Wow...I am impressed. A debate within a debate among intelligent people that appear to be alot more knowledgeable of things than I. 

All I clearly wanted to say is I believe in God and He is real if only to me on this site. I am writing my reasons and going to post them under a different forum. Thanks to each and every one of you for responding with such vigor. I hope that we may continue to seek dialogue for to do that wihout listening leaves monologue and that is not good for either side. 

I have no idea what "purely actual ground of being" means. Also, why would existence (in whatever way you mean the term) be predicated of "God"?

I'm going to have to disagree with you here.

....So begins the enthralling debate about nipples.

I do not know what you mean by that. You are right that the conclusion does not follow — I was thinking about what I would say there and what I would say afterward, which threw me off a bit, causing me to forgot the word "probably" in the conclusion. Is that what you are talking about?

I have a hard time understanding how you could read my argument as saying such a thing. Science is irrelevant to the point that I was making. I meant that both systems of metaphysics can be thought of in such a way that they would both lead to all of our perceptions, and they would lead to them equally well, so the balance of evidence does not tip in favor of either system and, as a consequence, one may not justly stray from agnosticism. (I am assuming here that noncognitivism does not hold water. I assume this only to be charitable.)

On the one hand, I want to know how that could be argued. On the other hand, the odds do not seem very good that such an argument would be enlightening or entertaining. Feel free to surprise me, I guess.

"I've always felt the ontological argument for god is weak, at best."

I wasn't referring to the ontological argument(s), but to how broad the concept of God is in classical theism. In other words, even if God did not exist it's still the case that the scope of the *concept* of God is greater than that of the *concept* of existence.

"The difference is, science uses deduction to make predictions, which are testable; natural theology does not."

Right, but there's a reason scientific conclusions must be tested, while the conclusions of natural theology are not, viz. scientific conclusions concern contingent phenomena, while the conclusions of natural theology concern what follows about the nature of reality given the conceptual commitments we must make to explain those contingent phenomena. They may make use of the same fundamental tools (induction, deduction, observation, etc.), but it no more follows that the methodological structure that results from the use of those tools is the same than it follows that if two contractors use the same tools and materials to construct a home they'll end up with the same physical structure.

"And if it has an argument that is not simply an argument from ignorance and incredulity (as are both the teleological and cosmological arguments), I have yet to hear them."

Most variations of the teleological and cosmological arguments are not arguments from ignorance or incredulity. Again, you could only reach this conclusion if you're still taking science and natural theology to be doing the same thing, which, as I've repeatedly emphasized, they're not.

"Kalam is just an argument from ignorance. We don't know, we have no current explanation, so there is evidence for god."

First, the conclusion of the Kalam argument proper isn't that god exists, but that the universe has a cause. God comes in after the argument by way of a conceptual analysis of what a cause of the universe could be. (I should add that Daniel Dennett has said that he can find nothing wrong with the logic of the Kalam argument, so he doesn't see all the fallacies you apparently do; his only problem with it is that it rests on plausible premises concerning issues he thinks we have no reasons to test our intuitions of plausibility). Second, it is not in any way an argument from ignorance, but an argument from what the best evidence currently tells us about the universe. Third, it is not itself an 'explanation' that is in competition with other scientific explanations, but again is a metaphysical argument. This distinction is *vital* if you are ever to understand what educated theists are saying when they discuss arguments for god's existence.

""Existence" isn't as hard as you might think. It is the physical scope of temporal interaction. Or, stated slightly differently: it is the property of being a part of the causal chain."

Where do mathematical objects, propositions, relationships, etc. fit in here? Many very secular mathematicians will tell you that they are engaged in a process of discovering mathematical objects, not in inventing them, and many very secular philosophers argue that propositions and the like do in fact exist. However, neither mathematical objects nor propositions, etc. can exist given your conception of existence, so I don't think it's comprehensive enough.

"The probability of the existence of god appears to approach 0 in this universe; so, no, I actually have a hard time picturing a world in which god is less probable."

Let's take an extreme example first to clarify things. (Also, remember that possible worlds analyses are concerned with logical possibility first, and not with physical or technological possibility.) Compare the actual world A with a possible world W in which no sentient, rational being ever conceived of a god, much less believed in one. Imagine that in W no being ever experiences happiness, hope, love, joy, etc. Further imagine that every being in W is in constant pain that only varies in its intensity. Imagine that there is no natural law and thus no order in W, and that these beings survive purely by chance. Imagine that these beings have no moral sense. Now, in which world would we say it's more likely that the omnipotent, omniscient and loving God of classical theism exists, A or W?

