The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God (TAG) asserts that whenever the non-believer employs the use of morality, logic, and science we do so from the presupposition that God exists, otherwise, how can we suppose that these sets of 'laws' would operate consistently? Without god as a foundation, they argue, everything falls into 'relativism' – where there are no absolute truths or valid foundations to justify any claims of knowledge. Christians themselves maintain that their own knowledge claims are validated through revelation that is received by them from God. In the absence of such revelation it is believed that the only alternative is chaos and a necessary ignorance of every issue.

Here is a review of how others have defined it:

Michael Martin writes:

Some Christian philosophers have made the incredible argument that logic, science and morality presuppose the truth of the Christian world view because logic, science and morality depend on the truth of this world view [1]. Advocates call this argument the Transcendental Argument for Existence of God and I will call it TAG for short.

http://www.reformed.org/apologetics/martin_TAG.html

The transcendental argument (TAG) is an argument for the existence of God that attempts to show that logic, science, ethics, and other often-thought-to-be good things in philosophy presuppose God's existence. That is, you can't make sense of them unless you stipulate that God exists. The argument is used by presuppositional apologists. Transcendental reasoning is inference about the prerequisite conditions for the possibility of knowledge. All major philosophies have transcendental theories.

http://www.fact-index.com/t/tr/transcendental_argument_for_the_existence_of_god.html

The transcendental argument (TAG) is an argument for the existence of God that attempts to show that logic, science, ethics, and other often-thought-to-be good things in philosophy presuppose God's existence. That is, you can't make sense of them unless you stipulate that God exists. The argument is used by presuppositional apologists. Transcendental reasoning is inference about the prerequisite conditions for the possibility of knowledge. All major philosophies have transcendental theories.

The TAG aims to prove God's existence from the impossibility of the contrary. Theists and nontheists alike rely on logic, science and ethics. The Christian God, being all logical, all uniform, and all good, exhibits his character in the created order. It is the Christian's contention that no other worldview can account for these things. Therefore, Christianity is true by being the sole contender left standing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendental_argument_for_the_existence_of_God

The proof of God's existence lies in the fact that God's existence is the necessary presupposition for all human knowledge. Man, as a limited being, must START their knowledge with God and His revelation in order to know anything at all and interpret the universe at all. God, as the measure of all things, is where our reasoning MUST start.

http://www.christianguitar.org/forums/archive/index.php/t-12980.html

The problems with TAG involve errors in ontology and epistemology so basic and so numerous that my attempt to write a refutation is stymied by the puzzle of which refutation to choose to use first. Let's begin here:

TAG is a Naked Assertion

TAG is an assertion based on a presumed dilemma. It does not define its terms nor does it give us an explanation of just how TAG accomplishes the goal of eradicating the dilemma. It simply assert that belief in god is required for the world to make sense. How so? What does this belief accomplish? How does it work? No answer comes from the TAGer.

"Archer says, "Without a good and holy God in heaven above, however, there is no solution to be found in freethinking or any other kind of thinking." Again no proof or justification is provided. Just another assertion that is supposed to be sufficient unto itself. Too bad I didn't think of that approach! Instead of devoting so much time and effort to reading and research, I could have just forgotten about all my studies, thrown away my notes, discarded my citations, and told it like it is. That certainly would have been easier.'' - Dennis McKinsey from Bible Errancy (http://mywebpages.comcast.net/errancy/issues/iss160.htm)

TAG is a Naked Assertion that relies on Incoherent Terms

TAG claims that one must presuppose 'god' in order to come to certain conclusions, but this claim is proven nonsensical when one considers that TAG is incoherent: it relies on incoherent terms. Terms such as "immaterial' and "transcendent' and "god' are purely negative terms without any ontological status.

http://www.rationalresponders.com/god_is_an_incoherent_term

TAG is a Naked Assertion that Relies on Incoherent terms, and violates the Concepts of Contingency and Necessity.

TAG offers up a confusion: While 'god' cannot be defined in positive terms, secondary traits assigned to 'god' such as 'omnipotent' and 'omniscient' can be examined independently. And it follows from the definitions of these secondary traits that anything created and sustained by an 'omnipotent creator' would exist contingently, as omnipotence obviates necessity by definition. Yet tautologies are necessarily true. How can a tautology be contingently true and necessary true, at the same time?

