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Multiplication aside, I doubt Peano Arithmetic has a verb that means "To have sex with."

Lol! It took me a couple of seconds to get but it was a good one! thumbs up
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
OK, I may be equivocating, granted, but still.... Assuming the universe works on causal dependence and the mind works on logical dependence, it's a

non sequitor

for the mind to work because of the different natures of systems involved. Even if it weren't, causal dependence operating in the external universe trumps the importance of any logical dependence inside the mind, so logic is a crutch of the mind and it's

another non sequitor

to apply to the universe.


Woah tiger.
I'm not saying that the mind words on logical dependence, I'm saying that understanding does.
The mind is an area of discourse that is itself justified by our understanding, in this case our understanding of mental concepts rather than physical concepts.
You could say that you need a mind in order to understand things. Fine - there is a kind of causal relation between having a mind and being able to understand.
Descartes' "I think therefore I am" was true.
However, notice how he justified the "I am" from the "I think"
"I think" was the premise that "I am" was justified by.
That's because although thinking is causally dependent on thinking (i.e. you need a mind to think), the existence of the mind is logically dependent on that I am thinking.
That is, the belief that 'I am' is justified by the fact that 'I think' rather than vice versa.
Our understanding is the root of all justification, the end of all logical dependence.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
...But the mind learned it from observing the universe, so for a logical dependence system to develop from observing a causal dependence system, is it possible (here we go again) that the causally dependent system is actually logically dependent, and is just modeled and understood in causal terms?

Again, it's the difference between justification and explanation.
Yes, the understanding came about through causal conditions.
Yes, something else came first. The understanding is causally dependent on something else.
However, when we talk about justified belief, which premise justifies the other, our understanding is where we start.
So our belief/model that something caused our understanding will always be justified by the understanding.


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Your posts are becoming

Your posts are becoming increasingly difficult to comprehend. This last one took me almost ten minutes just to figure out what you were saying when the concept really isn't that difficult. I assume this means we are getting close to something. What that something is, I have no earthly idea.

OK, henceforth (unless I specifically state otherwise) when I draw connections, I mean logically required connections.

Let me get this straight: Understanding proves itself because we understand that we are understanding  something.

To put the argument that this is circular in a way that is appropriate for this thread, this means that understanding is being used as it's own proof system, or is "Self-attesting." Way back on the first page, however, you said

Quote:
I don't hold anything to be "Self Attesting".
My 'defense' of logic is a bit like Descarte's defense of the general accuracy of perception - it's something that needs to be in place before any kind of thought/debate/communication is possible so if we are thinking/debating/communicating then logic must be already in place.

So you actually do hold that something is self attesting: understanding. While this is intuitive, making understanding self attesting when we have defined the human intellect as an (immensely complex) arithmetic machine invokes Godel's Theorems....You see where this is going.

So while it's intuitive to make understanding self attesting, it isn't logically sound, therefore it isn't actually justified in the logical sense.

As that perception is closely akin to understanding, I will now invoke the Leibniz quote in full and use it.

Quote:
One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it [understanding in this context] is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter it, just like a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. This it is in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.

While it is quite clear that Leibniz is saying that perception cannot be explained in physical terms, it is less clear that he is also saying that it cannot be justified in purely physical terms, either because perception is effectively it's own substance that cannot be subjected to further testing.

To assert that perception is based on physical causation, even if we don't understand it, is an assertion that has never been proven. In fact, if Leibniz is right then it never can be proven because perception is -forgive me for using an Intelligent Design word: in this context it has a slightly different meaning- irreducibly complex.

In the end, as I've said earlier, both halves of the equation make opposite appeals to ignorance at this point to explain perception, which indicates to me that perception is inexplicable and unjustifiable regardless of how you try to explain or justify it. The atheist makes an appeal based on a lack of evidence against perception being purely physical. The Theist makes an appeal that there is no evidence that it can be explained on purely physical grounds, either.

Special note: As I said above, to assert that understanding (or perception) justifies itself is intuitive, but doesn't actually justify the understanding.

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sorry to briefly interject

Sorry to briefly interject in this duologue, but it's time someone pointed out that while Godel statements may possibly apply to an attempt to justify physics in terms of physics itself, which is not a problem for the normal observations and explanations of physics, it's very different when applied to the non-physical.

Godel problems would seem to invalidate any attempt to 'prove' that any proposition or concept that only has evidence or justification in terms of other mental experiences and concepts, such many versions of God or the supernatural, has any status beyond that of a concept.

So while God exists as a concept, if it cannot be supported from natural observations as in physics, then, while you can attempt to attack physics with Godel logic, the non-physical is totally mired in Godel undecidability.

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

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BobSpence1 wrote:So while

BobSpence1 wrote:
So while God exists as a concept, if it cannot be supported from natural observations as in physics, then, while you can attempt to attack physics with Godel logic, the non-physical is totally mired in Godel undecidability.

This is only true if you hold two very specific assumptions about "God."

1. God (or the immaterial) is able to be probed via logic/ mathematics/ metaphysical arguments (etc.)   If we are not able to probe God, then there is no way of determining if Godel's Theorems actually even apply.

 

I'm kinda reluctant to compartmentalize my reason to only physics if I'm going to say that there really is a metaphysical realm, so I like the second solution:

2. "God" does not refer to a singular entity, but several entities intertwined in such a way that Godel undecidability is circumvented.  My understanding of Godel's Theorems of Incompleteness is that it only applies to individual systems, not several peer systems working together.

(In case you haven't figured it out, the Trinity fits #2's description perfectly. I find this...curious granted the Trinity's immensely counter-intuitive nature.)

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
OK, henceforth (unless I specifically state otherwise) when I draw connections, I mean logically required connections.

Cool. Noted.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Let me get this straight: Understanding proves itself because we understand that we are understanding  something.

That's one way of putting it.
At the end of the day, before we can prove anything we need to understand what is being proved.
So understanding is clearly more fundamental than proof - we need understanding to be in place before we can prove anything.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
To put the argument that this is circular in a way that is appropriate for this thread, this means that understanding is being used as it's own proof system, or is "Self-attesting." Way back on the first page, however, you said

Quote:
I don't hold anything to be "Self Attesting".
My 'defense' of logic is a bit like Descarte's defense of the general accuracy of perception - it's something that needs to be in place before any kind of thought/debate/communication is possible so if we are thinking/debating/communicating then logic must be already in place.

So you actually do hold that something is self attesting: understanding. While this is intuitive, making understanding self attesting when we have defined the human intellect as an (immensely complex) arithmetic machine invokes Godel's Theorems....You see where this is going.

So while it's intuitive to make understanding self attesting, it isn't logically sound, therefore it isn't actually justified in the logical sense.


1) I guess I should take back what I said about something being self attesting.
Whenever you work with any kind of logic, you are working with whatever system you have in place.
That system will be rooted in your understanding.
So in that sense your understanding will be self attested - if you even evoke the concept of proof then understanding must clearly be in place.

2) I don't see where we defined human intellect as an arithmetic machine?
You'll need to re-explain what you meant by that.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
As that perception is closely akin to understanding, I will now invoke the Leibniz quote in full and use it.

Quote:
One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it [understanding in this context] is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter it, just like a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. This it is in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.

While it is quite clear that Leibniz is saying that perception cannot be explained in physical terms, it is less clear that he is also saying that it cannot be justified in purely physical terms, either because perception is effectively it's own substance that cannot be subjected to further testing.

To assert that perception is based on physical causation, even if we don't understand it, is an assertion that has never been proven. In fact, if Leibniz is right then it never can be proven because perception is -forgive me for using an Intelligent Design word: in this context it has a slightly different meaning- irreducibly complex.