"You've also not presented a single property (or proposition) in this world which presents god as more plausible than not-god."

This is purposeful I've found that you have to do a lot of epistemological ground clearing -- which I'm in the process of doing now -- before you can have a meaningful discussion about the evidence for God's existence; otherwise, we'll wind up talking right past one another.

"I do not know what you mean by that. You are right that the conclusion does not follow — I was thinking about what I would say there and what I would say afterward, which threw me off a bit, causing me to forgot the word "probably" in the conclusion. Is that what you are talking about?"

Undercutting defeaters remove our grounds for holding a belief (i.e. show it's not justified), whereas rebutting defeaters show the belief to be false (i.e. concern its veracity). It seems to me that far too many people confuse the two. After all, I could have no good grounds for the belief that P and it could still be the case that P. So, merely by showing that one's belief is not justified (you haven't seen a god you would expect to see), you haven't done any work towards showing that it is false (such a god doesn't exist), and it is this that you were implying. Note that if you speak about the probability that such a God exists you're still talking about the veracity of the belief, while your concern was with its justification. This is a rather subtle distinction, but it's extremely important if you want to think clearly about these issues.

"Science is irrelevant to the point that I was making. I meant that both systems of metaphysics can be thought of in such a way that they would both lead to all of our perceptions, and they would lead to them equally well, so the balance of evidence does not tip in favor of either system and, as a consequence, one may not justly stray from agnosticism."

Sorry if I misunderstood you. However, you've of course summed up the entire debate here: Is it the case that both (of course, there are more than two, but that's besides the point) metaphysical constructs do an equally good job? That aside, though, I don't think agnosticism about metaphysical issues is in fact possible. We can't avoid metaphysical commitments -- indeed, all attempts to avoid them ineluctably make them!

"On the one hand, I want to know how that could be argued. On the other hand, the odds do not seem very good that such an argument would be enlightening or entertaining. Feel free to surprise me, I guess."

First, I take negative atheism to be the lack of theistic belief. Second, I take negative atheism to be a sufficient condition of atheism, such that it's accurate to call a negative atheist an atheist. Now, my first argument is something of an ordinary language argument. Does it make sense to say, "Atheism is true (or false, probable, likely, more plausible than theism, etc.)?" It seems to me that it clearly does. Now, if you agree that negative atheism is the lack of theistic belief, and if you agree that it's sensible to speak about the truth value, the probability or the plausibility of atheism, then you're going to face a problem: how can your lack of belief in anything be true, (more or less) probable, or (more or less) plausible? It may be true, probable or plausible *that* you lack belief, but you cannot meaningfully say that your lack of belief itself is true, probable or plausible. Negative atheism (understood as I defined it) concerns a description of one's psychology, i.e. if you search all of S's beliefs, you will find no theistic beliefs, and it makes no sense to say that a description of your psychology is true, probable or plausible (though, again, it may be true, probable or plausible *that* it's an accurate description of your psychology).

Second, I'd argue that negative atheism -- even if it can get past my first argument -- suffers the death of a thousand qualifications. S lacks theistic belief, but so does his chair, his Bonsai tree and his cat. So too does his newborn son and the feral child living in the woods behind his house. The insular tribe in which the feral child was born, but from which he was abandoned, has never been exposed to theistic belief, though it is quite intellectually sophisticated. Can we meaningfully predicate negative atheism of everything from the chair to the tribe members? What elements must be satisfied before S can meaningfully be said to be a negative atheist? We could go on. If the Pope were to go into a coma or to lose his memory, could we meaningfully speak about his atheism? Are you upset that newborns aren't included in surveys and polls that attempt to determine the relative percentages of theists and atheists? It seems to me that when you press atheists on the precise meaning of negative atheism, and on what elements it requires, you end up with something much closer to positive atheism than expected.

"You give concepts (Abyssinian cat, cat, and so on) the same ontological weight as a specific, existing cat. This is quite obviously a fallacy (that of composition). One cat exists; the group "Abyssinian cats" does not exist"

No, I was not doing that at all. Again, I was referring to the concepts, to the descriptions, alone. If you prefer, take Hamlet. I can say more about Hamlet than I can about homo sapiens, and more about homo sapiens than I can about Hominoidea, and so on. My only point concerned the nature of descriptions. We can be more precise and clear the less narrow the concept we're discussing (e.g. we can say more about Hominoidea than we can about living thing). But if this is true, then it follows that you shouldn't expect as precise a description of 'God' as you should of 'Southern White-cheeked Gibbon,' or even of 'existence' itself. I was trying to put the relative vagueness of conceptions of God in context, and demonstrate that this is not at all a defect, but rather is precisely what we should expect given the nature of the concept(and again, I'm referring to the concept alone here).