TAG is a Naked Assertion that Relies on Incoherent terms, and violates the Concepts of Contingency and Necessity as well as Basic Ontology

Let's first consider the problem of a 'supernatural being' being as the fountain of natural laws: the claim is necessarily a non sequitur. We've already discussed the ontological dilemma with making a reference to anything beyond nature - anything defined solely in negative terms. Next, we know that nothing natural can point back to its own antithesis, the supernatural, as nothing with onotological status can point towards something without any ontological status. In addition, we would expect that any universe created by, contingent upon, and sustained by a 'supernatural' 'force' would be magical, not lawful. Otherwise, if this 'god' 'worked' lawfully, causally, this 'god', this 'god' would then enter the causal chain, and be a natural entity. And this would undermine the entire supposed point of requiring this 'necessary' being as the solution to the Kalam-esque problem of creation. Any 'god' that is part of the causal chain could not create ex nihilo.

So to return to the original point, any universe created by a supernatural 'being' would be a universe created by fiat, where every parameter of existence would exist by fiat alone... it would be unlawful, unpredictable, random, literally "whimsical'. Does this represent our universe?

No.

On the other hand, if logic, reason, and order are universals that 'god' has to 'follow' if god were limited in some way, we leave theism altogether and enter pantheism. We'd have Spinoza and Einstein's god. The god of Christian theology would be out of a job.

Clever readers will recognize this answer to the transcendental argument as a permutation on Socrates' Euthyphro dilemma, indicating that the solution to this problem predated Christianity itself.

The most common theist response:

Theists will seek to avoid this dilemma by arguing that a third option exists: "Logic, etc. is/are part of god's 'character'. However this attempt to avoid both horns of the dilemma commits two blunders that, and ultimately forces the honest theist to return to one of the two horns of the dilemma.

Blunder number 1:

Ontological: This claim leads to a stolen concept fallacy. Here's how: 'Supernatural', 'is' defined as beyond nature - i.e. 'not nature', a purely negative definition without any remaining universe of discourse, ergo the term "supernatural" is a broken concept. As a broken concept it cannot refer to anything by definition. So to say that something beyond nature, has a nature, is to steal the concept of naturalism.

Attempted Rebuttal: Some balk at this as a play on words, by claiming that 'nature' and 'having a nature' are two different concepts altogether. This commits two more ontological errors. 1) This merely begs the question that we can speak of nature, devoid of nature! 2) Basic ontology tells us that to exist is to exist as something, to have identity, to have positive attributes. It is these positive attributes that give something a character. To define something as beyond nature is to rule out the ability to apply any positive attributes. Another way to understand this error is to recognize that any positive attribute is a limit. To have identity is to have limits. To define something as unlimited is to hold that it can't have limits. Ergo, it is beyond character/nature/identity.

Review:

Basic ontology, built off the basic axioms of reason, tell us that to exist is to exist as
something, to have identity, to have attributes. Existence and identity speak to limits. To be something is to not be what it is not. A=A. A does not equal NOT A.

To define something as supernatural is to say it is beyond limits, hence, beyond identity, hence beyond character, hence without a nature.

**********************

Blunder number 2:

It is a bizarre notion that 'logic' could be a part of any thing's 'character'. This is a category error of the first order! Logic applies to arguments, the referents to entities, not the entities themselves! By "logic" the TAGer can only mean that this 'god' has an ontology, a set of positive attributes, i.e. the TAGer can only be referring to metaphysics: ontology, and not "logic".

But we know from above that this 'god' has no ontological status.

Leaving this aside, let's assume for the sake of argument that this 'god' somehow has a 'character' and that this character is 'logical'. This leads us to the TAGer's next blunder:

Blunder number 3:

we must ask: can this 'god' change 'it's character?

If 'he' can, then we return to the first horn of the dilemma.

If 'he' cannot, we return to the second.

The attempt to seek sanctuary by placing 'logic' within 'god's character' fails on multiple fronts.

QED

TAG is a Naked Assertion that Relies on Incoherent terms, and violates the Concepts of Contingency and Necessity as well as Basic Ontology, including the concepts of Axioms

Whether or not the theist uses the term 'axiom', or other terms like 'reference point' (How can nature refer to it's own antithesis, the supernatural?!) is irrelevant. TAG boils down to a claim for 'god' representing an axiom, i.e. a necessary foundational part of any claim. (The fact that TAGers don't grasp what an axiom is is apparent in the flaws of TAG itself.)