1) We can separate understanding from perception.
Many concepts are based on perception but not all.
2) Relating perception to physical causes is an interesting topic with all sorts of puzzles, one that I'm happy to tackle someday but it's a bit off topic for where we are at.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
In the end, as I've said earlier, both halves of the equation make opposite appeals to ignorance at this point to explain perception, which indicates to me that perception is inexplicable and unjustifiable regardless of how you try to explain or justify it. The atheist makes an appeal based on a lack of evidence against perception being purely physical. The Theist makes an appeal that there is no evidence that it can be explained on purely physical grounds, either.

The atheist argument for perception having a physical base is that non-physical causation is incoherent.
You're right that there's more work to be done, but for the moment I'm using "physics explains perception" as premise.
I am justifying my argument on other grounds and simply noting that there's no contradiction so far in this particular area.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Special note: As I said above, to assert that understanding (or perception) justifies itself is intuitive, but doesn't actually justify the understanding.

On the contrary - seeing as understanding is necessary for any kind of proof/argument/justification you pretty much have to accept it as a given.
If you don't accept understanding... well, what exactly are you reading right now?
That's why I compared it to Descartes. He didn't claim that his 'undoutable' sentences were logically proved, just that if you denied them then you gave up everything that made sense altogether - the kind of scepticism that doesn't even make sense to talk about. (Heck, even talking about it refutes it!!)


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I would have posted back

I would have posted back sooner, but things around here have gotten...hectic.

Strafio wrote:
1) I guess I should take back what I said about something being self attesting.
Whenever you work with any kind of logic, you are working with whatever system you have in place.
That system will be rooted in your understanding.
So in that sense your understanding will be self attested - if you even evoke the concept of proof then understanding must clearly be in place.

2) I don't see where we defined human intellect as an arithmetic machine?
You'll need to re-explain what you meant by that.

#1: Clearly in place, yes, but accounted for, no. Essentially we will be able to create AI we will also be able to account for understanding, but there's some conjecture that AI is impossible -some of it is based on Godel's Theorems, and some of along the lines of one Computer Science writer who wrote:

Quote:
Unfortunately, most research in the field of artificial intelligence is just a lot of hot air. For years, researchers have been promising that intelligent, easy-to-use English-speaking computers and robots would be available at low prices “any day now”. After several decades of listening to such hoopla, I’ve given up waiting. The field of artificial intelligence should be renamed “artificial optimism”.

One of the more keen arguments I've heard against AI was voiced by Professor Robinson (the Teaching Company professor previously noted) who used Godel's Theorem of Incompleteness in an argument to conclude that the human intellect -while it may function in mathematical terms- is non-algorithmic, so emulation is impossible. What we are left with is imitation. (Some of this paragraph is going beyond what he said. Many of the dichotomies are original.)

I have sincere doubts that AI is possible because of the rule "if we were simple enough to understand ourselves, we would be too simple to understand ourselves." If someone ever does achieve AI, I suspect it will be in a similar way to HAL in 2001: A Space Odessy: by copying the functions of the human brain, not by comprehending them.

#2: This is where:

Quote:
Your argument appears to be as follows:
1) If patterns are causally dependent on the mind rather than reality then they are not a part of reality.
2) If we accept that they are not part of reality then we are denying their truth and therefore denying the truth of what our minds put forward.
Conclusion) Patterns cannot be causally dependent on the mind without denying the mind as useless.

In this new context, I don't see how Causal or Logical dependence bear any relevance. This is a simple definitional issue- one that I assumed you largely agreed with, seeing that you invoked the distinction between causal and logical dependence here rather than challenge the argument.

Quote:
1) We can separate understanding from perception.
Many concepts are based on perception but not all.
2) Relating perception to physical causes is an interesting topic with all sorts of puzzles, one that I'm happy to tackle someday but it's a bit off topic for where we are at.

I don't know how clear I can make this. I've been having problems expressing this thought all along, but I'll try.

Essentially, to understand that we are understanding (and hence make understanding self-attesting) requires perception. Unless you are perceiving your own understanding, you won't know that you are understanding. So while we can separate understanding from perception, to "prove" understanding in the way you do invokes perception...which itself needs to be proven.

You (implicitly) imported the system of perception to prove understanding, so this is just another incarnation of a Godel-puzzle, albeit an awkward one.

Quote:
The atheist argument for perception having a physical base is that non-physical causation is incoherent.
You're right that there's more work to be done, but for the moment I'm using "physics explains perception" as premise.
I am justifying my argument on other grounds and simply noting that there's no contradiction so far in this particular area.

AHA! Given that non-physical causation is incoherent, you must assume that physics bears an explanation that we don't yet understand...but to do that you must draw the dichotomy between physics itself and physics as we understand it. So you really do believe in my position of "physics itself" even though you called it incoherent. Now we just apply what I've been saying all along to the position that you have been extremely reluctant to admit, but that you have nonetheless.

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"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

AHA! Given that non-physical causation is incoherent, you must assume that physics bears an explanation that we don't yet understand...but to do that you must draw the dichotomy between physics itself and physics as we understand it. So you really do believe in my position of "physics itself" even though you called it incoherent. Now we just apply what I've been saying all along to the position that you have been extremely reluctant to admit, but that you have nonetheless.

You're contributing to a consistent miscommunication. If by "physics itself", you mean "reality", and you're pointing out that there's a gap between physics the model and reality, then fine. But to think you've check-mated Strafio because you refuse to understand what he's saying is bizarre.

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Meh! Better late than never!

Meh! Better late than never! Sticking out tongue
(I'm actually quite relieved that you hadn't given up already after all! Eye-wink)

Strafio wrote:
1) I guess I should take back what I said about something being self attesting.
Whenever you work with any kind of logic, you are working with whatever system you have in place.
That system will be rooted in your understanding.
So in that sense your understanding will be self attested - if you even evoke the concept of proof then understanding must clearly be in place.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
#1: Clearly in place, yes, but accounted for, no.

So your problem is whether the understanding can be accounted for in the physical world?
I outlined such an account earlier.
Understanding is rooted in rule following.
Understanding a word/concept consists in applying it correctly - i.e. following the correct rules in application.
So to account for understanding, all we would need would be a physical 'machine' that followed the correct rules.

You're right that we're yet to fully master how to make such a machine, and it's one of many things that we're far from fully explaining.
However, there's nothing to contradict it - i.e. there's no argument against it's possibility.
Any rule can be 'physically realized' as a physical process.
The argument in favour is that there's no coherent alternative.

Strafio wrote:
Your argument appears to be as follows:


1) If patterns are causally dependent on the mind rather than reality then they are not a part of reality.
2) If we accept that they are not part of reality then we are denying their truth and therefore denying the truth of what our minds put forward.
Conclusion) Patterns cannot be causally dependent on the mind without denying the mind as useless.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
In this new context, I don't see how Causal or Logical dependence bear any relevance. This is a simple definitional issue- one that I assumed you largely agreed with, seeing that you invoked the distinction between causal and logical dependence here rather than challenge the argument.

You're going to have to re-explain the argument.
My quote was what I thought you were saying, that you were talking about causal dependence.
Were you talking about definitions instead, like the definition of 'pattern'?
It seems that, like all words, when using language we found a use for the word pattern and we use this word to describe aspects of the physical world.
I'd be interested to see how you build an argument out of that.
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Essentially, to understand that we are understanding (and hence make understanding self-attesting) requires perception. Unless you are perceiving your own understanding, you won't know that you are understanding. So while we can separate understanding from perception, to

"pro

ve" understanding in the way you do invokes perception...which itself needs to be proven.


You don't need perception at all.
Since understanding is required for any evaluation to be possible, let alone proof, understanding must be in place before proof is possible.
"I understand something" cannot be false. Why not? Because to evaluate any proposition true or false you need to understand the proposition first.
So understanding isn't something that needs to be proved, because if you even have the concept of 'proof' or 'justification' then you clearly have understanding.
Maybe that I understand things implies that I must have perception. That would mean understanding proves perception.
Maybe, but I don't need perception in order to justify understanding.

