Abortion

Jacob Cordingley
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Abortion

Does it matter to the abortion debate whether foetuses are persons?

The subject of abortion is prone to great confrontation of ideas as members of both the anti and pro abortion campaigns clash in a never ending battle, sometimes even leading to acts of terrorism by the anti-abortion pro-life lobby. In the US particularly it is extremely controversial with government pressured from both sides; the pro-life and Christian groups wanting to ban it and the pro-choice wanting to keep it legal (or in some states legalise it) or even relax the limits upon it.

The main arguments between both sides rest on the question of when a life becomes a person[1]. Some pro-lifers believe that embryos are people or at the very least the fact that they are potential persons means they should not be killed whilst many pro-choice campaigners see six months into the pregnancy as a standard limit to when abortion should take place. Others such as neo-utilitarian Peter Singer and Michael Tooley believe that infanticide is ok and that babies are not persons. But do these arguments of exactly when and where personhood begins matter? Indeed does personhood matter?

This essay will argue yes this part of the debate matters and indeed is vitally important despite problems leading from subjective disagreements. In order to show why personhood is important we must first attempt to define what it is to be a person is and indeed what others believe it to be. There are two further problems we must then examine: the first is how an argument that doesn’t rest upon the idea of personhood may be flawed, the second is the problem that once we define personhood on logical grounds the pro-choice advocate might be faced with problems of their own definitions of personhood excluding more than just foetuses with the common case of infanticide.

There are many varying opinions held amongst people over what a person is. Religious belief usually is based on the abstract idea of a soul and that a foetus or embryo gains a soul at a certain point, usually at conception and non-religious pro-lifers believe the all humans are people. Scientific and secular pro-choice opinion is based more on when a foetus can think or when it can feasibly live externally from the womb (usually at about 6 months of pregnancy as is the legal limit in this country). Other more extreme thinkers such as Peter Singer and Michael Tooley believe that babies are not yet people and that therefore infanticide is acceptable just as abortion is.

Pro-life campaigners often simplify humanity as being all on the same moral level of personhood. A zygote, embryo or foetus (which for the purposes of this essay will all come under foetuses) is to them as much a person as a fully grown adult in the maturity of their brain. Don Marquis, a leading anti-abortion thinker believes that foetuses are innocent humans and therefore it is wrong to kill them. However his attempt to identify is vague and based mostly on the fact that a being is genetically human. His argument takes the example of premature death to prove what personhood is:

“Premature death is a misfortune, in general, because it deprives an individual of a future of value. An individual’s future will be valuable to that individual if that individual will come, or would come, to value it... Thus killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives her of a future like ours.”[2]

In essence Marquis’ ‘Future Like Ours’ argument is saying that because foetuses could potentially have a future like ours we are unjustified in killing them, that they are potentially people. The idea that foetuses potentially have futures like ours, i.e. that of being a person is unsatisfying however. It broadens personhood to include clumps of cells no more complex than the mould on a stale loaf of bread. Marquis, and indeed other pro-life thinkers do not offer a detailed account of what personhood is, they try and defend their position merely by lumping foetuses into the vague concept of humanity.

Mary Anne Warren, a pro-choice thinker attempts to describe what makes a being a person. She gives the example of a space traveller finding another planet on which life exists, would need to decide whether the various species on that planet were ‘people’ or whether they could be a potential source of food. There are six criteria which make a person: sentience, emotionality, reason, the capacity to communicate, self-awareness, moral agency.[3]

She makes it clear that not all these criteria need to be fulfilled in order for a being to be a person she uses the example of Mr Spock the human-alien hybrid and Data the android from Star Trek neither of whom can feel emotions but are undoubtedly people. What she does say is that a being with few or none of these criteria is undoubtedly not a person even if they have potential to become one. A foetus up until seven months of pregnancy has none of these, it may have some consciousness of light and sound before, and at seven months it only gains sentience, not enough to make it a person. In fact, Warren argues:

“Even a late term fetus[4] is arguably less like a person than are many nonhuman animals. Many animals (e.g., large-brained mammals, such as elephants, cetaceans, or apes) are not only sentient, but clearly possessed of a degree of reason and perhaps even self-awareness.”[5]

While the precise details of how to judge what makes a person are missing Warren provides a firm basis on which to judge. After all, there are differences between moral beings and some lesser animals, and here is a basis on which we can draw the line. People have rights; beings which aren’t people do not or even if they do then they come below the rights of people.

