Omni-Faults: The Conflicts of the Attributes of God

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Omni-Faults: The Conflicts of the Attributes of God

If god is omniscient there is no free will. God sees the entire contents of the world's unfolding events from beginning to completion prior to his creating or actualizing of it. If he creates the world as he sees it prior to its existence his act is the first cause of all constituents of that world. Those events will occur necessarily if god acts. The only resolution to this dilemma is, if there is a god he must sacrifice omniscience in the act of creation in order for there to be freewill. In other words he must make a boulder too big for himself to lift.


AS a result omnipotence is sacrificed as well as omniscience. For he can not create a free will agent without sacrifice of knowledge which entails loss of ability to know how. Therefore he no longer has power over a future outcome. He has no power to prevent that outcome. He has no power to create that outcome. And lastly that outcome has the power to frustrate god's will as being an outcome of another freewill agent in opposition to god.

If these factors are correct, then god can not be omni-benevolent for he lacks the knowledge of outcomes to always act accordingly. He lacks the ability to make the right choices in every outcome. And while the intent of his responses to such outcomes may be honorable they can be wrong because of the lack of omniscience and omnipotence.

These attributes, while ancient and worn in their usage by philosophy and theology, are contradictory to each other and the act of creation. They show themselves to be statements of adoration or veneration but not valid in any real or logical sense of the word. They leave no reason for a conscious act or actor as the first cause of our world. Therefore there is no need to assume or posit a god of creation.

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Just where in the Bible are

Just where in the Bible are all the various omni-attributes explicitly defined/claimed? I have often wondered. It seems to me none of them, nor his 'infinitude', are logically required of even a 'supreme' being. Merely sufficiently 'great' for the purpose...

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

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BobSpence1 wrote:Just where

BobSpence1 wrote:

Just where in the Bible are all the various omni-attributes explicitly defined/claimed? I have often wondered. It seems to me none of them, nor his 'infinitude', are logically required of even a 'supreme' being. Merely sufficiently 'great' for the purpose...

They are more a development of Christianity's embrace of Neo-Platonism and philosophical/theological speculation.  They are not Biblical concepts. God changes his mind several times in the Old Testament for example.  There are statements that God knows everything even the hearts of man and things like that but they seem to be forms of veneration or worship.  The theologians took them and made a pretty sterile god out of the very anthropomorphic one in the texts.


 

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TGBaker wrote:BobSpence1

TGBaker wrote:

BobSpence1 wrote:

Just where in the Bible are all the various omni-attributes explicitly defined/claimed? I have often wondered. It seems to me none of them, nor his 'infinitude', are logically required of even a 'supreme' being. Merely sufficiently 'great' for the purpose...

They are more a development of Christianity's embrace of Neo-Platonism and philosophical/theological speculation.  They are not Biblical concepts. God changes his mind several times in the Old Testament for example.  There are statements that God knows everything even the hearts of man and things like that but they seem to be forms of veneration or worship.  The theologians took them and made a pretty sterile god out of the very anthropomorphic one in the texts.

Thanks, TG.

That actually confirms my impression. So they are not 'necessary' attributes of the conceptual God of either the OT or the NT.

As you say - speculation. Yet they are presented as essential attributes of God. My respect for theology just fell further, if that is possible...

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:TGBaker

BobSpence1 wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

BobSpence1 wrote:

Just where in the Bible are all the various omni-attributes explicitly defined/claimed? I have often wondered. It seems to me none of them, nor his 'infinitude', are logically required of even a 'supreme' being. Merely sufficiently 'great' for the purpose...

They are more a development of Christianity's embrace of Neo-Platonism and philosophical/theological speculation.  They are not Biblical concepts. God changes his mind several times in the Old Testament for example.  There are statements that God knows everything even the hearts of man and things like that but they seem to be forms of veneration or worship.  The theologians took them and made a pretty sterile god out of the very anthropomorphic one in the texts.

Thanks, TG.

That actually confirms my impression. So they are not 'necessary' attributes of the conceptual God of either the OT or the NT.

As you say - speculation. Yet they are presented as essential attributes of God. My respect for theology just fell further, if that is possible...

Yea think about my situation. Four years into a degree of woo woo. So I switched to philosophy and wound up in sophisticated woo woo.  Study theology only to know the thoughts in order to argue against them.


 

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The 'irony' - not sure if

The 'irony' - not sure if that is the best word - is that all that theological work to construct a 'perfect' God-figure had the effect of discrediting the actual text by converting God into a far less plausible figure than in its original form...

You must have noticed well before this that your account of philosophy and theology fits well into into one of my sig lines...

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

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BobSpence1 wrote:The 'irony'

BobSpence1 wrote:

The 'irony' - not sure if that is the best word - is that all that theological work to construct a 'perfect' God-figure had the effect of discrediting the actual text by converting God into a far less plausible figure than in its original form...

You must have noticed well before this that your account of philosophy and theology fits well into into one of my sig lines...

Yes that is why I respect your posts and enjoy your conversations.  It is an irony I think.  Natural Theology is an oxymoron. And the morons are well..... deluded.  We must have so much invested as a species and so much fear of the implications that it is difficult to rid ourselves of something that would under other circumstances be laughable.  WE would laugh at the story of a turtle shell being the bowl of heaven but Genesis is built off a Mesopotamian myth about a bowl with the stars painted on the bottom that we see above us. It keep the water from above (blue) from meeting the water below ( sea).  But I can't for the life of me get caposkia to see that.  It is as we live in two different dimensions. One wonders if one should even invest in a dialogue about such issues. It is at best frustrating and energy draining no to mention circular.


 

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I was wondering how that

I was wondering how that conversation with Caposkia was going.

I can't quite summon up the will to navigate to the end of that thread any more, having spent more than enough frustrating time trying to 'reason' with him from time to time over the years it has been going...

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:I was

BobSpence1 wrote:

I was wondering how that conversation with Caposkia was going.

I can't quite summon up the will to navigate to the end of that thread any more, having spent more than enough frustrating time trying to 'reason' with him from time to time over the years it has been going...

He is leaving open the idea that the plants could have been made before the sun and sustained by the light of god's glory which is about as far as I can go with the discussion. I simply haven't gotten the energy up to respond to two of the post yet since it seems a bit circular. I jusrt want someone to show me a documented collection of evidence of Vatican miracles that convince me and/or scientists.

 

 

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BobSpence1 wrote:I was

BobSpence1 wrote:

I was wondering how that conversation with Caposkia was going.

I can't quite summon up the will to navigate to the end of that thread any more, having spent more than enough frustrating time trying to 'reason' with him from time to time over the years it has been going...

Oh do you think we ran off Jean and Mr. Metaphysics. They have been absent for over a week. Come to think of it the board has been quite for a while too.


 

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TGBaker wrote:BobSpence1

TGBaker wrote:

BobSpence1 wrote:

I was wondering how that conversation with Caposkia was going.

I can't quite summon up the will to navigate to the end of that thread any more, having spent more than enough frustrating time trying to 'reason' with him from time to time over the years it has been going...

Oh do you think we ran off Jean and Mr. Metaphysics. They have been absent for over a week. Come to think of it the board has been quite for a while too.

I was thinking that myself.

I feel the need for a fresh 'chew-toy' theist to metaphorically 'beat up'.

This drove me last Saturday to go into our downtown for our local Atheist Meetup Group Saturday Night 'social', where we gather between regular meetings for a drink and then a walk up to the area in our central open-air mall where a regular group of Christian 'speakers' stand up, in turn, to preach to the onlookers about how they need to come to Jesus. Some of us will attempt to confront either the speaker or his supporters with counter-arguments. It is significantly different from online discussion, but can be even more frustrating.

I say 'drove' me, because it wasn't looking good for a good roll-up - only three others had indicated on our web-site they intended to go, the weather was cold and with a hint of occasional light rain. And unfortunately no-one else turned up in the 45 minutes I hung around. I wandered up at one point to where the preachers usually gathered, but saw no sign of them - it may have been a bit early for them.

Oh well, it got me out of the house for a while...

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:TGBaker

BobSpence1 wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

BobSpence1 wrote:

I was wondering how that conversation with Caposkia was going.

I can't quite summon up the will to navigate to the end of that thread any more, having spent more than enough frustrating time trying to 'reason' with him from time to time over the years it has been going...

Oh do you think we ran off Jean and Mr. Metaphysics. They have been absent for over a week. Come to think of it the board has been quite for a while too.

I was thinking that myself.

I feel the need for a fresh 'chew-toy' theist to metaphorically 'beat up'.

This drove me last Saturday to go into our downtown for our local Atheist Meetup Group Saturday Night 'social', where we gather between regular meetings for a drink and then a walk up to the area in our central open-air mall where a regular group of Christian 'speakers' stand up, in turn, to preach to the onlookers about how they need to come to Jesus. Some of us will attempt to confront either the speaker or his supporters with counter-arguments. It is significantly different from online discussion, but can be even more frustrating.

I say 'drove' me, because it wasn't looking good for a good roll-up - only three others had indicated on our web-site they intended to go, the weather was cold and with a hint of occasional light rain. And unfortunately no-one else turned up in the 45 minutes I hung around. I wandered up at one point to where the preachers usually gathered, but saw no sign of them - it may have been a bit early for them.

Oh well, it got me out of the house for a while...

In the Bible Belt of the South such a thing could be dangerous, ruin your job or make you shunned by the community.   It is interesting though that one can drive 40  minutes into Metro Atlanta and the culture transforms significantly to a quite liberal tolerance.  Of course the result is a plethora of New Age and New Thought folk who see themselves as very progressive and open.  They are harder to pin down than Christians. 

 I know Jean was confronted with plagiarism and Mr. Meta Physics was in midstream with my argument about pain and suffering and then was gone.

 

 

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Bob also if you would see if

Bob also if you would see if I am wrong anywhere or if this needs a lot more study:

 

I am not sure that I am thinking correctly on this one John but this is what I see of a theistic claim of possible worlds scenario yet with indeterminism  as a justification for a free will entailed world. It seems to run against logical possible worlds as valid applications to the real world.

Open theists admit this and say that although God is omniscient he cannot know future contingent libertarian free-willed acts.

Possible Worlds are Invalid Tools: If libertarian free-willed acts are not known then foreknowledge is not a part of omniscience. Thus omniscience is qualified in  that freewill is possible by the nature of indeterminism.

If god must create free will such that there is a lack of foreknowledge then evil may obtain without god's intent.  Further god can not determine the best of all possible worlds for he can not see the outcome of all possible worlds. It is doubtful that we can use possible world scenarios regarding god's properties. 

This argument in turn would evidence against possible world scenarios in certain cases.

Possible Worlds  Are Valid Tools:  If on the other hand possible worlds are predetermined as potential actualities then their constituents are determined by their actualization. If god must create free will by not knowing the possibilities of these actual worlds god must "blindfold"  his knowledge and "roll the dice" as to which world to pick.  Yet that world's constituents would be completely determined in the actualization which contradicts the used definition of free will. The trans-causal idea of a complete world as determined and so also its constituents though some lack causality among themselves is presented by the physicist David Bohm and his glycerine analogy.

Possible worlds themselves leave free will impossible if defined as a closed process.
God can choose properties but not possible worlds.

There is a possible world that is not determined or is there a possible world without certain constituents? Possible worlds are only logical worlds which do not conform to the empirical world of actual quantum level indeterminacy.

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Hi lads

 

I've not reached the end of the Cap v TG thread yet but will later tonight. In any case TG, your efforts have not been wasted. When you start unravelling bible like that it's extremely valuable for us lurkers who inevitably pick things up in the course of the argument - I know I certainly have.

I think the thing that stands out is the pattern of denial that emerges on the theist site and the strangeness of the arguments where woo is taken seriously. A few times in Caps responses I sat back and took time to try and put myself where he'd have to be to embrace those positions he holds in relation to moral consistency. That business with the light of god's glory was too much. Maybe god is a titanic hydrogen reactor?

I agree with your earlier point that sometimes you wonder whether these arguments are worth undertaking. There seems such a difference in world view - a division in what should be admitted to be evidence.