Strafio wrote:
The atheist argument for perception having a physical base is that non-physical causation is incoherent.
You're right that there's more work to be done, but for the moment I'm using "physics explains perception" as premise.
I am justifying my argument on other grounds and simply noting that there's no contradiction so far in this particular area.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
AHA! Given that non-physical causation is incoherent, you must assume that physics bears an explanation that we don't yet understand...

I don't see why but carry on...

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
but to do that you must draw the dichotomy between physics itself and physics as we understand it. So you really do believe in my position of "physics itself" even though you called it incoherent. Now we just apply what I've been saying all along to the position that you have been extremely reluctant to admit, but that you have nonetheless.

'Physics itself' is the model we'd have if we had access to every possible perception of what actually happened.
'Physics as we understand it' is the model we have based on current evidence.
I only called 'physics itself' incoherent when you tried saying it wasn't a model, i.e. you said that it had no description.
 


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HisWillness wrote:You're

HisWillness wrote:
You're contributing to a consistent miscommunication. If by "physics itself", you mean "reality", and you're pointing out that there's a gap between physics the model and reality, then fine. But to think you've check-mated Strafio because you refuse to understand what he's saying is bizarre.

I frankly have no understanding of what you are saying here. Nothing about what Strafio said was "bizarre," in fact it was down-right predictable given the other positions he has defended.

Strafio wrote:
You're right that we're yet to fully master how to make such a machine, and it's one of many things that we're far from fully explaining.
However, there's nothing to contradict it - i.e. there's no argument against it's possibility.
Any rule can be 'physically realized' as a physical process.
The argument in favour is that there's no coherent alternative.

Actually, I cited several, most notably Professor Robinson's argument that the mind functioned "non-algorithmically." To summarize what he actually said:

1. Godel's Theorem proved that all mathematical systems must be able to import a higher system to analyze what had been achieved already.

2. The human mind functions on arithmetic principals, but does not need to "import" a higher system to analyze or review what it has done.

3. Therefor, we can say that the human mind functions non-algorithmically. Other things we know of function non-algorithmically as well, but those are also things we call "random" and no matter how humble our view of ourselves is, we do not think that our own thoughts are random.

I'm leaving a few things out of it, but this is the basic gist.

Quote:
You don't need perception at all.
Since understanding is required for any evaluation to be possible, let alone proof, understanding must be in place before proof is possible.
"I understand something" cannot be false. Why not? Because to evaluate any proposition true or false you need to understand the proposition first.
So understanding isn't something that needs to be proved, because if you even have the concept of 'proof' or 'justification' then you clearly have understanding.
Maybe that I understand things implies that I must have perception. That would mean understanding proves perception.
Maybe, but I don't need perception in order to justify understanding.

Here is where you are wrong. You don't just need to have perception to justify understanding, perception is a requirement to understand in the first place. Here's a little exercise to make my point clearer: thusfar your argument has been "I understand that I'm understanding, ergo I understand." No remove all the references to perception (the self-referencing ability: i.e. the "I"s) and try to retain the meaning. It is impossible because understanding is referenced to the self, and the self is defined by perception.

Your entire problem could be put another way: perception is recursive, and understanding is a recursive function within perception.

Quote:
'Physics itself' is the model we'd have if we had access to every possible perception of what actually happened.
'Physics as we understand it' is the model we have based on current evidence.
I only called 'physics itself' incoherent when you tried saying it wasn't a model, i.e. you said that it had no description.

QED. I actually don't recall saying that "physics itself" had no description, but rather that we did not have that description and couldn't know it to be accurate even if we did.

Besides, some aspects of "physics itself" can be (and have been in this discussion and elsewhere) modeled. The quote from wikipedia I used was an example of this.

Quote:
Stanley Jaki followed much later by Stephen Hawking and others argue that (an analogous argument to) Gödel's theorem implies that even the most sophisticated formulation of physics will be incomplete, and that therefore there can never be an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles, known for certain as "final".

Assuming the quote is accurate, this would be an example of modeling "physics itself", it just isn't modeling in the sense that gravity was, but rather modeling the nature of the system "physics itself." Yes it is a model, but not in the same sense.

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Actually, I cited several, most notably Professor Robinson's argument that the mind functioned "non-algorithmically." To summarize what he actually said:

1. Godel's Theorem proved that all mathematical systems must be able to import a higher system to analyze what had been achieved already.

2. The human mind functions on arithmetic principals, but does not need to "import" a higher system to analyze or review what it has done.

3. Therefor, we can say that the human mind functions non-algorithmically. Other things we know of function non-algorithmically as well, but those are also things we call "random" and no matter how humble our view of ourselves is, we do not think that our own thoughts are random.

I'm leaving a few things out of it, but this is the basic gist.


You'll have to explain what those premises even mean.
What does "Import a higher system to analyze what has been achieved" mean?
And what do you mean when you say that the human mind functions on mathematical principles.

You don't need perception at all.
Since understanding is required for any evaluation to be possible, let alone proof, understanding must be in place before proof is possible.
"I understand something" cannot be false. Why not? Because to evaluate any proposition true or false you need to understand the proposition first.
So understanding isn't something that needs to be proved, because if you even have the concept of 'proof' or 'justification' then you clearly have understanding.
Maybe that I understand things implies that I must have perception. That would mean understanding proves perception.
Maybe, but I don't need perception in order to justify understanding.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Here is where you are wrong. You don't just need to have perception to justify understanding, perception is a requirement to understand in the first place.

You've just made an argument here saying something along the lines of:
1) The understanding involves the concept 'I'
2) This concept of 'I' implies slef identity and perception
3) Therefore if I have understanding I must have perception

I have no problem with this argument.
You justified "I have perception" from "I understand".
So from our understanding we can see that we must perceive things.
Your statement that "Perception is a requirement to understand in the first place" is fine.
But why do you think that the understanding needs justification in terms of perception?


Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Here's a little exercise to make my point clearer: thusfar your argument has been "I understand that I'm understanding, ergo I understand."

Dude... I explicitly pointed out that this was not my argument in the previous post.
The argument is as follows:
1) Proof/justification, or even evaluating a proposition 'true' or 'false' requires understanding.
2) So understanding will never require proof - it is a given as it needs to be in place before proof is possible
3) So understanding is a given. If we didn't have it then we wouldn't be reasoning.

You seem to want to say from here, "Well your knowledge that you are reasoning comes from your perception"
Maybe that's the psychological explanation as to how I am aware of my reasoning. I don't care.
The point is, we are reasoning/debating/proving/justifying and for that things like the understanding are already in place.
Do you feel the fact we are reasoning/debating/proving/justifying needs proof?

You seem to be doing pedantic scepticism here.
It's when you say "Why is that?" and then whatever they say you can say "Why is that?" and it just goes on forever.
Besides, your scepticism is incoherent.
If you deny understanding then what are you reading and what are you writing?

Strafio wrote:
'Physics itself' is the model we'd have if we had access to every possible perception of what actually happened.
'Physics as we understand it' is the model we have based on current evidence.
I only called 'physics itself' incoherent when you tried saying it wasn't a model, i.e. you said that it had no description.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
QED. I actually don't recall saying that "physics itself" had no description, but rather that we did not have that description and couldn't know it to be accurate even if we did.

Fair enough. I got the impression that we were talking past each other there.
If "physics itself" was describable then that description would be the 'ideal model' - one that we clearly don't have access to at this time.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Besides, some aspects of "physics itself" can be (and have been in this discussion and elsewhere) modeled. The quote from wikipedia I used was an example of this.

Quote:
Stanley Jaki followed much later by Stephen Hawking and others argue that (an analogous argument to) Gödel's theorem implies that even the most sophisticated formulation of physics will be incomplete, and that therefore there can never be an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles, known for certain as "final".