1) Why God can't serve as an axiom*, and the Necessity of Epistemological Autonomy

A) The Presuppositionalists' "Presuppositions"

Leaving aside, for a moment the ontological problems of any reference to the supernatural, the second major fatal flaw of the presuppositionalist position is that there are axioms more 'properly basic' than his 'god' claim. In fact, the advocate of TAG must presuppose and employ the basic metaphysical axioms of existence, identity and consciousness before he 'presuppose' his 'god'.These axioms are properly basic to reason, they are epistemological in nature; they allow us to identify and know the world. Hence it is the TAGer who is stealing the concept within his own argument! He must rely upon naturalistic epistemology.

Can a presuppositionlist simply deny this claim?

If the presuppositionalist were to declare that God is more basic than the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness he would argue himself into incoherence. He would turn 'nothing' into an axiom. Literally.

Finally, TAG advocates have asserted (not argued) that while logical law may certainly be axiomatic, the non-believer is unable to account for why these axiomatic laws exist. Here the theist appears to wander off into cosmology. These axioms exist because, again, because any entity has positive attributes, and any sentient entity is able to work out, a priori, from basic ontology, the basic axioms of existence: to exist is to exist as something, to have identity, and to be aware of this is to be conscious.

TAG is a Naked Assertion that Relies on Incoherent terms, violates the Concepts of Contingency and Necessity as well as Basic Ontology, including the concepts of Axioms and actually commits the same error that it supposedly exists to solve

I discuss this error in full here:

http://www.rationalresponders.com/an_easy_argument_to_refute_van_tillian_calvinist_presuppositionalism

Briefly:

The Christian "solution" for the insufficiency of the assumption of the Uniformity of nature is "God told me (via the biblical revelation) that he promises to uphold the general uniformity and intelligibility of nature."

In doing this the Christian believes he has at once justified induction (because our inferences will be made against a universe that will act uniformly) AND avoided the essential problem of induction because their conclusion about the Uniformity Of Nature is not based upon induction; but upon revelation. They have a "third way" of knowledge, unacknowledged in our world view, which "solves" such epistemological problems.

But...even accepting this as true for the sake of argument.... they don't solve it! They've just slipped the problem back a step. The Christian has simply predicated the Uniformity Of Nature on the Uniformity Of (a) God (who will purportedly uphold the uniformity of nature). You ain't gonna have any uniformity of nature if the God upholding it isn't uniform Himself. So we can ask the same question to the Christian about the foundation for their belief in the uniformity of God: Leaving aside, for a moment, the insurmountable ontological problems with the 'god' term, on what non-question-begging grounds can you justify your expectation that God will keep his promise, or that God will be as he is tomorrow as he was yesterday?" You run into the same meta-problems that follow from using the uniformity of nature argument!*

On the same argument used by the presupper, the conclusion is inescapable: they can't do so. They ARE appealing to induction whether they refuse to acknowledge it or not.

Recap

TAGers cannot explain how TAG actually works. They merely assert a dilemma based on a misunderstanding of the problem of induction, without even offering a proof that the dilemma exists. TAGers reveal a poor grasp of the basics of logic, metaphysics. TAG advocates fail to recognize the slew of concealed presuppositions that the transcendental argument ultimately relies upon. It does so in that it presents god to be the foundation for logical process and yet must employ the exact opposite view of using the axioms of logic in order to confirm its position.

On the other hand, non-believers need only presuppose these axioms when employing the use of logical process and therefore God as a presupposition is unnecessary and ultimately irrelevant.

See:

The Transcendental Argument for the Nonexistence of God

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martin-frame/tang.html

TAG and the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept:
An Overview of TAG and Internal Reasons Why It Must Fail
by Anton Thorn

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Sparta/1019/Morgue/TAG_Stolen_Concept.htm

* A metaphysical axiom is an atomic statement, not capable of being broken down into smaller components, that is defended through retortion.

Retortion: Defense through retortion occurs when one is forced to rely upon the concept one seeks to refute. To deny existence, you must concede the existence of the axiom in order to deny it! There is nothing to the term 'god does not exist' that leads to an internal contradiction.

Question: Don't naturalists have to start out with unsupported assumptions?

This is a question that relates to foundationalism: the claim that all systems of thought must begin by making basic assumptions that are in turn used to get any system of knowledge 'off the ground'. Some putative examples (I don't necessarily agree on any of these being unsupported) might be: assuming the reliability of the senses allows me to make inferences from sensory knowledge, the assumption of the utility of reason to accurately know the world allows me to rely on reason, the need to assume that others experience a first person ontology, allows me to enter into meaningful discourse with others, etc.