 

 

 

"Experiments are the only means of knowledge at our disposal. The rest is poetry, imagination." Max Planck


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TG,I will try to comment,

TG,

I will try to comment, but I need a bit of time to get my head around just what is being argued.

I have an ingrained inability to take the whole 'possible worlds' style of argument seriously. There just seem to be too many ways it can fail to mirror reality.

I have to try and translate it into a 'properly' structured argument...

I'll be back...

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:TG,I will

BobSpence1 wrote:

TG,

I will try to comment, but I need a bit of time to get my head around just what is being argued.

I have an ingrained inability to take the whole 'possible worlds' style of argument seriously. There just seem to be too many ways it can fail to mirror reality.

I have to try and translate it into a 'properly' structured argument...

I'll be back...

My problem to but I can't see through it for sure. I may have defeated possible worlds in some sense if it makes sense.  These are mostly notes responding to another argument.


 

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Atheistextremist

Atheistextremist wrote:

 

I've not reached the end of the Cap v TG thread yet but will later tonight. In any case TG, your efforts have not been wasted. When you start unravelling bible like that it's extremely valuable for us lurkers who inevitably pick things up in the course of the argument - I know I certainly have.

I think the thing that stands out is the pattern of denial that emerges on the theist site and the strangeness of the arguments where woo is taken seriously. A few times in Caps responses I sat back and took time to try and put myself where he'd have to be to embrace those positions he holds in relation to moral consistency. That business with the light of god's glory was too much. Maybe god is a titanic hydrogen reactor?

I agree with your earlier point that sometimes you wonder whether these arguments are worth undertaking. There seems such a difference in world view - a division in what should be admitted to be evidence.

 

 

 

Thanks AE. It feels that way sometimes.  Yea that glory business is either off the wall, off the charts or a classic example of the two worlds in which we live the real and the imagined.


 

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

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Hi TG.My first problem is

Hi TG.

My first problem is that I need 'free will' to be defined.

I don't see it as meaningful - if you are making a choice not based on any prior considerations and your current state of mind, it is going to be determined by those things. If it is not based on anything identifiable, what distinguishes from pure randomness, ie the flip of a coin?

So I have to ignore 'free will'.

Now if God is going to allow us to act on our emotions and desires, which is more intelligible way to put it, then he can't rely on us to act even in our own clear best interests.

Even if we were fully rational, ie 'robotic' in the classic sense, we would still not be able to guarantee our choices would not lead sometimes to harm for ourselves or others, because we do not know everything relevant to any given situation we are confronted with, and even if we did, complexity could still make it impossible to know in all cases which choice would lead to less harm, if any.

So any 'world' which exceeds a minimal, non-trivial, complexity is going to have conflict of some kind, if it contains more than a small number of number of finite purposeful beings. Purpose need be no more than a drive to survive. Bacteria and ants fight.

The constituents of a 'world' are its actualization, which is going to be dependent to varying degrees on its defined nature, and I agree, 'God' can only determine the 'properties' of reality, not the course of events, unless he defines a purely mechanical universe, in the classic sense of 'mechanism'. As soon as you introduce anything as simple as colliding particles, all bets are off - perfect predictability is lost, the 'butterfly effect' rules.

As long as the above limitations on predictability hold in at least one 'world', He cannot prevent evil without continuous intervention.

That is my best current thinking on this. Hope it helps.

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:Hi TG.My

BobSpence1 wrote:

Hi TG.

My first problem is that I need 'free will' to be defined.

I don't see it as meaningful - if you are making a choice not based on any prior considerations and your current state of mind, it is going to be determined by those things. If it is not based on anything identifiable, what distinguishes from pure randomness, ie the flip of a coin?

So I have to ignore 'free will'.

Now if God is going to allow us to act on our emotions and desires, which is more intelligible way to put it, then he can't rely on us to act even in our own clear best interests.

Even if we were fully rational, ie 'robotic' in the classic sense, we would still not be able to guarantee our choices would not lead sometimes to harm for ourselves or others, because we do not know everything relevant to any given situation we are confronted with, and even if we did, complexity could still make it impossible to know in all cases which choice would lead to less harm, if any.

So any 'world' which exceeds a minimal, non-trivial, complexity is going to have conflict of some kind, if it contains more than a small number of number of finite purposeful beings. Purpose need be no more than a drive to survive. Bacteria and ants fight.

The constituents of a 'world' are its actualization, which is going to be dependent to varying degrees on its defined nature, and I agree, 'God' can only determine the 'properties' of reality, not the course of events, unless he defines a purely mechanical universe, in the classic sense of 'mechanism'. As soon as you introduce anything as simple as colliding particles, all bets are off - perfect predictability is lost, the 'butterfly effect' rules.

As long as the above limitations on predictability hold in at least one 'world', He cannot prevent evil without continuous intervention.

That is my best current thinking on this. Hope it helps.

I agree with you about free will. I assume it is a strategy game that evolution uses for a quick response rather than thorough processing of experience. It is as such an illusion ( not what it seems. Since our brain and body act we take credit for it and assume we chose.  But it has been determined neurologically ( Susan Blackmore for example)that the process occurs before consciousness experiences it. So the act of free will was actually a predetermined unconscious process that appears as an act when we  consciously experience it atribbuting linguistic syntax ( I did such and such which in turn is a reflexive or r4cursive process since you then experience that thought as a sentence. )  But working within Mr. Metaphysic's world and his relatives with these type of arguments I was looking at the presuppositions as they relate to their premises.  It seems to me that even indeterminism of a quantum mechanics rules out possible world scenarios in the sense that when they assume a limitless  entity that can have foreknowledge to choose based upon the constituents or properties of that world.  The god can not logically know the contents of the possible worlds and therefore can not discern one possible world from another.   Possible worlds are not consistent in the sense that variation resides in ONE world of possibilities ( the actual world)rather than a positing of potential variants of many worlds. Thus the logical presupposition and tool fails.     Free will is something that is argued and assumed in most of the scenarios.  If you grant it then it rules out the foreknowledge of a god as omniscient which in turn means he can not control the future events  and defeats omnipotents.  To me these seem like avenues to explore that can defeat the ontological arguments logically even without discourse to empirical evidence unless positing the quantum mechanics is  more evidential rather than a mathematical or logical format.  See whre I am trying to go with these  arguments?  Defeat them with there own premises.

 

 

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I guess my problem is to try

I guess my problem is to try and argue from within their own assumptions to show that even those assumptions do not logically lead to their professed conclusions.

My approach has habitually been to show that starting from closer to 'first principles', ie, minimum presuppositions, and using more advanced reasoning based on probabilities, and assessing evidence in other than absolute true/false terms, and the evidence we now have from Science, that we are lead to very different conclusions from theirs.

I can see that if we could 'get inside their heads' and show where their basic assumptions and arguments don't necessarily lead to what they think they do, we would be better able to convince them that they should at least have another look at their arguments.

But my my brain rebels at digging far enough into that sludge-pit of obsolete 'principles' and assumptions to make arguments they might take seriously...

 

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

"Theology is now little more than a branch of human ignorance. Indeed, it is ignorance with wings." - Sam Harris

The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

From the sublime to the ridiculous: Science -> Philosophy -> Theology


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BobSpence1 wrote:I guess my

BobSpence1 wrote:

I guess my problem is to try and argue from within their own assumptions to show that even those assumptions do not logically lead to their professed conclusions.

My approach has habitually been to show that starting from closer to 'first principles', ie, minimum presuppositions, and using more advanced reasoning based on probabilities, and assessing evidence in other than absolute true/false terms, and the evidence we now have from Science, that we are lead to very different conclusions from theirs.

I can see that if we could 'get inside their heads' and show where their basic assumptions and arguments don't necessarily lead to what they think they do, we would be better able to convince them that they should at least have another look at their arguments.

But my my brain rebels at digging far enough into that sludge-pit of obsolete 'principles' and assumptions to make arguments they might take seriously...

 

That is a very good point.  Not only call the attributes of the premises in question but call the definitions of those attributes in question.  So rather than discuss the conflict of the idea of free will and omniscience being contradictory. One would simply ask for a proof of free will and argue the problem of such a claim as it assumes.  Or one could show the ineherent problems with just positing an idea of omniscience.   An omniscient being who not necessarily be corehent because it defines the idea of the future as foreknown and therefore a closed causal determinism.   I can understand that. But look at the problems we encounter say with Mr. Metaphysics. We could not get to definition for the presentation of the assumptions or argument. We went in circles And about his third time around  when I tried a private discussion wher I tried to manintain an empirically grounded view of the propositions he left.

Perhaps it is agreeing on first principles that is the precursor to any discussion.   We should not assume the validity obviously of omnipotence and demand a definition. But then waht I tried to do is place omniscience against omnipotence and show the conflicting irrationalities when both applied to an entity using there definitions. Perhaps omniscience for example is not a valid word if the theistic definition its meaning. The same would go for the other omnis. They are non-valid ideas with internal inconsistancies.

 

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Einstein and Zeno

In rereading Hawking's Brief History of Time I am reminded of a problem i have with Einstein that parallels a Zeno paradox.  Zeno's ide aof dropping an object entails it falling half the distance before the whole distance generates the observation the half distance is now a whole distance of which the object must fall the half distance so infinite regression. Conclusion the object can never fall the whole distance. 

This seems to parallel the claim that an object can not reach the speed of light. At 90% of c an objects mass is 2x . It's mass increases porpationately and must reach infinite mass to reach c.  An object can not ever reach c.  It seems that Einstein has simply created a formula to maintain a paradox (light is c regardless of relationship to space or time locations)which actually has a regression similar to the Zeno paradox!!!!

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How did I miss this whole

How did I miss this whole post... good thinking material.  

Hey TG, the way I see possible worlds and freewill, without going too deep into the definition of freewill, if god is is considered omniscient, and there are a finite but extremely large number of possible realities convergent from an initial point (Schrodinger's cat type), could god not have knowledge of all the possible scenarios, which in turn do realize?

In other words, if you choose to turn left, or turn right out of your own free will, there will be a possible world where you have turned left, and one where you have turned right, they are both actualized and god knows of both those distinct realities.  I don't see a conflict here.

What Zeno's paradox signifies to me, is that there is an indivisible plank quanta to space-time.  Eventually there is no half point to get from point A to point B.  The transition is instantaneous.  So there really is no paradox, it's just like any other internally consistent logical argument, it is indeed sound, within it's own parameters, and is completely irrelevant contingent on reality.  Much like the OA Mr. M proposed, even ignoring the begging question fallacy, it is completely irrelevant to my reality.

 

 

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Ktulu wrote:How did I miss

Ktulu wrote:

How did I miss this whole post... good thinking material.  

Hey TG, the way I see possible worlds and freewill, without going too deep into the definition of freewill, if god is is considered omniscient, and there are a finite but extremely large number of possible realities convergent from an initial point (Schrodinger's cat type), could god not have knowledge of all the possible scenarios, which in turn do realize?

In other words, if you choose to turn left, or turn right out of your own free will, there will be a possible world where you have turned left, and one where you have turned right, they are both actualized and god knows of both those distinct realities.  I don't see a conflict here.

What Zeno's paradox signifies to me, is that there is an indivisible plank quanta to space-time.  Eventually there is no half point to get from point A to point B.  The transition is instantaneous.  So there really is no paradox, it's just like any other internally consistent logical argument, it is indeed sound, within it's own parameters, and is completely irrelevant contingent on reality.  Much like the OA Mr. M proposed, even ignoring the begging question fallacy, it is completely irrelevant to my reality.