Assuming the quote is accurate, this would be an example of modeling "physics itself", it just isn't modeling in the sense that gravity was, but rather modeling the nature of the system "physics itself." Yes it is a model, but not in the same sense.


Firstly, I don't know what these famous physicists have as arguments, but until they are presented they have no relevence here.
It is quite possible that, philosophy being outside their area of expertise, they, like countless others, have failed to understand the consequences of Godel's theorem.
The burden of proof is upon them to show their reasoning.
Even if they were proffessional philosophers then that argument from authority would still suck.
No more name dropping - supply arguments only.

Instead, explain your position better.
Give some examples of "Physics itself" that isn't a 'model'.
If "physics itself" is a 'system' rather than a 'model', then give some account of this 'system', what it does, how we use it and what relevence it has to 'physical fact'.


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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

HisWillness wrote:
You're contributing to a consistent miscommunication. If by "physics itself", you mean "reality", and you're pointing out that there's a gap between physics the model and reality, then fine. But to think you've check-mated Strafio because you refuse to understand what he's saying is bizarre.

I frankly have no understanding of what you are saying here. Nothing about what Strafio said was "bizarre," in fact it was down-right predictable given the other positions he has defended.

I'll rephrase: "physics itself" = reality? You're saying there's a space between reality and physics the model? It's not a new concept.

The second thing I said is:

1) You believe you've check-mated Strafio because you haven't understood what he's saying.

2) The mental mechanism you use to arrive at that conclusion is bizarre.

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
1. Godel's Theorem proved that all mathematical systems must be able to import a higher system to analyze what had been achieved already.

What's a "higher system"? Do you mean a convention?

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
2. The human mind functions on arithmetic principals, but does not need to "import" a higher system to analyze or review what it has done.

Who said the mind functions on arithmetic principals? And why ... actually, just explain that whole thing.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
3. Therefor, we can say that the human mind functions non-algorithmically. Other things we know of function non-algorithmically as well, but those are also things we call "random" and no matter how humble our view of ourselves is, we do not think that our own thoughts are random.

Okay, but you could state that the mind functions non-algorithmically from many angles, without the need for those two very confusing first statements.

 

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HisWillness wrote:Okay, but

HisWillness wrote:
Okay, but you could state that the mind functions non-algorithmically from many angles, without the need for those two very confusing first statements.

In the apparent event that you failed to notice this, I was summarizing someone else's argument on this matter. I'm not responsible for however confusing his argument is (and he is a lot more qualified to say it than I am.)

Strafio wrote:
What does "Import a higher system to analyze what has been achieved" mean?
And what do you mean when you say that the human mind functions on mathematical principles.

I'm not dead sure how to describe the first, but it's a little like a recursive program, except that it shouldn't be possible because the program that is being called is a "larger" program than the original. This is just baseless speculation, but I suppose that you could say that intelligence is about being able to call such a program without loosing itself into an infinite regression.

For the second, it should be pretty clear: humans think in terms of language or objects, both of which can be seen as mathematically formulated (or mathematically encrypted to allow for processing, if you prefer.) Even if you can think of a third type I'm missing, I doubt this changes.

Quote:
You seem to be doing pedantic scepticism here.
It's when you say "Why is that?" and then whatever they say you can say "Why is that?" and it just goes on forever.
Besides, your scepticism is incoherent.
If you deny understanding then what are you reading and what are you writing?

This is kinda the nature of the argument I use. I believe it is called "TAG" (Transcendental Argument for God) around here. Mine is actually a distant variant of it.

(Your "it.&quotEye-wink Jk.

Besides, I'm not being skeptical of "understanding." I'm being skeptical that the way you prove it isn't actually self-attesting, but in a rather insidious manner. Perception is also as far back as I can take this argument, seeing that I can't exactly invoke anything beyond it that we will actually agree exits.

Quote:
Instead, explain your position better.
Give some examples of "Physics itself" that isn't a 'model'.
If "physics itself" is a 'system' rather than a 'model', then give some account of this 'system', what it does, how we use it and what relevence it has to 'physical fact'.

As that I'm no longer alone in invoking "physics itself," I don't think I have to. But for the sake of argument, I'll provide a position that you can understand (and disagree with.)

Thusfar, you've held the position that mathematics "just happens" to be useful in modeling the universe and that perception must bear a physical explanation because "the alternative is incoherent."  There are some problems. Mathematics models the universe suspiciously well, and the solipsists' skepticism about others having perception along with the quote from Leibniz show that on the one hand perception by nature isn't empirically verifiable, and that perception is not reducible to components.

So to solve these problems, I propose that mathematics isn't physically based, but rather metaphysically based. If this were the case...and that the human mind is a mathematical machine- then it follows that the human mind, while it possesses a physical form, itself is not reducible to only the physical form.

Of course, invoking "metaphysics" to explain a physical event is incoherent, but still...

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Strafio wrote:What does

Strafio wrote:
What does "Import a higher system to analyze what has been achieved" mean?


And what do you mean when you say that the human mind functions on mathematical principles.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I'm not dead sure how to describe the first, but it's a little like a recursive program, except that it shouldn't be possible because the program that is being called is a "larger" program than the original. This is just baseless speculation, but I suppose that you could say that intelligence is about being able to call such a program without loosing itself into an infinite regression.

For the second, it should be pretty clear: humans think in terms of language or objects, both of which can be seen as mathematically formulated (or mathematically encrypted to allow for processing, if you prefer.) Even if you can think of a third type I'm missing, I doubt this changes.


I thought that we established earlier that mathematics was an example of language rather than vice versa.
'Truth' for example, isn't defined within mathematics.
We have language for describing mathematics, so we can say things about mathematics than cannot be said within mathematics.
I suspect that this programmer didn't have a strong grasp of philosophy of mind and language, but that's probably not fair of me as I haven't heard his argument in full.
Seeing as you don't have the full details of the argument either we should probably drop it from the conversation.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Besides, I'm not being skeptical of "understanding." I'm being skeptical that the way you prove it isn't actually self-attesting, but in a rather insidious manner. Perception is also as far back as I can take this argument, seeing that I can't exactly invoke anything beyond it that we will actually agree exits.

The argument is incredibly simple.
For a proposition to even be in question, let alone proven or justified, then we must understand the said proposition.
Not to mention that any system of proof will depend on the understanding.
Therefore it's nonsense to say that the understanding needs proof as to even talk about proof (or anything else for that matter) understanding must already be in place.
(btw, surely the bit in bold should say "Prove it is actually self-attesting" - if you thought that I was claiming that it wasn't self attesting then that would explain a lot of the confusion.
I know I earlier said that nothing was "self attesting" but I took it back a few posts later.)

Strafio wrote:
Instead, explain your position better.
Give some examples of "Physics itself" that isn't a 'model'.
If "physics itself" is a 'system' rather than a 'model', then give some account of this 'system', what it does, how we use it and what relevence it has to 'physical fact'.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Thusfar, you've held the position that mathematics "just happens" to be useful in modeling the universe and that perception must bear a physical explanation because "the alternative is incoherent."  There are some problems. Mathematics models the universe suspiciously well, and the solipsists' skepticism about others having perception along with the quote from Leibniz show that on the one hand perception by nature isn't empirically verifiable, and that perception is not reducible to components.

Maybe this should clear things up.
Mathematics 'happens' to be useful in modelling because is it translates to the language that we describe the universe, the language that the concepts of 'truth', 'reality'' and 'universe' are defined within.
So when we talk about these concepts, there are rules in place based on their use.
These rules are what justify the conclusions of the physicalist metaphysical position.

How did this langauge come about and 'happen' to describe the world?
It evolved within this physical universe so it was determined that way.
Note that there's no circularity here.
Beliefs about the universe are justified by the understanding, where the understanding is the root of all justification.
The understanding might be explained through physical causes, but that explanation is justified by the understanding, and that's where the justification ends.
No circularity.