I want to first note that one's epistemological starting point need not be foundationalism. One may employ other models instead, such as coherentism, (which denies that there is a need for foundationalism as there is no infinite regress problem), contextualism and pragmatism, which 'sidesteps the issue' by looking at the value of any human practice. Of course, one could also combine elements of any system, particularly if one is a Hegelian!

Now, I'd like to talk about naturalistic assumptions.
There are two types in my estimation: axiomatic knowledge, and basic assumptions that are not defended through retortion.

Axioms of reason would include the axiom of existence, identity and sentience.

Unfortunately, these axioms don't tell us anything about the 'world' around us, other than that 'something' exists, that whatever exists, exists as one thing and not another, and that these deductive truths demonstrate that we, the gleaner of these axioms, must be aware, seeing as we are aware of these axioms. If all we wanted out of life was a very basic metaphysic grounded in bedrock certainty, we would be content. If we want more, we must move past these axioms, and risk error.

And this is where a naturalist foundationalist would move to basic assumptions: self evident 'first principles' - beliefs that any natural being seems forced to make in order to operate in the world.

(Note: not all naturalists are foundationalists, see how complex this discussion really is?)

Hearing this, some might hold that since we must start with assumptions, this somehow grants us a freedom to assume whatever we like. However, this is a ridiculous strawman of the situation. While there are no deductive proofs for naturalistic assumptions, this does not mean that they are accepted without any grounds at all! And this is the basic error in theistic claims for equity between their assumptions, and naturalistic assumptions.

Let's look at how wrong their claim is:

1) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would only justifies what is required in order to begin knowing the world.

If, for example, there is in fact a need to assume the existence of other first person ontology other than my own, this assumption only allows me to assume whatever is needed to unpack first person ontology, nothing more.

2) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would never justify holding to an assumption that fails to adequately account for reality.

This is where pragmatism enters into any foundationalist approach to justifying knowledge. Pragmatic philosopher Nicholas Rescher declares that we are within our epistemic rights to hold to a basic assumption only as long as there is a bilateral feedback loop between assumptions and knowledge. Any claim, such as the future will resemble the past - may be presupposed, as long as the claim is open to revision/falsification. Thus, any assumption we use not only undergirdles attempts to gain knowledge, but must be subject to testing in the very process of gaining knowledge.

The presupposition of 'god' is incapable of being tested, rendering the 'god presupposition' pragmatically meaningless.

3) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would not justify making any assumption that violated what we know of the world through rational-empirical methods.

Consider Stephen Hawkings here, in his description of speculative cosmological theory:

"There are cosmological models that have as much evidence going for them as astrology. They differ from astrology, however, in that they do not violate what we already know of the universe." - Universe in a Nutshell.

4) The claim that we must make assumptions in order to begin to know the world would not justify any supernatural or 'transcendent' assumption. Why? Because these terms, "supernatural" and 'transcendent' are defined from the outset, in such a way that they preclude the possibility of holding to them as 'properly basic beliefs' because each definition is a negative definition, devoid of any universe of discourse.

To clarify further:

A negative definition requires a universe of discourse for it to be able to tell us 'anything'. For example, if I hold out a box with two objects, a penny and a pencil and rule out the penny as the object I want to point out to you, the universe of discourse (items in the box) provides you with information concerning what the object in question 'is" - the pencil.

However, a negative definition devoid of any universe of discourse is necessarily meaningless. There's 'nothing' left over for it to 'be', so the definition cannot provide any ontological status. So, to go right to the heart of the matter, to say that the 'supernatural' is the antithesis of nature is to render the concept meaningless.

Review:

So, to review: a naturalist only assumes what is needed in order to active a particular system of thought, she drops any any assumption that is falsified*, she does not assume what appears to contradict what we know of the world, and she never assumes what violates basic ontology itself.

So, in finally answer the question: are these beliefs unjustified, I can say this: Yes, these beliefs are basic and they are unjustified in the epistemological sense in that there is no set of proofs or inductive evidence for them. But the claim that these beliefs are 'unjustified' in the colloquial sense of the word: that there's NO reason to hold to them, they are taken on faith!", is rendered nonsensical.

* A clever reader might say: "aha, but falsification itself appears to be an assumption!" Even if this is so, think this point through: are you trying to argue that a naturalist ought to reject falsification if falsification is falsified?