 

 

hey dude good to hear from you.  I do jot see a conflict with god knowing both one world of left and another with right. But if he chooses the world with you going right and he knows it then you can not go left nor can he stop you from going right. You have no choice and he has lost his omnipotence in actualizing the possible world since he can not stop you from going right or forcing you to go left.  In fact the world is completely determined even without causal connection between all the constituents since they are necessary in the wholeistic realization of that world. The physicist David Bohm gives an  example in his Wholeness and the Implicate Order.  Take a vat of glyserine in which a mechanism can create a whirlpool effect when you turn its handle. Place drops of ink on the surface. As the glyserine is turned the ink drops swirl into the glyserine and become thinner and thinner lines until they are completely a solution in the glyserine. Reverse the turning of the glyserine and the lines will appear and grow thicker until  the individual ink spots separate and reappear where they were. Bohm produces a physics where events in space-time unfold without necessary causal realtionship but pre-determined in their relationship and sequences in meta-temporal or causal sense. 

 

My contention is this empircally based analogy goes further toward possible world relationships to the real world than a priori conceived logical presentations.

RE: The Zeno thing. Bob can show how to resolve it mathematically. But apply your implications to the idea that you can't achieve light speed ,"c"

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Visit my new blog when you get a chance. It is at the bottom of my post. I hope to make it a specialized arena for discussion and possibly an Atheistic Bible Study section if I get enough folk that want such a thing.  An arsenal of quotes to throw back to evangelizing biblical quoters.  

 

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The ultimate question is can

The ultimate question is can God get Angelina Jolie to give me a blow job?

Now, the theist will dodge this with "He wouldn't do that"

My response would be, "I am not talking about what he says he will do, I am talking strictly about ability"

IF IF IF IF IF  God does not have the ability to get Angelina Jolie to give me a blow job, then he is not all powerful.

For God to be "all powerful" then he has to have the ability to put my penis into her mouth.

SIDE NOTE AND DISCLAIMER,

Certainly this is blunt, graphic and blasphemous. But does anyone seriously think I have a shot at that, even with without a god?

The point is to demonstrate that wishful thinking is a cluster fuck and nothing but mental masturbation.

"All" is negated by the theist as soon as they set a limit to an attribute.

"He wouldn't" are only what addresses what he claims, not ability.

Any of the 7 billion humans on this planet can claim they wont kill someone. But they most certainly do have the ability to do such.

My point is that "all" as a concept as far as a fictional friend, is just that, it is our own desire to avoid the decay all things in the universe will endure.

There is no such thing as "all". There are only humans who dream of utopias.

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TGBaker wrote:hey dude good

TGBaker wrote:

hey dude good to hear from you.  I do jot see a conflict with god knowing both one world of left and another with right. But if he chooses the world with you going right and he knows it then you can not go left nor can he stop you from going right. You have no choice and he has lost his omnipotence in actualizing the possible world since he can not stop you from going right or forcing you to go left.  In fact the world is completely determined even without causal connection between all the constituents since they are necessary in the wholeistic realization of that world. The physicist David Bohm gives an  example in his Wholeness and the Implicate Order.  Take a vat of glyserine in which a mechanism can create a whirlpool effect when you turn its handle. Place drops of ink on the surface. As the glyserine is turned the ink drops swirl into the glyserine and become thinner and thinner lines until they are completely a solution in the glyserine. Reverse the turning of the glyserine and the lines will appear and grow thicker until  the individual ink spots separate and reappear where they were. Bohm produces a physics where events in space-time unfold without necessary causal realtionship but pre-determined in their relationship and sequences in meta-temporal or causal sense. 

 

My contention is this empircally based analogy goes further toward possible world relationships to the real world than a priori conceived logical presentations.

RE: The Zeno thing. Bob can show how to resolve it mathematically. But apply your implications to the idea that you can't achieve light speed ,"c"

http://atheisticgod.blogspot.com/

Visit my new blog when you get a chance. It is at the bottom of my post. I hope to make it a specialized arena for discussion and possibly an Atheistic Bible Study section if I get enough folk that want such a thing.  An arsenal of quotes to throw back to evangelizing biblical quoters.  

 

I had a glance at the blog, too tired to read in too much detail but I booked marked it and will definitely check it out.  Sounds really interesting Smiling.  I'll give a better response to your post tomorrow also. 

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TGBaker wrote:If god is

TGBaker wrote:

If god is omniscient there is no free will. God sees the entire contents of the world's unfolding events from beginning to completion prior to his creating or actualizing of it. If he creates the world as he sees it prior to its existence his act is the first cause of all constituents of that world. Those events will occur necessarily if god acts. The only resolution to this dilemma is, if there is a god he must sacrifice omniscience in the act of creation in order for there to be freewill. In other words he must make a boulder too big for himself to lift.

If God is omniscient, it only means that he knows everything that is going to happen.  But foresight does not entail strict determinism.  Even in an indeterminate universe, an omniscient person would know what's going to happen.  (Mind you, the last sentence is a quote from some Youtube video with Daniel Dennett--an atheist.)

Furthermore, omniscience entails only that God knows what is logically possible to be known; if it cannot possibly be known, then not even God can know it.  Mathematicians such as Lukasiewicz (and to a lesser extent, Aristotle), for instance, formalized a logical system in which future contingent propositions are given a third truth value--one which is neither true nor false; for God to be omniscient, he only has to know that such values are "1/2," given that they are neither "1" nor "0."

Moreover, one can defend compatibilist views of the free will issue in which determinism and free will are reconciled.  You are remiss to not even acknowledge this.

Similarly, omnipotence entails only that God can do what is logically possible.  If a universe is indeterminate, then it would be logically contradictory to say that one could affect the outcome so as to determine it since in that case such a universe would be at once determinate and indeterminate.  But again, you've begged the question with regard to your epistemological underpinnings couched with strict determinism; my contention is that there is nothing to support that free will strictly implies ignorance.

Let's say that God has the ability to make the wrong choices.  Are you saying that objective moral values exist?


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1. I wondered when Mr. M

1. I wondered when Mr. M would start redefining the omnis.

2. I believe objective moral values exist. If I didn't, I'd be a Christian.

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There is an objective basis

There is an objective basis for deriving moral guidelines, but they do not determine universal specific 'rules' in all contexts.

They have to take into account what matters to the members of the society or group, both positively and negatively, they are to apply to, otherwise they are simply a legalistic framework of laws, rewards and punishments, not a moral code.

This is why religion typically produces only a perversion of natural morality, having no objective basis, based on an imagined being and what are conjectured, ie imagined, to be the motives, power, and desires of such a being, something that would be inherently unknowable to mortal, finite beings. This leads to 'rules' based on instinct, prejudices and superstition, as we see, especially in the OT, and the Koran.

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

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jcgadfly wrote:1. I wondered

jcgadfly wrote:

1. I wondered when Mr. M would start redefining the omnis.

Haha, even scholarly atheists think that paradoxes of omnipotence and omniscience are laughable.

I can tell that you're a Dawkins fan.  Let me ask you a question I've asked you before:  How many books against your position have you read, and what were the titles/authors?

Quote:
2. I believe objective moral values exist. If I didn't, I'd be a Christian.

Yeah.  A Dawkins fan.  LOL


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BobSpence1 wrote:There is an

BobSpence1 wrote:

There is an objective basis for deriving moral guidelines, but they do not determine universal specific 'rules' in all contexts.

That's about as ridiculous as saying that there's an objective basis for deriving a mathematic theorem but that such a basis does not determine the specific rule in all contexts.

Quote:
They have to take into account what matters to the members of the society or group, both positively and negatively, they are to apply to, otherwise they are simply a legalistic framework of laws, rewards and punishments, not a moral code.

Is the notion that we ought to do what matters to society's members itself a universal moral guideline?  If not, then why should I believe what you are telling me?

Quote:
This is why religion typically produces only a perversion of natural morality, having no objective basis, based on an imagined being and what are conjectured, ie imagined, to be the motives, power, and desires of such a being, something that would be inherently unknowable to mortal, finite beings. This leads to 'rules' based on instinct, prejudices and superstition, as we see, especially in the OT, and the Koran.

(1) Are you claiming that religionless societies have historically produced better ethical frameworks, both ideologically and pragmatically?

(2) Are you claiming that objective morality does not exist even if there is a God whose commands are based upon his unchanging nature as an infinite (i.e., limitless) being?

(3) When you say that this being is "imagined," are you claiming to know for a fact that this being does not exist?

(4) How do you justify the claim that the motives of a being such as God would be "inherently unknowable" to finite beings?  Would it not be within this being's capacity to reveal such things to finite beings whom he created so as to be capable of understanding such revelations?

(5) Can you support biblically the idea that the rules of the OT were meant to be applicable for all eternity?

(6) Can you support biblically the idea that the rules of the OT were based on superstition and not on the historical context in which the rules were given to Israel?

(7) Can you support biblically the idea that the rules of the OT were based on prejudice and not on the historical context in which the rules were given to Israel?

(8 ) Have you ever actually read the Koran, or are you going on hearsay?  

 


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Mr_Metaphysics

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

jcgadfly wrote:

1. I wondered when Mr. M would start redefining the omnis.

Haha, even scholarly atheists think that paradoxes of omnipotence and omniscience are laughable.

I can tell that you're a Dawkins fan.  Let me ask you a question I've asked you before:  How many books against your position have you read, and what were the titles/authors?

Quote:
2. I believe objective moral values exist. If I didn't, I'd be a Christian.

Yeah.  A Dawkins fan.  LOL

And I told you - I will answer your question as soon as you tell me what books against your position you've read. Not before.

As for my having to be a Christian to have flexible, subjective moral values- that came from reading the Bible. I had never heard of Dawkins when I discovered that.

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jcgadfly wrote:And I told

jcgadfly wrote:

And I told you - I will answer your question as soon as you tell me what books against your position you've read. Not before.

I've read the God Delusion, End of Faith, Breaking the Spell, the Moral Landscape, Losing Faith In Faith, Why I Am Not a Christian, Divinity of Doubt, and a few other more obscure ones.

What about you?

 


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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:TGBaker

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

If god is omniscient there is no free will. God sees the entire contents of the world's unfolding events from beginning to completion prior to his creating or actualizing of it. If he creates the world as he sees it prior to its existence his act is the first cause of all constituents of that world. Those events will occur necessarily if god acts. The only resolution to this dilemma is, if there is a god he must sacrifice omniscience in the act of creation in order for there to be freewill. In other words he must make a boulder too big for himself to lift.

If God is omniscient, it only means that he knows everything that is going to happen.  But foresight does not entail strict determinism.  Even in an indeterminate universe, an omniscient person would know what's going to happen.  (Mind you, the last sentence is a quote from some Youtube video with Daniel Dennett--an atheist.)

I would beg to differ with you. If he knows everything that is going to happen in various possible worlds and actualizes any one of them they must necessarily actualize as he forsees it.  The contents are entailed by its whole. I disagree with Dennett all the time.  I am not a party line person.  An indeterministic world is handled by Bohm and his glyerin analogy wherein a vat of glyserin can  have drops of ink separated by space (noncausal). As the vat is turned the ink becomes thinner and thinner lines in the qlyserin. until they diappear. But turn the vat the opposite direction and the dots reappear. Such is the example of non-causally indeterministic events as realted to others. They are still enfolded deterministically in the boundary condition of the whole and unfold a in predetermined manner.

You can visualize several possible worlds with god looking at the entire contents and picking even the best world. He actualizes the unfiolding of that world as he knows it will occur. He is therein responsible for its entire contents including the bad shit.


 

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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:TGBaker

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

If god is omniscient there is no free will. God sees the entire contents of the world's unfolding events from beginning to completion prior to his creating or actualizing of it. If he creates the world as he sees it prior to its existence his act is the first cause of all constituents of that world. Those events will occur necessarily if god acts. The only resolution to this dilemma is, if there is a god he must sacrifice omniscience in the act of creation in order for there to be freewill. In other words he must make a boulder too big for himself to lift.

!) If God is omniscient, it only means that he knows everything that is going to happen.  But foresight does not entail strict determinism.  Even in an indeterminate universe, an omniscient person would know what's going to happen.  (Mind you, the last sentence is a quote from some Youtube video with Daniel Dennett--an atheist.)

 

2)Furthermore, omniscience entails only that God knows what is logically possible to be known; if it cannot possibly be known, then not even God can know it.  Mathematicians such as Lukasiewicz (and to a lesser extent, Aristotle), for instance, formalized a logical system in which future contingent propositions are given a third truth value--one which is neither true nor false; for God to be omniscient, he only has to know that such values are "1/2," given that they are neither "1" nor "0."