 


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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

In the apparent event that you failed to notice this, I was summarizing someone else's argument on this matter. I'm not responsible for however confusing his argument is (and he is a lot more qualified to say it than I am.)

Drop the condescending tone. Especially when you're presenting the merits of someone else's argument, only to disown it when you can't answer questions about it. If you're so sure he's right, but you don't understand what he's saying, then why do you think he's right?

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HisWillness wrote:Drop the

HisWillness wrote:
Drop the condescending tone. Especially when you're presenting the merits of someone else's argument, only to disown it when you can't answer questions about it. If you're so sure he's right, but you don't understand what he's saying, then why do you think he's right?

I'm still not responsible for his argument being more complex than needed. I'm not responsible for what happens if some of my non-original arguments aren't clear. I'm only responsible for how I use them...and as the originator does outrank me and is relevant to the discussion, it is also arguable that I am obliged to post it, even though it is a little confusing.

Strafio wrote:
I thought that we established earlier that mathematics was an example of language rather than vice versa.
'Truth' for example, isn't defined within mathematics.
We have language for describing mathematics, so we can say things about mathematics than cannot be said within mathematics.
I suspect that this programmer didn't have a strong grasp of philosophy of mind and language, but that's probably not fair of me as I haven't heard his argument in full.
Seeing as you don't have the full details of the argument either we should probably drop it from the conversation.

I'm fine with dropping this, too, but I should say this: any language can be understood as being defined within mathematical terms, while the reverse is not true. Assuming mathematics is a language, this makes mathematics the language that can be used to understand all others.

(Yeah, that's weak. Let's drop it.)

Quote:
The argument is incredibly simple.
For a proposition to even be in question, let alone proven or justified, then we must understand the said proposition.
Not to mention that any system of proof will depend on the understanding.
Therefore it's nonsense to say that the understanding needs proof as to even talk about proof (or anything else for that matter) understanding must already be in place.
(btw, surely the bit in bold should say "Prove it is actually self-attesting" - if you thought that I was claiming that it wasn't self attesting then that would explain a lot of the confusion.
I know I earlier said that nothing was "self attesting" but I took it back a few posts later.)

I'm not pursuing that you took back "nothing is self-attesting." What I'm saying is that "X knows he understanding Y, ergo X is understanding" requires X to be self-aware as well as understanding. As you've already pointed out, self-awareness =/= understanding.

Quote:
Maybe this should clear things up.
Mathematics 'happens' to be useful in modelling because is it translates to the language that we describe the universe, the language that the concepts of 'truth', 'reality'' and 'universe' are defined within.
So when we talk about these concepts, there are rules in place based on their use.
These rules are what justify the conclusions of the physicalist metaphysical position.

How did this langauge come about and 'happen' to describe the world?
It evolved within this physical universe so it was determined that way.
Note that there's no circularity here.
Beliefs about the universe are justified by the understanding, where the understanding is the root of all justification.
The understanding might be explained through physical causes, but that explanation is justified by the understanding, and that's where the justification ends.
No circularity.

You say understanding is the source of justification, but as I've already pointed out, justifying understanding requires pulling in perception, which you explain as being purely physical because "the alternative is incoherent."

OK, let's make this clear:

A:

Dictionary.com wrote:
1.without logical or meaningful connection; disjointed; rambling: an incoherent sentence.

"The alternative" involves a substance that is not purely physical. It either exists or it doesn't. In either case, however, invoking it to explain a known phenomenon that is not known to be purely physical (i.e. perception) is not incoherent.

Perhaps unneeded and unjustified in the event that such a phenomenon actually does have a physical causation that is to be discovered, but the connection itself is not incoherent.

B: Physics is understandable and studyable via statistics and empirical evidence. The solipscist's dilemma proves this is not true of a specific known phenomenon -perception. This means that by nature perception cannot be studied as a physical phenomenon, but rather as something else. In other words, regardless of any specifics, the nature of perception makes physical explanation (and justification) of it incoherent.

Perception may still be purely physical, but this is true regardless.

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At the moment our

At the moment our disagreement seems to stem from a single point where we're both repeating ourselves so I thought I'd focus on that.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
You say understanding is the source of justification, but as I've already pointed out, justifying understanding requires pulling in perception

And I must have refuted this about 3 times.
Understanding does not need perception to justify it.
Think about it: To use perception to justify understanding you need to understand what perception is.
To make any justification you need understanding.
So to say that understanding requires any kind of justification is self contradictory.

That's why understanding is self attesting because denying it is self contradictory.

 


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Unfortunately...no. It's not

Unfortunately...no. It's not like "understanding is self-attesting" but rather Truth outruns provability at this point. That's the basic idea of this thread...and that's my basic complaint here. It doesn't particularly matter if the alternative to understanding is nonsense, but rather you've outrun formal provability here. You've erected a facade of "the alternative is nonsense" to prevent me from pushing you back to where you know there's truth, but no proof.

Am I wrong?

Understanding aside...no comments on my position about perception?

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formal systems

I have not had the time nor inclination to read through all of this thread but basically your argument fails because you have not understood properly the scope of Godels theory (I wont even start on the various misinterpretations and misunderstandings committed towards quantum theory).

Godels theory applies to formal systems.

Physics, God, the universe are not formal systems

Hence Godel's theory can not be applied to such. If you study the proof of Godel's theorum and understand the rather beautiful reasoning behind it you will understand exactly what I can't be applied to physics or god or blue banana's its just not the correct topic!

This being the case the rest of the "argument" is moot.

 

 


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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Unfortunately...no. It's not like "understanding is self-attesting" but rather Truth outruns provability at this point.

Not really. Understanding is necessary for truth.
You cannot evaluate a proposition to be true or false until you understand it.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
That's the basic idea of this thread...and that's my basic complaint here. It doesn't particularly matter if the alternative to understanding is nonsense, but rather you've outrun formal provability here. You've erected a facade of "the alternative is nonsense" to prevent me from pushing you back to where you know there's truth, but no proof.

Am I wrong?


If your aim was to point out that there's atleast something that we accept is true without proof then duh!
The infinite regression argument proves that quite obviously. (The argument of infinite 'why?')
Before you can gave proof you need the means of proof.
Everything that is proved starts with the understanding in place.
You either have the understanding or you have absolutely nothing.

Godel's proof was interesting as it showed that there were genuine propositions that were true but not provable.
So we're no longer being pedantic and talking about the framework of understanding and proof, but a proposition constructed within that framework.
So there are propositions out there that are true without being provable.
When you understand what those propositions entail are, you see that's not really a big deal.
The ideas that they refuted were a bit OOT in the first place and don't do anything to knock commonsense notions of truth and proof.

Your topic was centered on how this could be applied to God and physics.
As I've said before, these unprovable truths are special cases with special properties.
For them to have any application to your cause, you would need to find propositions of God and physics with similar properties.
As physics is a descriptive use of language, it doesn't use the grammatical devices necessary for a Godel paradox.
What's applicable to God depend on your definition of God, that's if there even is one.

I really think that you would benefit from working through that book on Logic that I suggested.
It's not a book on the philosophy of logic and wouldn't be preaching you my ideas.
If I was looking to educate you more on to my position then I'd probably point you in the direction of Wittgenstein.
Instead it's a great introduction to Formal Logic that will get you more familiar with it and devellop your grasp of it through practice.
I get the feeling that a lot of what you claim about logic and proof is based on theories that you've read about it rather than your own intuitive grasp of the practice.
The book has some complex theorems but the point will be to work through and devellop your own natural logical skills.
It's definately essential if you want to make use of Godel's theorem in any shape or form.
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Understanding aside...no comments on my position about perception?