So if we can define what personhood can we define what rights a person has and which ones might be more important than others? There are many rights which are commonly accepted today and some which are debated but for the abortion debate there are two important rights: The right to life, and the right to control one’s own body.

It is widely acknowledged that people have the right to life – pro-life and pro-choice supporters alike so the argument still lies on whether or not a foetus is a person. However Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that although the foetus has personhood and therefore a right to life – at least at some point after conception – it does not have the right to maintain its life by using someone else. She uses this analogy:

“You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with a… famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood…”[6]

She goes on to say that if the violinist were to be unplugged from you anytime in the next 9 months he would die but asks if we should really be obliged to carry that burden. The analogy is fairly straight forward but it does have a very potent point. However as Don Marquis shows it cannot fully escape the personhood argument as it tries to.

Marquis clearly points out that “the right to life seems to be a stronger right than the right to control one’s own body in the case of abortion because the loss of one’s life is a greater loss than the loss of the right to control one’s body in one respect for nine months.”[7]

Marquis turns Thomson’s argument on its head. Rather than saying that the foetus’ right to life does not go as far as leeching off the mother’s body as Thomson does he says the opposite, that the mother’s right to control her own body does not go as far as ending another life. Here we find the biggest flaw on Thomson’s argument. Because she assumes that whether or not a foetus is or isn’t a person is not important and takes the assumption that it is a person then it is very easy to switch her argument around convincingly as Marquis has done.

Warren on the other hand takes Thomson’s argument along with her definition of what makes a person, making the pro-choice case much stronger.

“the basic rights of an actual person outweigh the rights of a merely potential person.”[8]

We might go even further than this to say that because the foetus is not a person it has no rights at all. It has no concept of itself, what it is, what death is, and therefore it would not know if it were to die.

However, there are problems with relying on the idea personhood in the abortion argument.

Warren’s definition of personhood which we will take to be a standard pro-choice definition[9], narrows down personhood to exclude not only foetuses but infants and people in a permanent unconscious vegetative state or mentally inactive state. An extreme view in this case would be a justification of infanticide.

One proponent of infanticide[10] Michael Tooley bases his argument on refuting all commonly conceived ideas about where the cut-off point should be which he states as: “(a) conception; (b) the attainment of human form; (c) the achievement of the ability to move about spontaneously; (d) viability; (e) birth.”[11] He argues in great length about why each one cannot be a viable cut-off point based on his definition of what personhood is. For the purposes of time I will not delve into this. His conclusion however comes to the claim:

“I believe, that a new born baby does not possess the concept of a continuing self, anymore than a new born kitten possesses such a concept. If so, infanticide during a time interval shortly after birth must be morally acceptable.”[12]

Infanticide to almost all people must seem like an extreme to condone. But if we accept that babies aren’t people in the same way that foetuses aren’t people and that it is ok to abort foetuses, can we really say that infanticide is wrong? Warren thinks that we can.

Warren argues that infanticide is wrong because there is no need to kill a new born baby; there are adoption and fostering services available in the modern world. If the mother doesn’t want the baby she can put it up for adoption or foster care (either of willing semi-parental carers or the state) even if it is seriously ill or handicapped. There is no longer any risk to the mother’s health in keeping the baby alive and she need not go through the pain of childbirth once the child is born because obviously she already has.[13]

Warren also points out that babies and indeed foetuses late in their development have features that arouse powerful protective instincts. This is also an argument against late abortion as it is emotionally traumatic for the woman as well as extremely painful as expelling the foetus would be very much like giving birth.[14]

We have examined various ideas as to what personhood is. Thinkers on both sides of the argument have thought that it is impossible to define what personhood is. Judith Thomson for example sought to defend abortion on grounds which ignored the question of whether a foetus was a person. This however we showed to fail because leaving the personhood of a foetus open to question it became extremely easy to present the foetus’ right to life above the right of the woman to control her body for nine months. We then saw that problems arose from the logical defining of personhood, that infanticide could be justified by people such as Tooley and Singer in extreme cases. However we saw that lines could be drawn against infanticide regarding the availability of other sources of care – that it is not necessary to destroy an already born baby. Lines could also be drawn against late abortion too because of the physical and psychological effects on the mother.