Moreover, one can defend compatibilist views of the free will issue in which determinism and free will are reconciled.  You are remiss to not even acknowledge this.

Similarly, omnipotence entails only that God can do what is logically possible.  If a universe is indeterminate, then it would be logically contradictory to say that one could affect the outcome so as to determine it since in that case such a universe would be at once determinate and indeterminate.  But again, you've begged the question with regard to your epistemological underpinnings couched with strict determinism; my contention is that there is nothing to support that free will strictly implies ignorance.

 

Let's say that God has the ability to make the wrong choices.  Are you saying that objective moral values exist?

I have addressed on in the prior post.

"I would beg to differ with you. If he knows everything that is going to happen in various possible worlds and actualizes any one of them they must necessarily actualize as he forsees it.  The contents are entailed by its whole. I disagree with Dennett all the time.  I am not a party line person.  An indeterministic world is handled by Bohm and his glyerin analogy wherein a vat of glyserin can  have drops of ink separated by space (noncausal). As the vat is turned the ink becomes thinner and thinner lines in the qlyserin. until they diappear. But turn the vat the opposite direction and the dots reappear. Such is the example of non-causally indeterministic events as related to others. They are still enfolded deterministically in the boundary condition of the whole and unfold a in predetermined manner.

You can visualize several possible worlds with god looking at the entire contents and picking even the best world. He actualizes the unfolding of that world as he knows it will occur. He is therein responsible for its entire contents including the bad shit."

 I have hardly begged the question because it simply states that if there are possible worlds they a coherent in the fact that they define and represent potenitalities. For them to be coherent and seen and known their constietuents must be known. To know everything that is going to happen does not entail strict determinism. But to know everything that is going to happen if you actualize that world and do so is strict determinism. As to two all you are saying is that god does not know the causal relationships or can not determine the causal realtionship or that THERE is no causal relationships of the constituents in the container of that possible world. So either possible world logisitics are invalid or the attributes that are ground through argument using that logic is invalid.  That is to say the preimse of the attributes are invalid while the argument's logic is valid in structure.

 

As to your second claim. If god can do only what is logically possible then he is limited by logic.  The logic of my presentation is such that he need not know the indeterminate of the universe but if he knows everything that happens in it as a possible world and chooses it over another possible world then he has predetermined the entire contents that you admit he knows beforehand. They are thus entirely predetermined and therefore the inconsistency is in the attribution of creation entailed by omniscience. If on the otherhand god is that which is the logic of the universe then god is principle or paramter of existence and therefore also not absolute.

 

As to adding ethical question to this. If god has no ability to make wrong choices then he is less than human because that is the one attribute that is being fought for in most of these type arguments.  You are left with a god who must sacrifice omniscience in creation to achieve freewill in a possible world on a subjective rather than rational act.

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TGBaker[I would beg to

TGBaker wrote:

I would beg to differ with you. If he knows everything that is going to happen in various possible worlds and actualizes any one of them they must necessarily actualize as he forsees it.

What reason do you have to presume that the possible world actualized by God has no accessibility to any other possible world?  We could also say that God created the world knowing full well the autonomous decisions that we would make.  If I put a chocolate bar on the table, I know that my obese relative is going to eat it; does it follow that I caused him to eat it or that his decision was not free.

Quote:
You can visualize several possible worlds with god looking at the entire contents and picking even the best world. He actualizes the unfiolding of that world as he knows it will occur. He is therein responsible for its entire contents including the bad shit.

No, he creates a world with mutual accessibility relationships to other possible worlds, knowing full well the course people and things are going to take.  He knows this, mind you, not because the course is adhering to a causal chain of events that he set in motion, but because his infinite wisdom entails that he knows everything there's to know about his creation (he would have to, for it exists because of what he knows)--including the character of his creatures such that he could predict with 100% certainty what use they'd make of their God-given autonomy.

 

 


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TGBaker wrote: I have

TGBaker wrote:

 I have hardly begged the question because it simply states that if there are possible worlds they a coherent in the fact that they define and represent potenitalities. For them to be coherent and seen and known their constietuents must be known. To know everything that is going to happen does not entail strict determinism. But to know everything that is going to happen if you actualize that world and do so is strict determinism.

I'm just not seeing how that follows.  God creates the world, and he knows what events will unfold; why does it follow that everything is determined?  There does not seem to be any reason to accept this.

Quote:
As to two all you are saying is that god does not know the causal relationships or can not determine the causal realtionship or that THERE is no causal relationships of the constituents in the container of that possible world. So either possible world logisitics are invalid or the attributes that are ground through argument using that logic is invalid.  That is to say the preimse of the attributes are invalid while the argument's logic is valid in structure.

I'm saying that God, while he could have created a world where strict determinism is true, instead created a world where people can make choices and do so freely such that they are either blameworthy or praiseworthy for their actions.  However you choose to define "free will," there is no reason to believe that we reside in a universe where God is responsible for our actions--even if you can't make resolve the prima facie irreconcilability between the natural order of events and otherworldly freedom.

Quote:
As to your second claim. If god can do only what is logically possible then he is limited by logic.  The logic of my presentation is such that he need not know the indeterminate of the universe but if he knows everything that happens in it as a possible world and chooses it over another possible world then he has predetermined the entire contents that you admit he knows beforehand. They are thus entirely predetermined and therefore the inconsistency is in the attribution of creation entailed by omniscience.  On the other hand, if god is that which is the logic of the universe then god is principle or paramter of existence and therefore also not absolute.

Your notion of God choosing one possible world over some other presupposes determinism; if God's choice of one possible world necessitates that any other possible world is impossible for us, then obviously determinism is true.  But this is just begging the question.  Kripke showed, or at least made a good case for the idea, that the best way to understand modal terminology is in terms of the relationships between worlds. 

Quote:
As to adding ethical question to this. If god has no ability to make wrong choices then he is less than human because that is the one attribute that is being fought for in most of these type arguments.  You are left with a god who must sacrifice omniscience in creation to achieve freewill in a possible world on a subjective rather than rational act.

If "human" is defined according to one's fallibility, then God is not human.  I don't see much of a problem here.  I could understand if that's what many unregenerate folks want God to be; it's probably the same reason people gravitate towards elected officials who enjoy popular music, or kids to teachers who play electric guitar.  There probably is a term in psychology for this.

But on the contrary, God sets the standard; it is us who fall short.  The fact that we wish to set the bar a little lower is not an argument against God, however.

 


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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:TGBaker

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

I would beg to differ with you. If he knows everything that is going to happen in various possible worlds and actualizes any one of them they must necessarily actualize as he forsees it.

What reason do you have to presume that the possible world actualized by God has no accessibility to any other possible world?  We could also say that God created the world knowing full well the autonomous decisions that we would make.  If I put a chocolate bar on the table, I know that my obese relative is going to eat it; does it follow that I caused him to eat it or that his decision was not free.

Why did you cut the analogy short?

The rest of the analogy is that (apparently) you 'love' your obese relative. And that you are (apparently) the one who made it so that your relative's metabolism is insufficient to cope with their love for the taste of chocolate (which was your invention, apparently...lol), without getting 'fat', which is something that angers you.

So, armed with this knowledge and understanding, you enable by putting a chocolate bar in front of your relative who you (apparently) 'love', and then plan to make them suffer for eternity after they die, because.....well, just because you've 'classified' it as a sin.

That is 'moral'?

Baaahaahaaahaaaaaaaaa
 

You're a fucking tool.

Stop posting while you're drunk, you moron.

 

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

No, he creates a world with mutual accessibility relationships to other possible worlds, knowing full well the course people and things are going to take.  He knows this, mind you, not because the course is adhering to a causal chain of events that he set in motion, but because his infinite wisdom entails that he knows everything there's to know about his creation (he would have to, for it exists because of what he knows)--including the character of his creatures such that he could predict with 100% certainty what use they'd make of their God-given autonomy.

Then he'd have completely out of control emotions and reactions, if he'd want to eternally torture his 'creations' for behaving in the exact way that they would have been designed by him.

 

That's about as insane as a designer of a slot machine wanting to torture the slot machine for not hitting the jackpot at every pull...

 

You really need to stop being delusional about how *cough* 'sophisticated' Christian apologetics are.

You people are patent morons...

 

 

I keep asking myself " Are they just playin' stupid, or are they just plain stupid?..."

"To explain the unknown by the known is a logical procedure; to explain the known by the unknown is a form of theological lunacy" : David Brooks

" Only on the subject of God can smart people still imagine that they reap the fruits of human intelligence even as they plow them under." : Sam Harris


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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:TGBaker

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

I would beg to differ with you. If he knows everything that is going to happen in various possible worlds and actualizes any one of them they must necessarily actualize as he forsees it.

1) What reason do you have to presume that the possible world actualized by God has no accessibility to any other possible world?  We could also say that God created the world knowing full well the autonomous decisions that we would make.  If I put a chocolate bar on the table, I know that my obese relative is going to eat it; does it follow that I caused him to eat it or that his decision was not free.

Quote:
You can visualize several possible worlds with god looking at the entire contents and picking even the best world. He actualizes the unfiolding of that world as he knows it will occur. He is therein responsible for its entire contents including the bad shit.

2)No, he creates a world with mutual accessibility relationships to other possible worlds, knowing full well the course people and things are going to take.  He knows this, mind you, not because the course is adhering to a causal chain of events that he set in motion, but because his infinite wisdom entails that he knows everything there's to know about his creation (he would have to, for it exists because of what he knows)--including the character of his creatures such that he could predict with 100% certainty what use they'd make of their God-given autonomy.

 

 

As to one. If god knows the constituents of the possible world and that it has access to another  possible world he either knows the accessibility to the other actual world if he is omniscient.  But I would state that that is not the meaning of a possible world.  It is a completely viewed possibility if it is posited. Another possible world would vay in only one event or entity and so on. So I would state that you are redefining the thought experiment on the fly. As to you eating the chocalote bar it does.  Nut as to you it does not. God has actualized your action and your obese relatives action in that it was foreseen to happen if god actualized your world. There was no other choice and the other possible worlds were not actualized. ( Now in a Wheeler physics all possible worlds actualized)   Only when Since he sees in the possible world that you will eat it if he actualizes it it is predetermined in the foreknowledge because the foreknowledge entails the actualization of that specific world. Your situation is not an actualization of a world in which all is seen and therefore determined to happen if actualized.  The attempt to sever the ontological first cause from epistemic absolutes  by relativized situations of limited context in the situation of your obese relative is fine if you relativize god's foreknowledge.

AS to 2) if you go down that road and conjoin multiple possible worlds then god still knows the contents of all possible worlds and either knows you will or want his actualization is still a complete deterministic chain of certainty and results from his act and none other. If you use the muyltiple possible world gambit then you must sacrifice gods omniscience still. What he knows can only occur if he actualizes the world and it will occur if he does and therefore must occur. It is simply.

 

 

 

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TGBaker wrote:As to one. If

TGBaker wrote:

As to one. If god knows the constituents of the possible world and that it has access to another  possible world he either knows the accessibility to the other actual world if he is omniscient.  But I would state that that is not the meaning of a possible world.  It is a completely viewed possibility if it is posited. Another possible world would vay in only one event or entity and so on. So I would state that you are redefining the thought experiment on the fly.

The underpinnings of your possible worlds semantics presupposes determinism.  You presuppose that God creates a possible world such that exists in complete isolation from all other possible worlds, which inheres in the very definition of "determinism."  If you presuppose that the choice of one possible world precludes others, then actuality is the only possibility (this is called the "principle of plenitude" ).  But this is just an assertion.