I think I'll avoid it in this thread.
Your arguments are the traditional 'explanatory gap' ones. (Unless I misunderstood)
They show how the connection between 'perception' and 'physical event' is both counter intuitive and that there's yet to be given a decisive explanation on it.
My problem with discussing it is that as it is an explanatory gap, the debate would be me giving an explanation and then you giving the critique.
It's a worthy topic but there's enough on our plate and it's not a question that we need to answer in order to tackle the issue at hand.
What's more, the explanation is something that I need to work on more.
Another time perhaps.


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I knew it existed, I just

I knew it existed, I just didn't know the name. There is a thought-experiment that was first posed by John Searle in 1980 that demonstrates that understanding requires perception. It's called the "Chinese Room" thought experiment, and is outlined below in the (unlikely) even that you aren't familiar with it.

On the assumption that understanding requires perception (which I will demonstrate via a quote momentarily) then while "understanding" may be able to prove itself given itself, for it to exist in the first place requires perception, which as I've already demonstrated does not lend itself to physical explanation or justification purely by virtue of its nature.

John Searle {paraphrase from Brainmakers (Freedman, David H. 1994, pg. 180)} wrote:
Imagine a person who cannot speak or read Chinese is put in a room with a long list of rules for manipulating different Chinese characters into strings. When a string of characters is slipped under the door, the person consults the rules, produces a new string, and slips the result back under the door. If the incoming strings actually comprise questions, then a particularly clever and exhaustive set of rules could conceivably allow the person in the room to produce outgoing strings that comprised the answers to the questions.

From the point of view of a Chinese-speaking person outside the room slipping in questions, the room would seem to contain an intelligent person who is reading the questions and coming up with  answers. And yet the person in the room has no idea what he or she is reading, nor what he or she is writing. The questions and answers are a meaningless gibberish of symbols.

This is actually quite similar to the solipsist's skepticism. On the assumption that the "person" inside has perception, then the person is perceiving Chinese, but doesn't necessarily understand it. Conversely, if the "person" inside the room does not have perception, all that is left is to shuffle around with the rules, which rules out any possibility of understanding.

Understanding requires perception to occur, therefore understanding is not self-attesting.

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"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Okay.So the point that

Okay.
So the point that you're trying to get across here is that understanding entails perception, and if perception cannot have a physical explanation then that we have understanding refutes physicalism?
Looks like we've moved onto a brand new topic again.
I'd like to think that you keep moving us on because you keep finding my previous points irrefutable! Sticking out tongue
Anyhow, what follows is a brief outline on my views on perception.
As I said above, this is a topic that I still need to work on, but I'll give you what I have at the moment.

Perception comes in two parts:
There is the sense-data and the 'organisation' of this data.
There's the qualia of pure empirical experience and the interpretation of the perceiver that turns these pixels of 'colour' into a 'thing' that they saw.
I think that the idea that both were necessary for perception was rooted in Kant's work.
He argued that sense data without organisation was a meaningless blur and that organisation without the data was empty - there was no content.
Perception required both to be present.

So a camera can take a picture of the cat, but the camera doesn't 'perceive' a cat.
The camera merely stores the sense data.
It would take something that recognised the sense data as representing a cat to perceive the cat.
So there are two parts to explain - the empirical sense data and our mind's organisation of it.
The sense data shouldn't be difficult - our eyes, ears, and nerves in the body react with the outside world and send signals to the brain.
It shouldn't be s

Thought experiments like the Chineese Room and the Chinese Nation cheat.
They say things like "This machine would give out all the outputs as if it was an intelligent mind" but then goes on to explain how it does that using a scenario that our intuition recognises wouldn't work - i.e. when we imagine it happening like the thought experiment demands, we find it hard to imagine that it actually succeeds into fooling the person on the other side that it was an intelligent mind. They are only fooled because they were gulliable and didn't ask the right questions to test it and expose how it's not really a mind.
They also abuse our sense of identity.
In both cases they make use of other intelligent people who are performing functions to give this effect.
This stops us from feeling like the machine itself has an 'identity' and encourages us to feel like it's multiple identities pretending to be this single identity.
Basically, what these thought experiments do is show a conception of mind that sort of follows the rules of functionalism, but sneaks in other flaws in it like problems in realistic feasibility and identity, and when our intuition objects to those flaws they try and say that the problem is with the functionalism.


 


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Strafio wrote:Okay.So the

Strafio wrote:
Okay.
So the point that you're trying to get across here is that understanding entails perception, and if perception cannot have a physical explanation then that we have understanding refutes physicalism?
Looks like we've moved onto a brand new topic again.
I'd like to think that you keep moving us on because you keep finding my previous points irrefutable! Sticking out tongue

Well, as that this is a discussion of the metaphysical implications of Godel's Theorems -and that AI and perception are fields where Godel's Theorems are routinely used- this really isn't a change in topic. It's a tangent as to whether or not perception is metaphysical by nature.

Oh, by the way, I'm not the only one ignoring a few points. Before I pulled up the Chinese room you were going to ignore my points about perception.

Quote:
Perception comes in two parts:
There is the sense-data and the 'organisation' of this data.
There's the qualia of pure empirical experience and the interpretation of the perceiver that turns these pixels of 'colour' into a 'thing' that they saw.

Wrong.

dictionary.com wrote:
Perception: the act or faculty of apprehending by means of the senses or of the mind; cognition; understanding.

qualia: a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.

Perception is not about receiving data, then processing it into paterns (I assume via algorithms.) It's about receiving data and then translating that data into a qualia, and even that may be too close to your position. If the definitions are correct, qualia can be produced and perceived internally, so theoretically input and output are not needed to produce perception. I suppose that kind of effect is what you would call "imagination."

If you insist that such a thing is only a pattern sorting algorithm, then the parameters it's working around (no input or output required) are pretty unique among algorithms.

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Well, as that this is a discussion of the metaphysical implications of Godel's Theorems -and that AI and perception are fields where Godel's Theorems are routinely used- this really isn't a change in topic. It's a tangent as to whether or not perception is metaphysical by nature.

Oh, by the way, I'm not the only one ignoring a few points. Before I pulled up the Chinese room you were going to ignore my points about perception.


It wasn't ignoring.
I acknowledged them and pointed out that they weren't relevent to the matter at hand.
This question on perception relates in no way to Godel or even anything else we've discussed so far.
The only thing it has in common is being a 'gap' argument.
 

Strafio wrote:
Perception comes in two parts:
There is the sense-data and the 'organisation' of this data.
There's the qualia of pure empirical experience and the interpretation of the perceiver that turns these pixels of 'colour' into a 'thing' that they saw.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Wrong.

dictionary.com wrote:
Perception: the act or faculty of apprehending by means of the senses or of the mind; cognition; understanding.

qualia: a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.


Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Perception is not about receiving data, then processing it into paterns (I assume via algorithms.) It's about receiving data and then translating that data into a qualia, and even that may be too close to your position. If the definitions are correct, qualia can be produced and perceived internally, so theoretically input and output are not needed to produce perception. I suppose that kind of effect is what you would call "imagination."

Alright. So you want to separate Qualia that we get from hallucination and dreaming from the Qualia we get from our senses.
Other than this nitpicking of the details, do you have any further disagreement?
 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
If you insist that such a thing is only a pattern sorting algorithm, then the parameters it's working around (no input or output required) are pretty unique among algorithms.

Ofcourse there's input and output.
Whether the input comes from your senses or is created by the mind itself (e.g. dreaming) then there's still input.
When you have conscious thoughts, you can have a memory of them long after they've left your conscious, so there's quite clearly output too.


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Strafio wrote:Ofcourse

Strafio wrote:
Ofcourse there's input and output.
Whether the input comes from your senses or is created by the mind itself (e.g. dreaming) then there's still input.
When you have conscious thoughts, you can have a memory of them long after they've left your conscious, so there's quite clearly output too.