In conclusion. The debate over foetal personhood is important, nay crucial to the abortion debate because the abortion debate cannot be won without it. Moreover, it is extremely possible to define clear grounds as to what personhood is without having to go as far as Singer and Tooley and justify infanticide or even late abortion.


Word Count: 2,099

Bibliography:

(In order of use)

- Don Marquis, An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing

- Mary Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing

- Judith Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing

- Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, page 50 Princeton University Press, 1972 taken from JSTOR: link



[1] For the purposes of this essay, the word person or people will refer not only to human beings but any creature that fulfils the criteria offered by Mary Warren, see below. The word personhood will mean the quality of fulfilling most of the criteria.

[2] Don Marquis op cit. An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 87 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[3] Mary Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 76 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[4] The American spelling of foetus

[5] Mary Warren, op cit. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 78 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[6] Thomson op cit. A Defense of Abortion, published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 64 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[7] Marquis op cit. An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 84 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[8] Warren op cit. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 79 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[9] Other definitions by members of the pro-choice side of the argument are different but they still focus on various similar criteria, Tooley for example focuses on self-awareness as the defining criteria. For the purpose of simplicity Warren’s definition will be employed on behalf of those with similar viewpoints.

[10] Infanticide I will take to mean the killing of a new born baby at a point before it gains the criteria of personhood as set out either by Warren or Tooley.

[11] Tooley op cit. Abortion and Infanticide, published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, page 50 Princeton University Press, 1972 taken from JSTOR: link

[12] ibidem. Page 63

[13] Warren op cit. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion published in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Part 1, page 80 Hugh LaFollette, 2002, Blackwell Publishing.

[14] ibidem. Page 79

Mod: I tidied up your long-assed links because I'm nice like that! Smiling


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I would just like to make

I would just like to make one specific point about Mary Anne Warren's criteria for personhood.

I have read her article and discussed it before in a medical ethics class I had last semester. The implications of her criteria are alarming when looked at from all angles. Only persons who fit her criteria for personhood are moral agents. It is only morally wrong to kill moral agents (persons). Therefore, it should it be morally permissible to kill non-persons. For example, in the case of abortion, since fetuses are non-persons in her criteria, they are not moral agents and may be killed. Using a personhood criteria is alarming on so many other levels. What about the mentally disabled? What about infants? What about if someone is merely temporarily outside of the criteria standards, can we kill them? What if someone is temporarily inside the criteria standards, can we not kill them?

Bottom line is that Ms. Warren's argument allows for the moral permissibility of infaniticide and killing of the mentaly handicapped (just to name a few). Her attempt is valiant, but her implications are absolutely intolerable (morally).  

The implication that we should put Darwinism on trial overlooks the fact that Darwinism has always been on trial within the scientific community. -- From Finding Darwin's God by Kenneth R. Miller

Chaos and chance don't mean the absence of law and order, but rather the presence of order so complex that it lies beyond our abilities to grasp and describe it. -- From From Certainty to Uncertainty by F. David Peat


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jread wrote: I would just

jread wrote:

I would just like to make one specific point about Mary Anne Warren's criteria for personhood.

I have read her article and discussed it before in a medical ethics class I had last semester. The implications of her criteria are alarming when looked at from all angles. Only persons who fit her criteria for personhood are moral agents. It is only morally wrong to kill moral agents (persons). Therefore, it should it be morally permissible to kill non-persons. For example, in the case of abortion, since fetuses are non-persons in her criteria, they are not moral agents and may be killed. Using a personhood criteria is alarming on so many other levels. What about the mentally disabled? What about infants? What about if someone is merely temporarily outside of the criteria standards, can we kill them? What if someone is temporarily inside the criteria standards, can we not kill them?