But now that I think more about it, we have to be more clear on our terminology.  If by "possible world" you mean a complete description of reality, then God does not create possible worlds anymore than he creates numbers or the law of noncontradiction; rather, every proposition pertaining to God is contained in that maximal description.  But you are probably referring to God's created order, in which case I'll be complaisant and grant that we can call this a "possible world."  But there seems to be no reason to accept that God's created order cannot contain autonomous creatures.  From what I can tell, your only argument in support of this is that knowledge of the future entails predetermination; why suppose that this is true?  I create a universe, have complete knowledge of the character of its contents, and thus I know how it will operate just as I know that 2 will be the answer in all future instances where 1 and 1 are added together.

There are also other notions of time, which your argument overlooks.  One is that time is based merely on our mental ordering of events, which we do in consensus with one another so as to come to an agreement to a particular timescale.  Time in the Newtonian sense, however, is not real; the past is no more, the future has not happened, and the present is fleeting.  As finite beings with imperfect knowledge, we perceive things temporally in various parts of a long story; God, however, in his infinite wisdom sees every event holistically such that for him nothing is past or future--only present.  Scientifically, we have confirmed that Newtonian time is unreal.

So, I don't think you have a very strong argument.  Even if we suppose that God is in time, it doesn't prove that free will is impossible; knowledge of the future isn't causation of it.  And we need not even suppose that time is real, such that epistemic future propositions as it pertains to God are not meaningful in the way that you'll need them to be in order for your argument to work.

 


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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:TGBaker

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

As to one. If god knows the constituents of the possible world and that it has access to another  possible world he either knows the accessibility to the other actual world if he is omniscient.  But I would state that that is not the meaning of a possible world.  It is a completely viewed possibility if it is posited. Another possible world would vay in only one event or entity and so on. So I would state that you are redefining the thought experiment on the fly.

1) The underpinnings of your possible worlds semantics presupposes determinism.  You presuppose that God creates a possible world such that exists in complete isolation from all other possible worlds, which inheres in the very definition of "determinism."  If you presuppose that the choice of one possible world precludes others, then actuality is the only possibility (this is called the "principle of plenitude" ).  But this is just an assertion.

2) But now that I think more about it, we have to be more clear on our terminology.  If by "possible world" you mean a complete description of reality, then God does not create possible worlds anymore than he creates numbers or the law of noncontradiction; rather, every proposition pertaining to God is contained in that maximal description.  But you are probably referring to God's created order, in which case I'll be complaisant and grant that we can call this a "possible world."  But there seems to be no reason to accept that God's created order cannot contain autonomous creatures.  From what I can tell, your only argument in support of this is that knowledge of the future entails predetermination; why suppose that this is true?  I create a universe, have complete knowledge of the character of its contents, and thus I know how it will operate just as I know that 2 will be the answer in all future instances where 1 and 1 are added together.

3)There are also other notions of time, which your argument overlooks.  One is that time is based merely on our mental ordering of events, which we do in consensus with one another so as to come to an agreement to a particular timescale.  Time in the Newtonian sense, however, is not real; the past is no more, the future has not happened, and the present is fleeting.  As finite beings with imperfect knowledge, we perceive things temporally in various parts of a long story; God, however, in his infinite wisdom sees every event holistically such that for him nothing is past or future--only present.  Scientifically, we have confirmed that Newtonian time is unreal.

So, I don't think you have a very strong argument.  Even if we suppose that God is in time, it doesn't prove that free will is impossible; knowledge of the future isn't causation of it.  And we need not even suppose that time is real, such that epistemic future propositions as it pertains to God are not meaningful in the way that you'll need them to be in order for your argument to work.

 

 

1) AS to your 1) Actually my argument does not presuppose determinism. My analysis has the result of determinism. If we use possible worlds in the normal sense and apply the attribue of omniscience to a "knower" of any possible world its possibilities and entailments are known completely by definition and proper usage of the term.  Determinism has a dual aspect to it in the sense we normally employ it to speak of existent things.  But when we speak of knowledge things which brings in the "rotten fruit" of omniscience then the idea of determining what will occur before hand reaches  absolute by nature of the attributes of the "knower" in this case a god that is omniscient and omnipotent.

 

Secondly a possible world scenario is typically used as I have used it. There are a multitude of possible worlds from which to choose.  God is supposed to choose the best of all possible worlds. So this is the best of all possible worlds. Thus he chose the world out of all possible worlds with the least evil. And freewill corrupted it with non-natural evil.  This is so since theologians have attempted to resolve god of "acts of god( hurricanes and earthquakes)" by calling them natural evil. This leaves human choice of the bad as unnatural evil.  This is Plantinga not me.  This is also the typical argument. My response is the defeater.   Any world go knows beforehand lacks freewill simply because the epistemic determinism is actualized as ontological certainty. 

 

2) As to the second argument above by you.....

If by "possible world" you mean a complete description of reality, then God does not create possible worlds anymore than he creates numbers or the law of noncontradiction; rather, every proposition pertaining to God is contained in that maximal description"

 

If god does not have a complete description of the possible world which is but a subset of reality then he is not omniscient for he transcends all those possible worlds and can choose among them and knows them ALL.  Secondly it is not that god creates possible worlds it is that he can determine what all possible worlds are and can choose to actualize any of them.  Even this becomes a tarnished description. Because if god is omnibenevolent though he may know all possible worlds he cannot actulaize any evil worlds. As to your last statement "rather, every proposition pertaining to God is contained in that maximal description"  then god is a product of the summation of those propositions in that maximum description and you have demonstrated that god is subject to and limted by a higher entity the transcendent set of logic. 

But as to your compliance.... The actual world is simply in such a scenario of applied possible worlds the one that god actualized. The freedom is illusion for god has created the world in which he even knows the number of hairs on your head or when a sparrow falls in the field.  So this scenario worlds fine for hyper-calvinism and demonstrates the Greek philosophical addition to a Jewish concept of god.  So contrary to what you say the idea of an autonomous creature is simply a relative belief from within the context of that world. I would again refer you to Bohm's thought experiment.

 

3)  I do not overlook the question of time for the choosing of the possible world is atemporal which you also argue about prior to the big bang. So the question about time is not an issue. It is the result of the actualization and a secondary and separate analysis. Time in such scenarios becomes  simply a relational product. God is not in time in the scenario and only responds to temporal events either as desired or any the other calssical sense sense he knows all the contents of the world's time his apparent responses are simply the one response of creation experienced in relative moments as individual  actions.  This has been used by theologians ad nausem to defend the idea that god does not change . He has entirely responded and is the same in each apparent relativized moment. So god is the sme yesterday, today and tomorrow. 

My argument is strong contrary to what you think because you have mistaken it apparently as a god placed in time. You have failed to see the realtionship of modal logic to omni-attributes and their consequences. They create incoherence and non-resolvable paradox and conflict.

 

PS this really answers everything in your other post I think but prlease respond if need be.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

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Mr_Metaphysics

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

jcgadfly wrote:

And I told you - I will answer your question as soon as you tell me what books against your position you've read. Not before.

I've read the God Delusion, End of Faith, Breaking the Spell, the Moral Landscape, Losing Faith In Faith, Why I Am Not a Christian, Divinity of Doubt, and a few other more obscure ones.

What about you?

 

ETDAV, Jesus Among Other Gods, Finding Darwin's God, Darwin's Black Box, Case For Christ, Case for Faith, Case for a Creator, Celebration of Discipline, Mere Christianity. The Science of God, Why Men Go Back, sermons by A.W Tozer, John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, and some others as well.

"I do this real moron thing, and it's called thinking. And apparently I'm not a very good American because I like to form my own opinions."
— George Carlin


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TGBaker wrote:1) AS to your

TGBaker wrote:

1) AS to your 1) Actually my argument does not presuppose determinism. My analysis has the result of determinism. If we use possible worlds in the normal sense and apply the attribue of omniscience to a "knower" of any possible world its possibilities and entailments are known completely by definition and proper usage of the term.  Determinism has a dual aspect to it in the sense we normally employ it to speak of existent things.  But when we speak of knowledge things which brings in the "rotten fruit" of omniscience then the idea of determining what will occur before hand reaches  absolute by nature of the attributes of the "knower" in this case a god that is omniscient and omnipotent.

Yes it does presuppose determinism, which includes the notion that there is only one possible world.  You are not using possible worlds in the "normal sense"; you are using it in an outdated Leibnizian sense, and he barely even touched upon the notion (his status as the Father of Possible Worlds Semantics notwithstanding).  You assume that for any possible world that God chooses, it's isolated from every other possible world--that we are trapped in this one possible world that God has chosen for us; this is determinism.  But Kripke showed that this idea of possible worlds semantics gives way to all sorts of hermeneutical difficulties, especially when one tries to reconcile it with the Lewis systems; hence, he introduced the accessibility relationship in order to resolve this very issue.  We live in a possible world that is accessible to other possible worlds; there's no reason to say otherwise.  Your argument hinges upon the notion that omniscience necessarily precludes free will; all I have to do in order to disprove this is show that it is possible to be free even if God is omniscient.  Since I've done that, your argument fails.  

Quote:
Secondly a possible world scenario is typically used as I have used it. There are a multitude of possible worlds from which to choose.  God is supposed to choose the best of all possible worlds. So this is the best of all possible worlds.

No, that's an outdated Leibnizian argument based upon an unclarified notion of possible worlds.  It has nothing to do with possible worlds semantics as has been adopted by guys like Rudolf Carnap or Saul Kripke.  Today, a possible world is generally understood as a maximal description of reality; that is, it's a set of atomic propositions that have some truth value.  Leibniz's argument was meant to address those interlocutors whose main argument was that God, if real, did a horrible job creating the universe that we live in; Leibniz said that this was the best that he could have done.  It had nothing to do with the issue of free will.  The idea that this somehow entails a lack of freedom is nothing that he brought to the table.

Quote:
he chose the world out of all possible worlds with the least evil. And freewill corrupted it with non-natural evil.  This is so since theologians have attempted to resolve god of "acts of god( hurricanes and earthquakes)" by calling them natural evil. This leaves human choice of the bad as unnatural evil.  This is Plantinga not me.  This is also the typical argument. My response is the defeater.   Any world go knows beforehand lacks freewill simply because the epistemic determinism is actualized as ontological certainty.

Your argument is that we are not free because God knows what we will do and created us and the world in which our actions would take place.  It's a non-sequitur; there is no connection between the premise and the conclusion.  It is possible for God to have created our universe, and know our future actions even if they are not predetermined.

Quote:
If god does not have a complete description of the possible world which is but a subset of reality then he is not omniscient for he transcends all those possible worlds and can choose among them and knows them ALL.  Secondly it is not that god creates possible worlds it is that he can determine what all possible worlds are and can choose to actualize any of them.

He does not determine possible worlds anymore than he determines logic or mathematics.  It could be that abstract metaphysical possibilities and abstract principles are part of God's nature insofar as he is an intelligent being who thinks in a certain way (see Greg Bahnsen).  In the modern sense, a possible world includes God as part of the description, such that "God creates this universe" is an atomic constituent of the actual world.

Quote:
Even this becomes a tarnished description. Because if god is omnibenevolent though he may know all possible worlds he cannot actulaize any evil worlds. As to your last statement "rather, every proposition pertaining to God is contained in that maximal description"  then god is a product of the summation of those propositions in that maximum description and you have demonstrated that god is subject to and limted by a higher entity the transcendent set of logic.

Logic is not some police officer going around making sure that A remains A or that a dog doesn't start becoming a non-dog.  Logic exists merely in the abstract, and people are free to make contradictory claims if they so please.  If I say that "God is what he is," I am not claiming that God is constrained into doing something; rather, I am articulating a truism that's logically necessarily--but not ontologically necessary.  This is just a weak rebuttal to the Christian response to the paradox of omnipotence.  

Quote:
But as to your compliance.... The actual world is simply in such a scenario of applied possible worlds the one that god actualized. The freedom is illusion for god has created the world in which he even knows the number of hairs on your head or when a sparrow falls in the field.  So this scenario worlds fine for hyper-calvinism and demonstrates the Greek philosophical addition to a Jewish concept of god.  So contrary to what you say the idea of an autonomous creature is simply a relative belief from within the context of that world. I would again refer you to Bohm's thought experiment.