 No wonder you chose sub d visions as your moniker for obviously you are too short sighted.

Again we are discussing essentially faith against those who have none. Nothing created God, the scripture says I am Alpha and Omega the beginning and the last. He, who Is has always been and the logical, reasoning ,scientific mind just can't fathom that concept. But something had to jump start everything else. A molecule didn't just pop up in the vacuum of space to multiply and become so on and so on. So something not only had to bring the first molecule into being but also be able to protect it from being absorbed into nonthingness. One may contend that at that time the Dimensions of space as we know it may have been so much considerably smaller then that the vacuum and gravitational forces that abound were so insignificant that the molecule may have had a fighting chance....Still leaves the question...Who or what created the first molecule and leaving it up to cosmic chance is more of a comical delusion of grandeur than conceiving a Higher Authority than us and we with our little brains couldn't even begin to dissect a billionth of an ounce of God's power.    

So make believe is the answer?

Oh! My bad. Sorry -- it looked very much like the ontological argument, when in fact it is only 1/2 of the classical composition. I jumped to conclusions.

In that case: I am willing to follow where you lead on this one. I'm still a bit troubled by the admittance of an unsupported into an ontology (as ontologies are, by definition, sets of models and data that represent a reality), but I'd like to see where you go with this.

Which seems to beg the question. If you must assume the conclusions you wish to prove, natural philosophy seems to be an exercise in wish-fulfillment. And, without a method of testing those conceptual commitments, there is no way to assign any probability of truth at all.

The reason the scientific method includes testing of deductive conclusions is because it's necessary the test conclusions against reality. Otherwise, you have a very high probability of simply being wrong.

So again, from an epistemological standpoint, it seems there is nothing to validate the propositions.

Relationships such as mathematics do not exist per se. We have discovered relationships between objects and properties of objects, but the objects exist. The relationships of objects fall within the physical scope of temporal interaction. Mathematics is nothing more and nothing less than the abstracted model of the patterns exhibited by these relationships and interactions. "Mathematics" does not exist as an independent entity. That's like saying that "Abyssinian cat" exists as an entity independent of the collection of actual cats we place in that group.

So, I maintain my definition is sufficient.

I provided a definition of existence -- I believe you owe me a definition of god.

Okay. This is going to take some going-over, and (again) I'm at work. Gah. Not enough time....

I'll get back to this one.

And-- thanks again. This is fun.

  Even if God was real, I still have no use for him and he is certainly no friend of mine.

I mean really ....worship Jesus or he'll burn you alive ? ( Luke 19:27 )  Wow, how could you not love a God like that ? 

Hey, BADWAY. Glad you're joining in the fray here.

Of course, lots of things exist that are unknown. For instance, there are planets and suns that we know nothing about -- even the fact that they exist. This is an ontological issue: the actual existence or non-existence of these entities is unknown to us. One could even say the same about god. Ontologically, god may or may not exist.

Then there is the epistemic question: how do we know what we know? And even more important, what can we legitimately claim to know?

The question of god is one such epistemic issue. How can we claim to know whether god exists or not?

Ontologically, we can make claims about god only if we have epistemic reasons. If we can't know about god, how can we claim he exists? This is no different than me saying there is a planet orbiting Betelgeuse, and it is populated with intelligent slugs. What are my epistemic reasons for making an ontologic claim?

Honestly, when discussing god, it's all about epistemology. We make ontologic claims ('god exists,' or 'god does not exist') but honestly, what it comes down to is, "How do we know?" And that is epistemic in nature. That's really what this debate is about. edejardin and I are dancing around epistemology, though there are ontologic claims here and there. (Basically, if you can show logically that something *must* exist, it leaves the realm of epistemology, and enters the realm of ontology.) I'm attempting to narrow the epsitemologic field, while he is attempting to expand it.

When you say, "Because it is unknown does not mean that it does not exist," you are essentially saying, "That which is unknown is open for imagination." And that's true. However, just because you can imagine it, or even feel that it is real, does not make it real. There are certain standards by which we judge things as true or not true. The standard you hold determines how likely that which you believe is actually (ontologically) true. If you say, "I feel god, therefore god exists," your standards are fairly low, and the ontological likelihood of your assumption is really pretty low.