Bottom line is that Ms. Warren's argument allows for the moral permissibility of infaniticide and killing of the mentaly handicapped (just to name a few). Her attempt is valiant, but her implications are absolutely intolerable (morally).  

Please bear in mind that my thinking has changed since December when I wrote this. I still find abortion acceptable but I have moved away from personhood somewhat and am more in favour of interest-based rights.


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Jacob Cordingley

Jacob Cordingley wrote:
jread wrote:

I would just like to make one specific point about Mary Anne Warren's criteria for personhood.

I have read her article and discussed it before in a medical ethics class I had last semester. The implications of her criteria are alarming when looked at from all angles. Only persons who fit her criteria for personhood are moral agents. It is only morally wrong to kill moral agents (persons). Therefore, it should it be morally permissible to kill non-persons. For example, in the case of abortion, since fetuses are non-persons in her criteria, they are not moral agents and may be killed. Using a personhood criteria is alarming on so many other levels. What about the mentally disabled? What about infants? What about if someone is merely temporarily outside of the criteria standards, can we kill them? What if someone is temporarily inside the criteria standards, can we not kill them?

Bottom line is that Ms. Warren's argument allows for the moral permissibility of infaniticide and killing of the mentaly handicapped (just to name a few). Her attempt is valiant, but her implications are absolutely intolerable (morally).

Please bear in mind that my thinking has changed since December when I wrote this. I still find abortion acceptable but I have moved away from personhood somewhat and am more in favour of interest-based rights.

 

All well and good then. I was just pointing out the personhood criteria, in my opinion, is a horrible argument in favor of abortion. The interest-based arguments are much compelling and interesting. 

Oh and I gotta ask, where do you study philosophy? If you say Oxford I will fall over and die of a heart attack induced from envy this instant.  

The implication that we should put Darwinism on trial overlooks the fact that Darwinism has always been on trial within the scientific community. -- From Finding Darwin's God by Kenneth R. Miller

Chaos and chance don't mean the absence of law and order, but rather the presence of order so complex that it lies beyond our abilities to grasp and describe it. -- From From Certainty to Uncertainty by F. David Peat


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Lancaster. It's a fairly

Lancaster. It's a fairly new University in my native North-West of England, it was established in the 1960s. It's one of the highest but most underestimated universities in the country. I believe it came fourth in the country for philosophy at the time I started, I'm not sure where it is now, but not much has changed.

I would actually hate to go to Oxford, they work their students like slaves! It's also full of toffs, if there's one thing I can't stand it's the English Upper Class! My dad went there in the late 70s/early 80s and absolutely hated it. My ex girlfriend is there and hates it.


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Wow. I guess that makes

Wow. I guess that makes sense. That happens in the top universities in the States as well. I've never heard or seen that word "toffs." Can you explain what it means?

What school of philosophy would you say that your philosophy department focuses on?  

The implication that we should put Darwinism on trial overlooks the fact that Darwinism has always been on trial within the scientific community. -- From Finding Darwin's God by Kenneth R. Miller

Chaos and chance don't mean the absence of law and order, but rather the presence of order so complex that it lies beyond our abilities to grasp and describe it. -- From From Certainty to Uncertainty by F. David Peat


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In terms of personhood I

In terms of personhood I still accept Warren's criteria by the way. However I would use it more as a way of grouping species with more interests, thus higher moral status, not any moral status at all. A foetus can get to a stage where it is sentient (i.e. it can feel pain) and so abortion should be made painless if possible, however a right to life comes from a conscious interest in life and a sense of self. I also bear natural intuitions in mind too. i.e. it would be wrong to put the mother through the psychological ordeal of aborting a late foetus, say after 6 months. Warren actually says the same and, unlike Singer does not condone infanticide.

 


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I didn’t read “An

I didn’t read “An Argument that Abortion is wrong” but I did read “Why abortion is immoral” also written by Marquis about ten years earlier. I find Marquis’ argument to be very unconvincing. If “the right to life seems to be a stronger right than the right to control one’s own body in the case of abortion because the loss of one’s life is a greater loss than the loss of the right to control one’s body in one respect for nine months.” then by that reasoning you can justify doing anything to a person or taking anything from a person that is necessary to your survival as long as you do it for less than nine months and it doesn’t kill them.