On your worldview, free will does not exist.  That would necessitate that every choice that we make is actually the product of physical events, which are themselves the product of other physical events.  As such, I am not morally responsible for anything that I do, because the laws of physics necessitate that I do what I do.  Thus, I am a Christian because physical events necessitated that I be one.  

Quote:
3)  I do not overlook the question of time for the choosing of the possible world is atemporal which you also argue about prior to the big bang. So the question about time is not an issue. It is the result of the actualization and a secondary and separate analysis. Time in such scenarios becomes  simply a relational product. God is not in time in the scenario and only responds to temporal events either as desired or any the other calssical sense sense he knows all the contents of the world's time his apparent responses are simply the one response of creation experienced in relative moments as individual  actions.  This has been used by theologians ad nausem to defend the idea that god does not change . He has entirely responded and is the same in each apparent relativized moment. So god is the sme yesterday, today and tomorrow.

You are overlooking the question.  If time only exists in a relativized sense, and God does not experience the world in the same way that we experience the world, then the idea that God knows what will happen does nothing for your argument.  Let's say that God doesn't know what will happen, but rather he just knows what happens; how is this inconsistent with free will?

Quote:
My argument is strong contrary to what you think because you have mistaken it apparently as a god placed in time. You have failed to see the realtionship of modal logic to omni-attributes and their consequences. They create incoherence and non-resolvable paradox and conflict.

This is your argument:

(1) God created the actual world (assumed premise).

(2) God knows all future events in the actual world (premise).

(3) God created the actual world and knows all future events in it (from 1 and 2).

(4) If God created the actual world and knows all future events in it, then nothing in the actual world has free will (premise).

(5) Nothing in the actual world has free will (from 3 and 4). 

The argument is deductively valid, but what reason do you have for supposing that the fourth premise is true?


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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:TGBaker

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

1) AS to your 1) Actually my argument does not presuppose determinism. My analysis has the result of determinism. If we use possible worlds in the normal sense and apply the attribue of omniscience to a "knower" of any possible world its possibilities and entailments are known completely by definition and proper usage of the term.  Determinism has a dual aspect to it in the sense we normally employ it to speak of existent things.  But when we speak of knowledge things which brings in the "rotten fruit" of omniscience then the idea of determining what will occur before hand reaches  absolute by nature of the attributes of the "knower" in this case a god that is omniscient and omnipotent.

Yes it does presuppose determinism, which includes the notion that there is only one possible world.  You are not using possible worlds in the "normal sense"; you are using it in an outdated Leibnizian sense, and he barely even touched upon the notion (his status as the Father of Possible Worlds Semantics notwithstanding).  You assume that for any possible world that God chooses, it's isolated from every other possible world--that we are trapped in this one possible world that God has chosen for us; this is determinism.  But Kripke showed that this idea of possible worlds semantics gives way to all sorts of hermeneutical difficulties, especially when one tries to reconcile it with the Lewis systems; hence, he introduced the accessibility relationship in order to resolve this very issue.  We live in a possible world that is accessible to other possible worlds; there's no reason to say otherwise.  Your argument hinges upon the notion that omniscience necessarily precludes free will; all I have to do in order to disprove this is show that it is possible to be free even if God is omniscient.  Since I've done that, your argument fails.  

Quote:
Secondly a possible world scenario is typically used as I have used it. There are a multitude of possible worlds from which to choose.  God is supposed to choose the best of all possible worlds. So this is the best of all possible worlds.

No, that's an outdated Leibnizian argument based upon an unclarified notion of possible worlds.  It has nothing to do with possible worlds semantics as has been adopted by guys like Rudolf Carnap or Saul Kripke.  Today, a possible world is generally understood as a maximal description of reality; that is, it's a set of atomic propositions that have some truth value.  Leibniz's argument was meant to address those interlocutors whose main argument was that God, if real, did a horrible job creating the universe that we live in; Leibniz said that this was the best that he could have done.  It had nothing to do with the issue of free will.  The idea that this somehow entails a lack of freedom is nothing that he brought to the table.

Quote:
he chose the world out of all possible worlds with the least evil. And freewill corrupted it with non-natural evil.  This is so since theologians have attempted to resolve god of "acts of god( hurricanes and earthquakes)" by calling them natural evil. This leaves human choice of the bad as unnatural evil.  This is Plantinga not me.  This is also the typical argument. My response is the defeater.   Any world go knows beforehand lacks freewill simply because the epistemic determinism is actualized as ontological certainty.

Your argument is that we are not free because God knows what we will do and created us and the world in which our actions would take place.  It's a non-sequitur; there is no connection between the premise and the conclusion.  It is possible for God to have created our universe, and know our future actions even if they are not predetermined.

Quote:
If god does not have a complete description of the possible world which is but a subset of reality then he is not omniscient for he transcends all those possible worlds and can choose among them and knows them ALL.  Secondly it is not that god creates possible worlds it is that he can determine what all possible worlds are and can choose to actualize any of them.

He does not determine possible worlds anymore than he determines logic or mathematics.  It could be that abstract metaphysical possibilities and abstract principles are part of God's nature insofar as he is an intelligent being who thinks in a certain way (see Greg Bahnsen).  In the modern sense, a possible world includes God as part of the description, such that "God creates this universe" is an atomic constituent of the actual world.

Quote:
Even this becomes a tarnished description. Because if god is omnibenevolent though he may know all possible worlds he cannot actulaize any evil worlds. As to your last statement "rather, every proposition pertaining to God is contained in that maximal description"  then god is a product of the summation of those propositions in that maximum description and you have demonstrated that god is subject to and limted by a higher entity the transcendent set of logic.

Logic is not some police officer going around making sure that A remains A or that a dog doesn't start becoming a non-dog.  Logic exists merely in the abstract, and people are free to make contradictory claims if they so please.  If I say that "God is what he is," I am not claiming that God is constrained into doing something; rather, I am articulating a truism that's logically necessarily--but not ontologically necessary.  This is just a weak rebuttal to the Christian response to the paradox of omnipotence.  

Quote:
But as to your compliance.... The actual world is simply in such a scenario of applied possible worlds the one that god actualized. The freedom is illusion for god has created the world in which he even knows the number of hairs on your head or when a sparrow falls in the field.  So this scenario worlds fine for hyper-calvinism and demonstrates the Greek philosophical addition to a Jewish concept of god.  So contrary to what you say the idea of an autonomous creature is simply a relative belief from within the context of that world. I would again refer you to Bohm's thought experiment.

On your worldview, free will does not exist.  That would necessitate that every choice that we make is actually the product of physical events, which are themselves the product of other physical events.  As such, I am not morally responsible for anything that I do, because the laws of physics necessitate that I do what I do.  Thus, I am a Christian because physical events necessitated that I be one.  

Quote:
3)  I do not overlook the question of time for the choosing of the possible world is atemporal which you also argue about prior to the big bang. So the question about time is not an issue. It is the result of the actualization and a secondary and separate analysis. Time in such scenarios becomes  simply a relational product. God is not in time in the scenario and only responds to temporal events either as desired or any the other calssical sense sense he knows all the contents of the world's time his apparent responses are simply the one response of creation experienced in relative moments as individual  actions.  This has been used by theologians ad nausem to defend the idea that god does not change . He has entirely responded and is the same in each apparent relativized moment. So god is the sme yesterday, today and tomorrow.

You are overlooking the question.  If time only exists in a relativized sense, and God does not experience the world in the same way that we experience the world, then the idea that God knows what will happen does nothing for your argument.  Let's say that God doesn't know what will happen, but rather he just knows what happens; how is this inconsistent with free will?

Quote:
My argument is strong contrary to what you think because you have mistaken it apparently as a god placed in time. You have failed to see the realtionship of modal logic to omni-attributes and their consequences. They create incoherence and non-resolvable paradox and conflict.

This is your argument:

(1) God created the actual world (assumed premise).

(2) God knows all future events in the actual world (premise).

(3) God created the actual world and knows all future events in it (from 1 and 2).

(4) If God created the actual world and knows all future events in it, then nothing in the actual world has free will (premise).

(5) Nothing in the actual world has free will (from 3 and 4). 

The argument is deductively valid, but what reason do you have for supposing that the fourth premise is true?

My argument does not presuppose determinism. It is its conclusion.

As to the question of whether he determines the possible worlds ot logic is a question of semantics.  If the possible worlds are external to god and he observes all of those possible worlds he has determined the contents of them all should  and only if he has omniscience.  The same with logic if he observes all aspects of logic that he has omnscience of logic. To claim foul from the works of Leibniz and to assume the validity of Kripke and Carnap does not speak to the scenario and that of Plantinga's. 

 

 

 

To assume a world has many possible worlds is a scenario of an actual world in which the possible worlds give choice. It STILL conflicts with the question of of god and omniscience because the possible worlds are non-actual, they are possible worlds to be chosen by god, theyARE exclusive since he is 1) Omniscient and knows and 2) omnipotent and can actualize.  Thus the Kripke and  Carnap criticisms fail to address the fact that epsitemic determination entail ontological certainty when god as omniscient( epistemic) actualizes his known (ontologically)  You can not have your cake and eat it too.  If god actualizes such a world every choice is already known. If you say that he actualizes a world open to potentialies of other worlds by agants THEN he does not know those choices. IF YOU say he does know those choices then his foreknowledge has determined the extent in which the actual world actulaizes extends into other possible worlds and becaomes a silly game of semantics. Kripke and Carnap only work from within the actual world. Plantinga free world argument fails in the sense of which I present and you defense fails to address the adequacy or defeintion of omniscient foreknowledge which does not relieve the agent to freewill  since his choice remains known if the world is actualized. Only by using Kripke and Carnap can you overcome this with a non-omniscient god of process or contemporary fad of Sophisticated Theology.  REMEMBER IT IS GOD that is choosing one out of all the possible worlds ( Supposedly the best one). 4) is the conclusion and not the premise.

 

You present the argument wrongly from your view point which is backwards.  It is thus

 

1) God knows all possible worlds

2) He therefore knows all their properties ( constituents) They are determined by him as so.

3) God chooses the best of all possible worlds because he knows fully the constituents. It is they that are good or bad. 

4) God actualizes the best of those possible worlds

4)All constituents in that possible world  therefore actualize were known by god. They are the determining factor for gods choice.

5)Since god knows these contents of the possible world when actualized its contents  are predetrmined and must conclude as foreknown absolutely.

6) The first cause is gods actualization and entails all that unfolds in that world.

 

As to my view free will exists because the classical Greek attributes of god are not coherent.  He is not omniscient. He is not omnipotent.

Your statement:  On your worldview, free will does not exist.  That would necessitate that every choice that we make is actually the product of physical events, which are themselves the product of other physical events.  As such, I am not morally responsible for anything that I do, because the laws of physics necessitate that I do what I do.  Thus, I am a Christian because physical events necessitated that I be one. 

 

This is not my worldview simply the conclusion of claims concerning god. They do not obtain because of what I present. That says nothing as to my own worldview. And finally this is beside the point and not an argument as to the attributes of god.

Your statement: You are overlooking the question.  If time only exists in a relativized sense, and God does not experience the world in the same way that we experience the world, then the idea that God knows what will happen does nothing for your argument.  Let's say that God doesn't know what will happen, but rather he just knows what happens; how is this inconsistent with free will?

This shows a move from the classical attributes of god and that is fine if you want to revision him as not having foreknowledge.   This is my point. But if god does not know what will happen and if he chooses to actualize a possible world and only knows what happens afterwards then  he does not have foreknowledge of it and a basis whereby to choose from possible worlds in that he can not determine what makes one possible world better than the other. He simply gambles.

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'Determinism' does not

'Determinism' does not necessitate or imply predictability - that is a result of Chaos theory.

This inherent possibility of 'unpredictability' is reinforced in the real world by Quantum Theory, which points to the idea that nothing, not even Time, perhaps, is infinitely continuous, but is 'quantized' at a fundamental level, characterized by the Planck scale. This means that any mechanistic process requiring extreme precision of measurement of its initial state for useful prediction of its future trajectory will not be predictable to the extent that that would require measurement of of the initial position and momentum of its 'bits' to a precision precluded by the Uncertainty Principle.