And this is the quandary you find yourself in. You are asserting a metaphysical being exists; you must therefore answer the question, "How do I know?" Without an acceptable answer to that question, your knowledge itself becomes suspect. (Note: I haven't read either of your "Why I believe in god" threads. I intend to, when I have time. I'm really interested, because I kinda like you so far.)

This doesn't mean you shouldn't believe it. It simply means you shouldn't expect anyone else to accept your reasons.

There are others that get to choose. Dolphins seem intelligent. Dogs, even, to a certain extent. The major difference between us and the other "intelligent" animals is our ability to think about patterns, and abstract from those patterns.

As far as the rest: dude, we're all trying to build our "happily ever after." We're all in this together, you and me and everyone else. The only thing I care about (other than hanging out with intelligent people and having my 'happily ever after') is that we all act that way -- like we're all in this together.

Hate to break it to you but your god isn't real. The only real ones are the ones I believe.

HAIL THOR.

 I beleive if you don't believe in the God as we are relating at this moment then that classifies you as an atheist technically speaking....a rose by any other name....

Say hi to thor for me!

Great your a polytheist....me I'm more of a polyeurythane kind of girl /guy ya heard....

Lovely story - shame it;s not biblical...

 I was wondering when you were gonna get back to me dog...I felt like a bride left at the altar and you ran off with edejardin...hehe

I just want to point out and as you read my other posts to catch up maybe I won't sound to redundant.

When your are quoting me as saying Because you don't see therefore it doesn't exist or Because it is unknown doesn't mean that it doesn't exist, it  doesn't have to require imagination. If that helps you to put a face with something so you can relate to it fine..the truly faithful need not that support or validation to justify their belief in something that is true even if at risk is currently unavailable in proper description or translation to showcase their proof of the unknown. Examine the tree in the forest theory I described and you may understand my point clearer....true we could imagine that a sound was made if a tree fell in the forest and by what we know about sound so forth we would agree that it does make a sound even if no one is there to hear it....but no one can say absolutely without a shadow of doubt that is true because you both can't be here or there to prove it which creates a paradox of sorts. So one can only assume based on his current understanding of the forces at work as it relates to sound that he is safe in his assumption. But one must be careful since neither one can be proven absolute that a sound can occur if no one hears it so it leaves open the window of possibility. I know scientist would consider this a bs argument but none the less if it can't be proven and cannot be proven then both sides of the table must agree that both is plausible and unplausible. But not impossible.  I've been on this site all day so forgive me if I'm rambling on....I'll think more clearly tommorrow and probably dismiss this as being written half asleep...haha ...goodnight both Theists and non may you all have a good night sleep and pleasant dreams and may no harm come to any one here and abroad.....Thank you for your time this is indeed fun for me. But then again I am not your typical Christian...

"Which seems to beg the question. If you must assume the conclusions you wish to prove, natural philosophy seems to be an exercise in wish-fulfillment. And, without a method of testing those conceptual commitments, there is no way to assign any probability of truth at all."

Arguments in natural theology are no more question begging than the arguments in, say, mathematics (that is, the valid arguments in natural theology and mathematics, of course). Here's a quick example: One famous argument begins with the observation that some things change. It then goes on to analyze the concept of change, and makes a number of important distinctions and conceptual analyses. From there, it takes these distinctions and analyses and rigorously draws out their logical implications, the result being the necessity of positing a sustaining cause with attributes we would all uncontroversially ascribe to God. So, this argument -- which we can take as a sort of paradigm case -- begins with an observation, analyzes the conceptual content we need to use to make sense of that observation, and proceeds to draw out the logical implications of those conceptual structures. While such arguments can of course be question begging, they're no more *inherently* question begging than any valid deductive argument is.

As far as probability goes, it's simply not an issue here. As with mathematical arguments, these types of metaphysical arguments in natural theology either work or they don't. (Incidentally, it's been argued that it is literally meaningless to ask about the probability that God exists. One of God's properties, if he exists, is that he exists necessarily. That is, God either exists in all possible worlds, or he exists in no possible world. And, since this is part of the very definition of God, it makes as much sense to talk about the probability that God exists as it does to ask about the probability that a triangle has three sides. Note, this is not to say that God does in fact exist, but that if he exists, he exists necessarily.)