Also it’s glossing over the fact that it is not just “the loss of the right to control one’s body in one respect for nine months.” It’s a lifetime of raising a child, a lifetime of having their body permanently changed, or a lifetime of living with the decision to give the child away knowing that they’re out there somewhere. That is extremely short sighted to the point of stupidity.

And why does this apply to abortion and nothing else? Because women have it coming when they can’t keep their slutty little legs closed?

nice essay BTW.

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jread wrote: Wow. I guess

jread wrote:

Wow. I guess that makes sense. That happens in the top universities in the States as well. I've never heard or seen that word "toffs." Can you explain what it means?

What school of philosophy would you say that your philosophy department focuses on?  

Ahh sorry, slipping into dialect. Toff means upper class both aristocratic and upper bourgeois. The sort who send their kids to Eton or Harrow or some other public school (which actually means private school in this country, it's a confusing term)

As for Don Marquis, yeah I thought his arguments were piss poor also. I was never convinced. I did actually used to think abortion was wrong, at the same time I used to think swatting flies was wrong.


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You're missing a crucial

You're missing a crucial point though. The debate about whether an unborn child constitutes a person or not may be interesting for philosophers, but in context of the abortion debate it is quite irrelevant. It's being dragged in by the ears because in order to create an unambigous, all-encompasing legal wall against abortions a definition of personhood is required. In effect, theists are trying to construct a legal fiction - a shortcut entity on which law operates - in order to push their effort forwards. This is by its nature very much alike firemen setting fires or antivirus companies writing viruses: manufacturing a problem and selling a solution, albeit in a curiously perverse fashion where they're manufacturing a tool to manufacture a problem. That is where prying eyes of criticism should be focused.

In turn, I propose my own favourite pet argument against against abortions:

Forcing a woman to carry a child against her free will is sexual slavery.


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Mike Seth wrote: Forcing a

Mike Seth wrote:

Forcing a woman to carry a child against her free will is sexual slavery.

 Well, by saying this you open a whole new can o' worms. It begins the typical "fine print" aspects of abortion legislation. (ie instances of rape and/or incest) These instances support your position that it would (in my opinion) be slavery to force her to carry the child from a produce of rape and/or incest. 

Yet, in cases where the mother willing chose to engage in sexual intercourse the "sexual slavery" card becomes less powerful. The question pertaining to a mothers free will to not carry the baby comes into question when she willingly takes that risk of becoming pregnant. 

This is not me saying that I'm 100% pro-life and all abortions are wrong. I am merely pointing out that walking into a dangerous situation and knowing the danger you are getting yourself into severely brings to doubt the retention of your previous free will to act. Perhaps a clearer explanation will help you understand what I mean. 

A classic example in abortion debates has to do with the kidney  sharing example. The example goes: You're walking down the street and a person in a van comes and kidnaps you. You wake up and are hooked up to a dieing person. The kidnapper tells you, "If you unplug yourself from this dieing man, then you will kill him. He needs you to survive." The person hooked up to this man as a result of kidnapping is being held in slavery and is not morally obligated (in my opinion) to stay connected to the dieing person. 

On the other hand, in another situation the moral obligation question seemingly changes. The other example goes: You're walking down a normal street sidewalk. Suddenly, you see a sign that says "If you turn left and walk down this street, there is a small possibility of being kidnapped and hooked up to a dieing person for 9 months." Pondering for a moment, you decide to turn left and walk down the street. You remember that the street to the left is a shortcut to your destination. Suddenly, as you're about half way down the street, a van drives up and a person from inside kidnaps you. You wake up, hooked up to a dieing person and are told that if you disconnect yourself you will kill the dieing person. What is the kidnapped victim's moral obligation now? 

Now I'm not pretending to have "the answer" to this question of moral obligation. All I am trying to point out, is that the obligation factor does seem to change a person's freedom of will when they willingly risk their free-will. 