Chaos says that some non-linear feedback systems would require infinite precision of measurement to predict their trajectory, under some conditions, such as if they start in the vicinity of certain 'cusp' states, even without Quantum Theory considerations.

Favorite oxymorons: Gospel Truth, Rational Supernaturalist, Business Ethics, Christian Morality

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The path to Truth lies via careful study of reality, not the dreams of our fallible minds - me

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TGBaker wrote:To assume a

TGBaker wrote:

To assume a world has many possible worlds is a scenario of an actual world in which the possible worlds give choice. It STILL conflicts with the question of of god and omniscience because the possible worlds are non-actual, they are possible worlds to be chosen by god, theyARE exclusive since he is 1) Omniscient and knows and 2) omnipotent and can actualize.  Thus the Kripke and  Carnap criticisms fail to address the fact that epsitemic determination entail ontological certainty when god as omniscient( epistemic) actualizes his known (ontologically)  You can not have your cake and eat it too.  If god actualizes such a world every choice is already known. If you say that he actualizes a world open to potentialies of other worlds by agants THEN he does not know those choices. IF YOU say he does know those choices then his foreknowledge has determined the extent in which the actual world actulaizes extends into other possible worlds and becaomes a silly game of semantics. Kripke and Carnap only work from within the actual world. Plantinga free world argument fails in the sense of which I present and you defense fails to address the adequacy or defeintion of omniscient foreknowledge which does not relieve the agent to freewill  since his choice remains known if the world is actualized. Only by using Kripke and Carnap can you overcome this with a non-omniscient god of process or contemporary fad of Sophisticated Theology.  REMEMBER IT IS GOD that is choosing one out of all the possible worlds ( Supposedly the best one). 4) is the conclusion and not the premise.

Sorry, you've totally lost me here.

As for your argument, you've only taken it out of the flame and into the fire.  

Quote:
1) God knows all possible worlds

True.  There's nothing that can be known which God does not know.

Quote:
2) He therefore knows all their properties ( constituents) They are determined by him as so.

No, he does not determine the properties of possible worlds.  In fact, this is again presupposing that determinism is true.  Possible worlds are abstract entities much like mathematical propositions; the most famous Lewis axiom is perhaps that all modal propositions are necessary.  God does not "determine" them or their atomic constituents.  

He does, however, determine the universe that he'll create for us.

Quote:
3) God chooses the best of all possible worlds because he knows fully the constituents. It is they that are good or bad.

If we're understanding "possible world" as this universe that we live in, then I'll say that I can neither affirm nor deny it.  I see no reason to deny that God could have morally permissible reasons for not giving us the best possible place to live in, and I would certainly not claim to know why he does the things that he does--not unless he told me himself.  Are you privy to the mind of God more so than Christians?

Quote:
4) God actualizes the best of those possible worlds

4)All constituents in that possible world  therefore actualize were known by god. They are the determining factor for gods choice.

See above.

Quote:
5)Since god knows these contents of the possible world when actualized its contents  are predetrmined and must conclude as foreknown absolutely.

Bald assertion.  Furthermore, would you be willing to grant that there is a possible world (if we are understanding "possible world" as previously noted) where humans are free?  If so, then you would grant that God, creating in the manner that he does, could create a universe where beings such as us make free choices; so why do you believe he didn't?

If you wish to say that there is no possible world where people are free, then I would ask for you to justify it.


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Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker wrote:

To assume a world has many possible worlds is a scenario of an actual world in which the possible worlds give choice. It STILL conflicts with the question of of god and omniscience because the possible worlds are non-actual, they are possible worlds to be chosen by god, theyARE exclusive since he is 1) Omniscient and knows and 2) omnipotent and can actualize.  Thus the Kripke and  Carnap criticisms fail to address the fact that epsitemic determination entail ontological certainty when god as omniscient( epistemic) actualizes his known (ontologically)  You can not have your cake and eat it too.  If god actualizes such a world every choice is already known. If you say that he actualizes a world open to potentialies of other worlds by agants THEN he does not know those choices. IF YOU say he does know those choices then his foreknowledge has determined the extent in which the actual world actulaizes extends into other possible worlds and becaomes a silly game of semantics. Kripke and Carnap only work from within the actual world. Plantinga free world argument fails in the sense of which I present and you defense fails to address the adequacy or defeintion of omniscient foreknowledge which does not relieve the agent to freewill  since his choice remains known if the world is actualized. Only by using Kripke and Carnap can you overcome this with a non-omniscient god of process or contemporary fad of Sophisticated Theology.  REMEMBER IT IS GOD that is choosing one out of all the possible worlds ( Supposedly the best one). 4) is the conclusion and not the premise.

Sorry, you've totally lost me here.

As for your argument, you've only taken it out of the flame and into the fire.  

Quote:
1) God knows all possible worlds

True.  There's nothing that can be known which God does not know.

Quote:
2) He therefore knows all their properties ( constituents) They are determined by him as so.

No, he does not determine the properties of possible worlds.  In fact, this is again presupposing that determinism is true.  Possible worlds are abstract entities much like mathematical propositions; the most famous Lewis axiom is perhaps that all modal propositions are necessary.  God does not "determine" them or their atomic constituents.  

He does, however, determine the universe that he'll create for us.

Quote:
3) God chooses the best of all possible worlds because he knows fully the constituents. It is they that are good or bad.

If we're understanding "possible world" as this universe that we live in, then I'll say that I can neither affirm nor deny it.  I see no reason to deny that God could have morally permissible reasons for not giving us the best possible place to live in, and I would certainly not claim to know why he does the things that he does--not unless he told me himself.  Are you privy to the mind of God more so than Christians?

Quote:
4) God actualizes the best of those possible worlds

4)All constituents in that possible world  therefore actualize were known by god. They are the determining factor for gods choice.

See above.

Quote:
5)Since god knows these contents of the possible world when actualized its contents  are predetrmined and must conclude as foreknown absolutely.

Bald assertion.  Furthermore, would you be willing to grant that there is a possible world (if we are understanding "possible world" as previously noted) where humans are free?  If so, then you would grant that God, creating in the manner that he does, could create a universe where beings such as us make free choices; so why do you believe he didn't?

If you wish to say that there is no possible world where people are free, then I would ask for you to justify it.

As for your argument, you've only taken it out of the flame and into the fire.  

Quote:
1) God knows all possible worlds

True.  There's nothing that can be known which God does not know.

Quote:
2) He therefore knows all their properties ( constituents) They are determined by him as so.

Quote:
Mr Meta:

No, he does not determine the properties of possible worlds.  In fact, this is again presupposing that determinism is true.  Possible worlds are abstract entities much like mathematical propositions; the most famous Lewis axiom is perhaps that all modal propositions are necessary.  God does not "determine" them or their atomic constituents.  

He does, however, determine the universe that he'll create for us.

TGB: He knows all possible worlds which you admit.  If he knows all possible worlds and knows what is in them then he has determined what is in them (epistemic sense) just as you determine what is in your pocket by looking.  There IS NO presumption of determinism here. It is simply the situation in which omniscience experiences all possible worlds. They are not on last analysis like mathematical propositions and are not abstract entities. They are potential entities wherein one can abstract their properties as attributes. Certainly logic and mathematics may in fact be merely abstract. 

You also admit he determines the  universe that he actualizes.  It is merely one of those possible worlds and as I said omniscience entails knowing it as a possible world and as you admit he knows all possible worlds any possible world would be predetermined in its actualization for its outcome is known in its creation. 


Quote:
3) God chooses the best of all possible worlds because he knows fully the constituents. It is they that are good or bad.

If we're understanding "possible world" as this universe that we live in, then I'll say that I can neither affirm nor deny it.  I see no reason to deny that God could have morally permissible reasons for not giving us the best possible place to live in, and I would certainly not claim to know why he does the things that he does--not unless he told me himself.  Are you privy to the mind of God more so than Christians?

TGB: We are understanding this would as an actualization of many possible worlds.  If he knew its content entirely as a possible world it unfolds whether there is causal determinism or not as determined by god and of necessity from its first cause.  For the act of creating it ensures that those things known beforehand mush occur as its result. Aain I would refer you back to the David Bohm analogy for the idea or Augustine for that matter.

 

MR. MEta :

Bald assertion.  Furthermore, would you be willing to grant that there is a possible world (if we are understanding "possible world" as previously noted) where humans are free?  If so, then you would grant that God, creating in the manner that he does, could create a universe where beings such as us make free choices; so why do you believe he didn't?

If you wish to say that there is no possible world where people are free, then I would ask for you to justify it.

 

TGB: It is not an assertion . It is commonly understood to follow from such.  Again the only way that humans could be free is if god DID NOT know the contents of the possible world he has actualized as ours. God could only create a universe with free agents if he did not have omniscience or if he did he sacrificed it in the at of creation. That is simply where process philosophy and your faiths new Sophisticated Theology goes. This is only about the problem of the attribbutes of god. When the possible world scenarios are used the attributes of god prevent free will just as Hyper-Calvinsim claims. If you grant a possible world of free agents then the attributes of Greek philosophical  infected theism  is false.

 

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TGBaker, we're starting to

TGBaker, we're starting to go around in circles.  I'd like to approach this from another angle.  I'll ask you a question, and I'd like to be keep your answer short and succinct.

Would you say that knowledge of p strictly implies that it is necessary that p?  In other words, do you suppose that any claim of knowledge entails that what is known is so and cannot be otherwise?

 


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If you can't beat 'em, troll 'em!

I have nothing useful to say, so I'll resort to becoming a troll...


 

 


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Mr_Metaphysics

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

TGBaker, we're starting to go around in circles.  I'd like to approach this from another angle.  I'll ask you a question, and I'd like to be keep your answer short and succinct.

Would you say ?  In other words, do you suppose that any claim of knowledge entails that what is known is so and cannot be otherwise?

 

Actually we are not going in circles. We are unveiling distinct presuppositions in both of our worldviews.  I do no appreciate the insulting picture posting....   That is not gentlemanly.  There can be free will in a world that god has predetermined all facts about that world if he has not actualized that world.  If he has actualized that world then he has actualized all facts of that world from potential to actual. AS to you question "that knowledge of p strictly implies that it is necessary that p" my answer is NO. I require an externalist justification of truth claims in conjunction with logic.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

Knowledge as 'Justified True Belief'

Many or most analytic philosophers would wish to be able to hold to what is known as the JTB account of knowledge: the claim that knowledge can be conceptually analyzed as justified true belief — which is to say that the meaning of sentences such as "Smith knows that it rained today" can be given with the following set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions:

A subject S knows that a proposition P is true if, and only if:

  1. P is true
  2. S believes that P is true, and
  3. S is justified in believing that P is true

he problem Gettier raised was also raised by Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy.[1] Russell provides an answer of his own to the problem. Edmund Gettier's formulation of the problem was important as it coincided with the rise of the sort of philosophical naturalism promoted by W.V.O. Quine and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards externalist theories of justification.[1] John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge".[2]

[edit] The Cow in the Field

Farmer Franco is concerned about his prize cow, Daisy. In fact, he is so concerned that when his dairyman tells him that Daisy is in the field, happily grazing, he says he needs to know for certain. He doesn't want merely to have a 99 percent probability that Daisy is safe, he wants to be able to say that he knows Daisy is safe.

Farmer Franco goes out to the field and standing by the gate sees in the distance, behind some trees, a white and black shape that he recognizes as his favorite cow. He goes back to the dairy and tells his friend that he knows Daisy is in the field.

Yet, at this point, does Farmer Franco really know it?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internalism_and_externalism

 

The dairyman says he will check too, and goes to the field. There he finds Daisy, having a nap in a hollow, behind a bush, well out of sight of the gate. He also spots a large piece of black and white paper that has got caught in a tree.

Daisy is in the field, as Farmer Franco thought.

But was he right to say that he knew she was?