 

WHOA! Input can be created by the mind itself? Have you taken any programming at all?  I learned in my CSCI 1301 class that such a program will not run unless another program is running it, and even then it results in an infinite loop. Here's why:

1. Program A needs input X to run.

2. Program A creates the value X in the process of it's running.

3. Therefor Program A must have run before Program A could ever run.

 

There are two slightly different alternatives. One is that another program inserts a temporary value for X until the true value for X is created, but then we wouldn't be talking about a single algorithm. The other is for you to assign a trash value to X before the program creates the actual value, which is equally poor programming because there's wasted input and you have an added task to create the trash value.

In effect, these boil down to the same thing: wasted input.

Besides, "dreaming" is not what I was talking about. I was talking about conceptualization, which is determined by the mind  (isn't input) and yet isn't broadcast to the universe (so it isn't output, either.)

"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few." George Berkeley
"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sir Valiant for Truth

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

WHOA! Input can be created by the mind itself? Have you taken any programming at all?  I learned in my CSCI 1301 class that such a program will not run unless another program is running it, and even then it results in an infinite loop. Here's why:

Please stop. Considering a programming analogue proof positive that Strafio's statement is impossible is nothing short of ridiculous. Is your brain a computer? No. Saying your brain is like a computer is one thing. Saying your brain IS a computer would just be wrong. Strafio knows that. He's making a grown-up argument.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Besides, "dreaming" is not what I was talking about. I was talking about conceptualization, which is determined by the mind  (isn't input) and yet isn't broadcast to the universe (so it isn't output, either.)

If you can come up with a mind that has not experienced input, then you might have a point. Difficult task, though.

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:

HisWillness wrote:
Drop the condescending tone. Especially when you're presenting the merits of someone else's argument, only to disown it when you can't answer questions about it. If you're so sure he's right, but you don't understand what he's saying, then why do you think he's right?

I'm still not responsible for his argument being more complex than needed. I'm not responsible for what happens if some of my non-original arguments aren't clear. I'm only responsible for how I use them...and as the originator does outrank me and is relevant to the discussion, it is also arguable that I am obliged to post it, even though it is a little confusing.

I repeat: If you're so sure he's right, but you don't understand what he's saying, then why do you think he's right?

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Sir Valiant for Truth

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
WHOA! Input can be created by the mind itself? Have you taken any programming at all?  I learned in my CSCI 1301 class that such a program

will not run

unless another program is running it, and even then it results in an infinite loop. Here's why:

HisWillness wrote:
Please stop. Considering a programming analogue proof positive that Strafio's statement is impossible is nothing short of ridiculous. Is your brain a computer? No. Saying your brain is like a computer is one thing. Saying your brain IS a computer would just be wrong. Strafio knows that. He's making a grown-up argument.

Cheers for the support but I'll defend him on the programming analogy.
Given that I'm defending the mind as a physical process, any physical process can be described as a program.
Neuroscience is the study of the behaviour of the mind and many programmers are trying to see what they can learn from it to devellop more sophisticated computers.
 

Strafio wrote:
Ofcourse there's input and output.


Whether the input comes from your senses or is created by the mind itself (e.g. dreaming) then there's still input.
When you have conscious thoughts, you can have a memory of them long after they've left your conscious, so there's quite clearly output too.


 

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
WHOA! Input can be created by the mind itself? Have you taken any programming at all?  I learned in my CSCI 1301 class that such a program will not run unless another program is running it, and even then it results in an infinite loop. Here's why:

1. Program A needs input X to run.

2. Program A creates the value X in the process of it's running.

3. Therefor Program A must have run before Program A could ever run.


Looks like I need to replain it better.
Conscious has input/output from other areas of the mind.
Sometimes the input is sense data.
Sometimes the input is memory.
Sometimes the input is another idea.
The subconscious parts of the mind are often working on things and if they find something that they feel the conscious mind ought to know about, they pass it through.
That's why you get the "Eureka" moments when an idea appears to come out of nowhere.
It actually happens that your subconscious processes have probably been working on it for hours, but this is the first time it has been presented to the conscious mind.

Consciousness takes input from other parts of the mind and it also gives output.
Our conscious decisions affect our actions and conscious experiences are stored as memory.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Besides, "dreaming" is not what I was talking about. I was talking about conceptualization, which is determined by the mind  (isn't input) and yet isn't broadcast to the universe (so it isn't output, either.)

That's because conceptualisation is something that happens in the processes inbetween.


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HisWillness wrote:I repeat:

HisWillness wrote:
I repeat: If you're so sure he's right, but you don't understand what he's saying, then why do you think he's right?

I don't recall you ever saying that. As a matter of fact, I DO understand what he's saying, but if I changed his argument to make it more understandable, then it would be my argument, not his...and as that he is more qualified in this field than I am (and I prefer to remain safely anonymous, anyway) then it makes more sense for me to just cite his argument without changing it (which is what I did.)

Strafio wrote:

Looks like I need to replain it better.
Conscious has input/output from other areas of the mind.
Sometimes the input is sense data.
Sometimes the input is memory.
Sometimes the input is another idea.
The subconscious parts of the mind are often working on things and if they find something that they feel the conscious mind ought to know about, they pass it through.
That's why you get the "Eureka" moments when an idea appears to come out of nowhere.
It actually happens that your subconscious processes have probably been working on it for hours, but this is the first time it has been presented to the conscious mind.

Well, I have my suspicion that there is no such thing as "subconscious" but rather things that we are have such a limited scope of effect on consciousness that any tasks run in parallel will drown them out, but that's beside the point.

Input from memory and ideas (and arguably sense data as well)  is not an input from a single algorithm to itself, but is input from one algorithm to another. In other words, consciousness is not a single algorithm, but a collection of algorithms working together, some call other algorithms, some take input from other algorithms, and some are recursive.

This is good programming, but it's also a radically different model from the original one you originally posed that there was input via senses and then a pattern-detecting algorithm that was run on that input. While it is conceivable for a single algorithm to be reducible in its complexity, systems of algorithms -by nature- not reducible. The exception is if all of the algorithms can be collapsed into a single algorithm, which is not true in this case.

We know that algorithms are based on instructions, which are based on information, so while I can see the Intelligent Design Irreducible Complexity notion not applying to biology, unless you can explain otherwise it seems to apply by default to algorithms. Intuitively, this makes sense: we can empirically verify that changing a random bit or byte in MS DOS 6 creates a failed program rather than eventually making Windows Vista.

Quote:
Consciousness takes input from other parts of the mind and it also gives output.
Our conscious decisions affect our actions and conscious experiences are stored as memory.

Quote:
That's because conceptualisation is something that happens in the processes inbetween.

I know of a Psychologist: Jeffery Schwartz (sp?) who believes that the mind is able to exert control over it's own neurochemistry. He even has a program for treating OCD this way, which has been observed to work in some cases when drugs and therapy have failed. So...can the human mind exert control over its own function? If this is the case, then doesn't this make it non-algorithmic? If it's not the case, how do you explain the results?

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"Truth is always strange — stranger than fiction." Lord Byron

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Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Well, I have my suspicion that there is no such thing as "subconscious" but rather things that we are have such a limited scope of effect on consciousness that any tasks run in parallel will drown them out, but that's beside the point.

If you're interested, this book pretty much proved the existence of the subconscious through psychological experiments.
It's a fantastically interesting book if you ever have the time.
It also reminds you how much of our 'competence' comes from our subconscious functions, and important reminder for those of us who have assumed that everything important is what we are conscious of.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
Input from memory and ideas (and arguably sense data as well)  is not an input from a single algorithm to itself, but is input from one algorithm to another. In other words, consciousness is not a single algorithm, but a collection of algorithms working together, some call other algorithms, some take input from other algorithms, and some are recursive.