The implication that we should put Darwinism on trial overlooks the fact that Darwinism has always been on trial within the scientific community. -- From Finding Darwin's God by Kenneth R. Miller

Chaos and chance don't mean the absence of law and order, but rather the presence of order so complex that it lies beyond our abilities to grasp and describe it. -- From From Certainty to Uncertainty by F. David Peat


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jread wrote: Mike Seth

jread wrote:
Mike Seth wrote:

Forcing a woman to carry a child against her free will is sexual slavery.

Well, by saying this you open a whole new can o' worms. It begins the typical "fine print" aspects of abortion legislation. (ie instances of rape and/or incest) These instances support your position that it would (in my opinion) be slavery to force her to carry the child from a produce of rape and/or incest.

Yet, in cases where the mother willing chose to engage in sexual intercourse the "sexual slavery" card becomes less powerful. The question pertaining to a mothers free will to not carry the baby comes into question when she willingly takes that risk of becoming pregnant.

I contend. It is absolutely unimportant whether the mother willingly took the risk or not. As far as her rights are concerned, she has a complete dominion over her body, and no obligations whatsoever to be held accountable for whatever she chooses to do with this body. There is also no distinction between "not wanting to carry the baby" and "wanting to not carry the baby" as those are semantically equivalent (even though the underlying motivation behind both may be different) just the same as noble sounding "pro-life" is used to refer to people who are "against abortions".

In principle, there are no mitigating circumstances that can reduce an instance of sexual slavery to a social compromise any more than it is possible to reduce forced labor of black people on sugar plantations to an industrial compromise. That is exactly what makes it a strong argument. Sexual slavery is absolutely defined, very visible, completely undeniable and impossible to redefine, which is a very solid ground to stand on when you present your opinion before a court.

Quote:

This is not me saying that I'm 100% pro-life and all abortions are wrong. I am merely pointing out that walking into a dangerous situation and knowing the danger you are getting yourself into severely brings to doubt the retention of your previous free will to act. Perhaps a clearer explanation will help you understand what I mean.

A classic example in abortion debates has to do with the kidney sharing example. The example goes: You're walking down the street and a person in a van comes and kidnaps you. You wake up and are hooked up to a dieing person. The kidnapper tells you, "If you unplug yourself from this dieing man, then you will kill him. He needs you to survive." The person hooked up to this man as a result of kidnapping is being held in slavery and is not morally obligated (in my opinion) to stay connected to the dieing person.

There is no obligation on my part, correct.

Quote:

On the other hand, in another situation the moral obligation question seemingly changes. The other example goes: You're walking down a normal street sidewalk. Suddenly, you see a sign that says "If you turn left and walk down this street, there is a small possibility of being kidnapped and hooked up to a dieing person for 9 months." Pondering for a moment, you decide to turn left and walk down the street. You remember that the street to the left is a shortcut to your destination. Suddenly, as you're about half way down the street, a van drives up and a person from inside kidnaps you. You wake up, hooked up to a dieing person and are told that if you disconnect yourself you will kill the dieing person. What is the kidnapped victim's moral obligation now?

My obligation is still null, and your example is invalid; rather it illustrates a point that is not present in the abortion debate. Here's why.

In your hypothetical example, the initiation of agression against me (which is what it is, agression against me) is completely immoral. A person who would place such a sign is threatening me while I act within my rights (which are to walk the very street). Not only a crime would be committed if the person acted upon those threats, but also when this person posts the sign an immoral act is committed, and one may not seek relief from injury if his hands are unclean. The person in question asserts moral supremacy to be forced on other people, displaces the law and commits a crime at the same time; that person has duty before the society to obey the law (of unlawful imprisonment and assault, neither in dispute) which he or she disobeys.

On the other hand, a woman who chooses to ignore the risk of pregnancy or even chooses to become pregnant and changes her mind after some time does no immoral act, as she has no duty, neither before the society, nor before the unborn child, and consequently not before any authority, fictional or institutional, to preserve the child's life before birth.

Quote:

Now I'm not pretending to have "the answer" to this question of moral obligation. All I am trying to point out, is that the obligation factor does seem to change a person's freedom of will when they willingly risk their free-will.