The philosopher, Martin Cohen, who described this scenario originally,[3] says that in this case the farmer:

  • believed the cow was safe;
  • had evidence that this was so (his belief was justified);
  • and it was true that his cow was safe.

However, we might still feel that the farmer did not really know it; his justified true belief was actually operating independent of the truth. Herein lies the core of the problem of 'knowledge as justified true belief'.

Justification

In contemporary epistemology, internalism about justification is the idea that everything necessary to provide justification for a belief must be immediately available to an agent's consciousness. Externalism in this context is the view that factors other than those internal to the believer can affect the justificatory status of a belief. One strand of externalism is reliabilism, and the causal theory of knowledge is sometimes considered to be another strand. It is important to distinguish internalism about justification from internalism about knowledge. An internalist about knowledge will likely hold that the conditions that distinguish mere true belief from knowledge are similarly internal to the individual's perspective or grounded in the subject's mental states. Whereas internalism about justification is a widely endorsed view, there are few defenders of internalism about knowledge thanks in no small part to Edmund Gettier and Gettier-examples that suggest that there is more to knowledge than just justified true belief. In a short but widely discussed paper published in 1963, Gettier produced examples that seemed to show that someone could be justified in believing something which is actually false, and inferring from it a further belief, this belief being coincidentally true. In this way, someone could be justified in believing something true but nevertheless not be considered to have knowledge of that thing.

One line of argument in favor of externalism begins with the observation that if what justified our beliefs failed to eliminate significantly the risk of error, then it does not seem that knowledge would be attainable as it would appear that when our beliefs did happen to be correct, this would really be a matter of good fortune. While many will agree with this last claim, the argument seems inconclusive. Setting aside sceptical concerns about the possession of knowledge, Gettier cases have suggested the need to distinguish justification from warrant where warrant is that which distinguishes justified true belief from knowledge by eliminating the kind of accidentality often present in Gettier-type cases. Even if something must significantly reduce the risk of error, it is not clear why justification is what must fill the bill.

One of the more popular arguments for internalism begins with the observation, perhaps first due to Stewart Cohen, that when we imagine subjects completely cut off from their surroundings (thanks to a malicious Cartesian demon, perhaps) we do not think that in cutting these individuals off from their surroundings, these subjects cease to be rational in taking things to be as they appear. The 'new evil demon' argument for internalism (and against externalism) begins with the observation that individuals like us on the inside will be as justified as we are in believing what we believe. As it is part of the story that these individuals' beliefs are not produced by reliable mechanisms or backed by veridical perceptual experiences, the claim that the justification of our beliefs depends upon such things appears to be seriously challenged. Externalists have offered a variety of responses but there is no consensus among epistemologists as to whether these replies are successful (Cohen, 1984; Sosa, 1991).

[edit] As a response to skepticism

In responding to skepticism, Hilary Putnam (1982) claims that semantic externalism yields "an argument we can give that shows we are not brains in a vat (BIV). (See also DeRose, 1999.) If semantic externalism is true, then the meaning of a word or sentence is not wholly determined by what individuals think those words mean. For example, semantic externalists maintain that the word "water" referred to the substance whose chemical composition is H2O even before scientists had discovered that chemical composition. The fact that the substance out in the world we were calling "water" actually had that composition at least partially determined the meaning of the word. One way to use this in a response to skepticism is to apply the same strategy to the terms used in a skeptical argument in the following way (DeRose, 1999):

Either I am a BIV, or I am not a BIV.

If I am not a BIV, then when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true.
If I am a BIV, then, when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true (because "brain" and "vat" would only pick out the brains and vats being simulated, not real brains and real vats).
---
My utterance of "I am not a BIV" is true.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internalism_and_externalism

 

 

To clarify how this argument is supposed to work: Imagine that there is brain in a vat, and a whole world is being simulated for it. Call the individual who is being deceived "Steve." When Steve is given an experience of walking through a park, semantic externalism allows for his thought, "I am walking through a park" to be true so long as the simulated reality is one in which he is walking through a park. Similarly, what it takes for his thought, "I am a brain in a vat," to be true is for the simulated reality to be one where he is a brain in a vat. But in the simulated reality, he is not a brain in a vat.

Apart from disputes over the success of the argument or the plausibility of the specific type of semantic externalism required for it to work, there is question as to what is gained by defeating the skeptical worry with this strategy. Skeptics can give new skeptical cases that wouldn't be subject to the same response (e.g., one where the person was very recently turned into a brain in a vat, so that their words "brain" and "vat" still pick out real brains and vats, rather than simulated ones). Further, if even brains in vats can correctly believe "I am not a brain in a vat," then the skeptic can still press us on how we know we are not in that situation (though the externalist will point out that it may be difficult for the skeptic to describe that situation).

Another attempt to use externalism to refute skepticism is done by Brueckner[1] and Warfield.[citation needed] It involves the claim that our thoughts are about things, unlike a BIV's thoughts, which cannot be about things (DeRose, 1999).

 

 

 

 

 

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There is a distinction

There is a distinction between:

  • inherent omniscience - the ability to know anything that one chooses to know and can be known.
  • total omniscience - actually knowing everything that can be known.[citation needed]

Some modern theologians argue that God's omniscience is inherent rather than total, and that God chooses to limit his omniscience in order to preserve the freewill and dignity of his creatures.[3] Certain theologians of the 16th Century,[who?] comfortable with the definition of God as being omniscient in the total sense, in order for worthy beings' abilities to choose freely, embraced the doctrine of predestination.

Controversies

 

The Omniscience Paradoxes

The Omniscience Paradox can be defined by these questions,

  • "Can an omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, timeless, boundless, limitless, and uncontained Entity create that which it doesn't already know?"
  • "If information is the substance and causation to all that exists, would an omniscient entity not literally be everything and anything in, or of existence?"

Well if such an entity is boundless and limitless to which is uncontained, its omniscience would thus need to be infinite. Thus saying it could create that which it doesn't already know would defy its omniscience on an equally infinite scale. If it were omniscient without bounds or limits, it would defy its omnipotence, boundlessness, and limitlessness. It would even collapse its status of being uncontained. And if it were eternally Omniscient without bounds or limits, how could it create anything at all? If information theory is correct, would not this entity be the sum total of all that exists?

This also brings us to the question of how one can "know" how to create the following, which also seems to be the foundation of cause to our own existence. That is, how can an entity design and bring all the following listed objects or concepts into existence, when it requires, or may require them to exist itself? How can one thus be omniscient without them?

  • Reality
  • Existence
  • Information
  • Intelligence
  • Consciousness
  • Logic and mathematics
  • Time (the process to create time would in itself require time)
  • Complexity
  • The five basic senses (Touch, Smell, Hear, Sight, Taste) (In order to be an observer, and know anything including its own existence, a conscious mind will require the tools of observation in order to know, experience, perceive, respond, or act)

When we approach this subject of the paradox of knowledge, or the creation of, we can notice many of these problem areas that concern omniscience and knowledge in regards to such supposed omniscient entities. Thus it can be said that such an argument self-collapses in every area of the supposed attributes given when anyone of them is taken out of the equation by another conflicting attribute. Especially in the case or state of absolute Omniscience. We can explore these problems in religious ideologies such as Christianity (as an example amongst others). In Orthodox Christianity there is a set of specific attributes to which they use to describe their God with. Among these attributes are as follows:

St John of Damascus, The Fount of Knowledge:

Abstract 1:
"The uncreate, the unoriginate, the immortal, the boundless, the eternal, the immaterial, the good, the creative, the just, the enlightening, the unchangeable, the passionless, the uncircumscribed, the uncontained, the unlimited, the indefinable, the invisible, the inconceivable, the wanting nothing, the having absolute power and authority, the life-giving, the almighty, the infinitely powerful, the sanctifying and communicating, the containing and sustaining all things, and the providing for all all these and the like He possesses by His nature. They are not received from any other source; on the contrary, it is His nature that communicates all good to His own creatures in accordance with the capacity of each."

Abstract 2:
"And yet again, there is His knowing of all things by a simple act of knowing. And there is His distinctly seeing with His divine, all-seeing, and immaterial eye all things at once"

  1. Omniscient
  2. Boundless
  3. Unlimited
  4. Uncontained
  5. The containing and sustaining of all things
  6. Timeless
  7. Omnipresent

These seven attributes also led many to question if those with such religious beliefs are unaware that they are seemingly depositing the idea of pure solipsism. Here the argument can be made that even if such an entity would deny the existence of other minds or not, it would still be solipsism. Under this argument in regards to omniscience, one person just stating there isn't any other individual minds would be equal to said entity saying there are no other individual minds. Thus we have to consider that all minds that exist are of this entity's own mind. In light of this, anyone arguing against the argument would be The entity arguing with itself just for the sake of doings so, or for the amusement of doing so. Regardless of what reply anyone might have to this, the six attributes on that list can only mean pure Solipsism in order to be Omniscient without bounds, limits, or containment. This includes number 5 on the list in regards to containing and sustaining all things. These attributes also directly conflict with inherent omniscience stance, or our own individualism since it would be placing limits to a said to be limitless, uncontained, boundless God. However, the worst part isn't any of the above. The worst part is that even if one would argue that such an entity was only to be all knowing in regards to what is knowable, or existent, it would still be depositing the idea of Solipsism as noted in the example below:

Omniscient Solipsism from a Designers Perspective:
(This as if you are the Omniscient Entity about to design and create something into existence. Such as a human being)

I =: reference to all information that gives I an Identity, substance, dimension, value, an awareness, an existence, an intelligence, or a consciousness.

  1. I'm Omniscient
  2. I have an idea of something I want to build, construct, or make existent
  3. I know infinitely everything about this thing, person, or place infinitely before, and infinitely after I have constructed it, or even thought of it.
  4. I would know in my design everything it will infinitely ever do.
  5. I would know everything about my design's essence or being to the point of actually, and literally being that of my design (object, entity, thing, or place) in every infinitely literal way. (and we must pay close attention to the term infinite)
  6. I would know all the above infinitely in the past, present, and future.
  7. This thing I designed would only be able to do what it was designed to do, and what I already infinitely know it will do, even to the point of it actually being literally me, and literally me doing all those things myself in every infinite way imaginable.
  8. Even if I wanted to state that I am only omniscient to which is knowable, 5, 6 (past, and present), and 7 would all be knowable. Omniscience would translate to I, the said entity being existence itself in the best case possible, or everything that is existent in every infinite way.

[edit] Omniscience vs Freewill

See : Determinism, Freewill and argument from free will

[edit] Anterograde Omniscience

Anterograde Omniscience is the type of Omniscience used to incorporate complete knowledge of the future into God. It has been often criticized by the opponents, stating that Free-Will is incoherent with Anterograde omniscience.

A common objection towards free-will is the fact that God knows the future, and what is already known is not considered part of free-will, thus is considered predestination. Moreover stating that predestination and free-will are incoherent, because God would perfectly know everything about the future. Moreover if heaven were eternal, God would know everything the people would do during their time in bliss, laying an infinite series of determinism.

If the future was given the definition of Physics, it can be drawn down to this. The past is something that's known, the future is something that is not known but may have an infinite series of possible branched time-lines and the present is the eliminator of possibilities. If God were to know the future very precisely, it wouldn't even be considered the future since it's a logical fallacy to call it the future if given the specific definition. Therefore the future wouldn't exist. Moreover, the present wouldn't exist, thus everything would be considered "the past" since the past is something that's known with certainty, not a possibility (according to physics). The problem would persist within the nature of God himself, such as he, having a future or even things about what's he's gonna think next.

A possible correction is to state that God doesn't know the future. If this were true, it wouldn't compete with his omnipotence, since no one else would know the future ahead of God. Another correction would be that God knows all possible future events, meaning that he would see an infinite number of timelines laid out on a plane, and such time lines would still remain to exist even if not chosen. Such a God would know every possible way of how something was going to be. However, if this were true, God still wouldn't be omniscient, as his knowledge would be nothing more than mathematical; every possible hand in a poker game is known, but which one is not know before dealt.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omniscience#Omniscience_vs_Freewill

 

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