This is good programming, but it's also a radically different model from the original one you originally posed that there was input via senses and then a pattern-detecting algorithm that was run on that input. While it is conceivable for a single algorithm to be reducible in its complexity, systems of algorithms -by nature- not reducible. The exception is if all of the algorithms can be collapsed into a single algorithm, which is not true in this case.


My original algorithm was for perception, and I guess I was thinking of perceiving the external world when perception means a lot more than that.

We know that algorithms are based on instructions, which are based on information, so while I can see the Intelligent Design Irreducible Complexity notion not applying to biology, unless you can explain otherwise it seems to apply by default to algorithms. Intuitively, this makes sense: we can empirically verify that changing a random bit or byte in MS DOS 6 creates a failed program rather than eventually making Windows Vista.

The irreducible complexity argument was an interesting idea, only it applies even less to the functions of the mind than it does to biology.
The human brain is a very versatile organ and is constantly re-programming itself.
Again, I recommend this book which spends a lot of time on looking into how we learn and then how our brain with it's neurons makes this happen, makes us capable of learning things.

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I know of a Psychologist: Jeffery Schwartz (sp?) who believes that the mind is able to exert control over it's own neurochemistry. He even has a program for treating OCD this way, which has been observed to work in some cases when drugs and therapy have failed. So...can the human mind exert control over its own function? If this is the case, then doesn't this make it non-algorithmic? If it's not the case, how do you explain the results?

Not really. It's possible to give the computer a program that programs a welding machine to change it's own chipset.
A 'program' on the mind would be one that instructs the biology of the brain to change in a certain way.
Besides, the brain is always changing itself - it's how neurons work.
It's a much more sophisticated 'computer' than those 'set in stone' silicon chips.
Again, I recommend the book.


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Think maybe we don't know

Think maybe we don't know jack shit ?

Eloise wrote:
The mathematical systems used to model physics are incomplete and sound.

  Absolutely   2 + 2  is 4 , but ........ ???   


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"God and Gödel’s

"God and Gödel’s Theorem of Incompleteness"   [Brain edit]

Just wondering if I / you will agree with my uneducated musings, as I question what came first, the chicken or the egg, and how does consciousness play into this "life" manifestation?   

  Physics is our highest "inherently innate" dogmatic mathematical modeling tool.

  Philosophy investigates knowledge and all dogmas.   

  Religion is dogma fantasy .....
 
  Lack of knowledge is not proof of a separate supernatural god "anything".

Philosophy is: "love of wisdom; rational investigation of theories and principles or knowledge, existence, and conduct" , ..... written as our evolving linguistics.

Science is modeling the universe, primarily using our math dogma, and "publicly" communicated in the style of "folklore", by our linguistics.

Science and Philosophy is helpful and, acknowledge themselves as inescapably dogmatic, while religion "fundamentalism" is unhelpful "blind dogmatic surrender", in denial.

(((  our goal???  is eliminating "unnecessary life suffering" ..... Right ??? )))

Then then there are the comedians !  The best of all !  ..... 

Ahh fuck, all is one,  ONE , and everyone is nuts !  

Fix my damn words , you the "saved" .... you Atheists and Theists .... I AM GOD !  

   AS YOU .....     ( even shit faced )     
 


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Strafio wrote:The human

Strafio wrote:
The human brain is a very versatile organ and is constantly re-programming itself.

...OK... perhaps this is why AI hasn't been created yet. We've written programs that make other programs, but we've never written a program that can edit itself. A program can delete an unused function, but doesn't have the tools to create a new function from scratch. Even if it did, the tendency of logical systems is to loose complexity as rules are internally edited, not for complexity to be gained.

I'm not saying it's impossible. I'm saying that such a system is so inherently unstable that something that is as generally stable as the human mind is being such a system nears incredibility.

Quote:
It's possible to give the computer a program that programs a welding machine to change it's own chipset.
A 'program' on the mind would be one that instructs the biology of the brain to change in a certain way.
Besides, the brain is always changing itself - it's how neurons work.
It's a much more sophisticated 'computer' than those 'set in stone' silicon chips.

I'll check out the book if I can find it. Even if we have a sub-conscious, its effects must be quite limited to explain effects that have been observed with biofeedback machines.

Isn't the hardware around which the algorithm is run pretty much irrelevant? It should only change how fast a given algorithm takes to run. Besides, even a system that is changing itself must be changing itself according to another algorithm, so you've added another layer of complexity to the algorithms and not explained the apparent effect: an algorithmic system "willing" itself to have different output given the same input.

I don't see how such an effect (or mirroring effect) can be an algorithm because algorithms (and systems of algorithms) should by default always give the same output for a given input because the algorithm itself is just a very specific list of instructions. It has no freedom to change those instructions. Different outputs for the same inputs suggest what we are looking at is a non-algorithmic system that isn't random, either.

I AM GOD AS YOU wrote:
Just wondering if "you" basically agree with my uneducated summary?

Who is ""you""?

I think that "science" is another form of idealism. While the scientific method and experiment repeatability work just fine, the method scientific journals use to remove personal bias from papers -peer review- is not.

Peer review is used to remove bias and inaccurate facts from a paper. The problem is that the bias that is removed and the inaccurate facts that are corrected via peer review are totally dependent on who does the reviewing. In other words, peer review isn't repeatable in the way that experiments are, and it gives no guarantee that it will remove bias or inaccurate facts. In fact, it is entirely conceivable that if the "peers" have a similar bias to the author that the bias will be enhanced.

In this regard, science is the lowest of the means of inquiry of the world. It is impure to an extent that can only be subjectively measured and removed.

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I AM GOD AS YOU, before I

I AM GOD AS YOU, before I could comment on your summary I'd need to summarise it myself to make sure I understood you...
But then you'd probaby need to summarise that...
I think this could go on for some time...

So I say fuck it, and high five for commendians. thumbs up

Sir Valiant for Truth wrote:
I'm not saying it's impossible. I'm saying that such a system is so inherently unstable that something that is as generally stable as the human mind is being such a system nears incredibility.

The 'stability' of a human mind is achieved through habit.
The brain starts with with lots of neurons with no bonds.
When neurons connect, that connection becomes stronger and it's more likely to happen again.
Things we do lots create powerful connections.
That is how the 'self changing system' builds stability.

That's a weak 4 sentence explanation anyhow.
We've moved on from Philosophy to Psychology and Neuroscience.
I think I'll leave you with that book.
It's a great book and I think you'll find it fascinating in itself, even where it doesn't touch on our debate.

Quote:
Isn't the hardware around which the algorithm is run pretty much irrelevant? It should only change how fast a given algorithm takes to run. Besides, even a system that is changing itself must be changing itself according to another algorithm, so you've added another layer of complexity to the algorithms and not explained the apparent effect: an algorithmic system "willing" itself to have different output given the same input.

I guess the 'higher' algorithm of how the other algorithms change will be the more basic functions of the brain.
Again, it's biology rather than philosophy.

Quote:
I don't see how such an effect (or mirroring effect) can be an algorithm because algorithms (and systems of algorithms) should by default always give the same output for a given input because the algorithm itself is just a very specific list of instructions. It has no freedom to change those instructions. Different outputs for the same inputs suggest what we are looking at is a non-algorithmic system that isn't random, either.

Who says that the mind has to made of fixed algorithms?
We only brought algorithms in because physical processes can be described as such.
The concept Dog refers to a lot of different animals with enough similarities to come under the same concept but millions of subtle differences.
Functions of the mind would be similar.
That it organises sense data etc would be something in common with all functions we call 'perception' but they wouldn't all have to do it in the same fixed way.

 

Anyhow, I recommend two books:
Formal Logic - It's Scope and Limits will take you through the basics in formal logic - essential for a better understanding of Godel.
Hare Brain and Tortoise Mind is just a fascinating book on the mind and will bring great understanding about the functions of your subconscious, particularly your creativity and intuition.

Let me know if you pick either of them up.