I have to contend yet again: it does not. There is no obligation factor towards other persons; and one's obligations towards oneself may not be raised into matter of law. There is, in fact, also no obligation towards the father of the child (despite the status quo, laws that promote such obligation are too, immoral as they promote sexual slavery). Being fruitful and multiplying is a biblic obligation of man to god; and since god is fiction, obligations derived from it are best left in the lala land where they truly originate.


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An opportunity isn’t an

An opportunity isn’t an invitation. So in your analogy walking past the sign doesn’t mean you have any moral obligation to the person that hijacks you.

If you open the window of your apartment you might get burglarized but opening your window isn’t an invitation to burglars and you’re not obligated to let someone burgle you just because you opened it.

You seem to be saying that women have a responsibility to carry the child to term because they had sex, and they could avoid that by never having sex (I don’t like this just from a personal standpoint) but you could use that same line of reasoning and say that women can avoid pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy. Something like 1 in 6 women are raped and they know that rape is possible, and they know that they may become pregnant following the rape, yet they walk around without hysterectomies.

There are twists of time and space, of vision and reality, which only a dreamer can divine
H.P. Lovecraft


Mike Seth
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Yeah, that's what I was

Yeah, that's what I was trying to say. But either way, it goes further than not having an obligation.

In the eyes of law, your obligation is null and void. The person who has posted that sign has already committed a crime - not merely a dubiously justified act but a full blown crime - the moment they threatened you. A party that seeks relief in bad faith is not entitled to relief.

The problem with law and abortions, however, is much more involved. First of all, the prohibition of abortions is easy waters to navigate by: there's no reasonable base at all to prohibit abortions, as no fundamental rights are being hampered, and secondary rights (such as the alleged father's right to have a say on abortion) are trumped by the fact that the mother is the sole owner of her body, has no accountability towards any authority, and may not be held to act with it against her wishes.

This glaring omission in founding documents of all modern legal systems - the lack of clear establishment of rights based on indivisibility of a person and a body - is due to influence of religion. When the present legal systems were developed, there was no conscious understanding of moral issues around body and sex because the society at large was pretending to be sexless as a whole. Some people still believe that masturbation makes you blind. Because of the sexual opression by religious authorities, this particular branch of philosophy never made into public discussion and thus was never written into constraining law (constitutions and their respective counterpart mandates). If it did, things would be different today:

1) Homosexuality, sodomy, incest and other despicable laws that immorally regulate sex between consenting adults would all go down the drain. Every single one of them was installed by a particular special interest group that specialized in discrimination.

2) Prohibition on use of drugs would go down the drain too, which means drastic reduction of crime, implying huge boost to economies.

3) There would be no abortion dispute. At all. If the principle of bodily dominion was written into constraining law, it would be obvious to everyone why there's no place to even discuss prohibiting abortions

4) Laws against torture would not be based on abstract "niceness" and not on a self-devised prohibition of bodily harm, but on a much more solid idea that you may not touch the body that belongs to another person without their consent, and that causing bodily harm is not just a crime but a heinous one.

5) Laws against rape would not be based on a politically tactical ad-hoc need to protect the women, but in true legal recognition that women have exactly the same rights as men, one that courts and people can see very clearly.

6) Laws against covert experiments on people would not have to rely on a fictional moral justification that can easily be eroded by corruption and lobbyism, but again on a much more fundamental notion that body is indivisible property of a person and the relationship is inviolable. Laws that mandate circumcision would be barred. Laws against tampering with one's body in other ways (such as implanting an RFID chip to a prisoner) would not need to be created.

7) Arranged marriages (those against the will of the married) would automatically become illegal. There would be no need to map this repugnant, barbaric and absolutely unacceptable practice to a shaky moral and legal framework.

Cool Gay marriage wouldn't be an issue either, since the institution of marriage would've turned into completely civic and it would be impossible to install a law that prohibits it no matter how hard you try.

9) There would be no nonsense such as the case in the last episode of the series that your avatar refers to - a doctor patenting his patient's DNA. 

In other words, if the people who wrote these laws thought openly about body and not about god, the world would've been a better place today.


TheDalbster
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