"The reason the scientific method includes testing of deductive conclusions is because it's necessary the test conclusions against reality. Otherwise, you have a very high probability of simply being wrong."

I don't think this is true at all (at least not in all cases, though I do concede, of course, the necessity of testing properly scientific conclusions). For example, I can construct an a priori argument that concludes that squared circles don't exist, and I don't need to test this conclusion to be justified in holding it. Similarly, I can construct an argument demonstrating that there is necessarily something with pages in it on my computer desk (There is a book on my desk, all books(\/df) have at least one page, so there is something with at least one page on my desk), and I wouldn't have to test the conclusion to be certain of its truth. Note, like arguments in natural theology, it relies (at least in part) on premises derived a posteriori, but leads (if valid) to a necessarily true conclusion. (These are simplistic examples, of course, so don't get caught up in these particular arguments themselves, but rather focus on the point I'm driving at, to wit we can come to know things about the world without satisfying science's 'testability' criterion. Indeed, to claim otherwise would be self refuting, since we cannot test the proposition that 'the testability criterion is necessary if a conclusion is to be justified.')

"The relationships of objects fall within the physical scope of temporal interaction. Mathematics is nothing more and nothing less than the abstracted model of the patterns exhibited by these relationships and interactions. "Mathematics" does not exist as an independent entity...So, I maintain my definition is sufficient."

I disagree. For example, what is the physical analog of imaginary numbers, or of the Mandelbrot set?

"I provided a definition of existence -- I believe you owe me a definition of god."

Well, there are still serious problems with your definition, aside from the ones I've already raised (e.g. the term 'physical' is notoriously tricky to get a handle on; your definition would seem to preclude virtual particles on the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, since they arise uncaused for a fleeting moment and then 'dissolve' back again into the quantum vacuum; etc.) but let's go with your definition for the time being, so I can proceed to make my point. You said that existence is "the physical scope of temporal interaction." I think you'd agree that this is an extremely vague definition, and I think you'd also agree that this isn't in any sense a fault; rather, it's vagueness is entailed by the very nature of the exercise, i.e. of trying to work out a concept broad enough to comprise all of reality. Now, as I said, the concept of God has been understood by classical theists for centuries to be even broader still, since God is understood as the sustaining cause of all that exists. Hence, we should *expect* the definition of God to be even more encompassing, and thus even more vague, than "the physical scope of temporal interaction." So, we could (tentatively) go with something like this: God is the purely actual ground of the physical scope of temporal interaction, i.e. the purely actual ground of being. ("Purely actual" is a technical term that roughly means, if I may simplify it for the sake of brevity, "lacking all potentiality." Unfortunately, "potentiality" is another technical term that means, again simplifying for the sake of brevity, "the capacity an entity has that, given its nature, can be actualized, whether it ever is actualized or not.") As the ground of being, God can be thought of as standing in a relationship to existence -- the physical scope of temporal interaction -- that is (very roughly) analogous to the relationship that obtains between an orchestra and the music it's playing: the orchestra's playing is the sustaining cause of the music. As long as the orchestra plays, the music exists; if the orchestra stops, the music stops. Similarly, everything that exists does so only because God grounds it at every moment as a sustaining cause. (N.B. I'm here *explaining* various parts of the definition, not *arguing* for them, so it's no objection to say that I'm merely asserting such and such. However, the various elements of my definition -- excepting my incorporation of Nigel's conception of existence, of course -- are in fact all *conclusions* of rigorously formulated arguments, all of which rest, at least in part, on simple empirical premises, and which rely not a whit on revelation. This is not to say that revelation plays no role in Christian epistemology; of course it does. But nothing I've said in these many posts on this thread is derived in any sense from revelation.)

I would just like to reiterate my main point apropos of the definition of God: If you expect the definition of God to be clearer than a good definition of existence, then you're setting the bar far too high because (1) you've failed to think through the nature of definitions as we move from specific tokens to ever broader and more encompassing types, and (2) you've not understood what classical theists mean when they say, "God," viz. insofar as it's a concept that is even more expansive than "existence" itself. In short, think about how many unanswerable questions arise from the sorts of vague definitions we're capable of giving of "existence," and then realize that, given (1) and (2), we should not consider it a defect if the definition of God is even vaguer than the definition of "existence" and raises even more difficult questions.

Okay, not much time (again!), but I'd like to reply to this, briefly.

To construct this argument, you must relate assumptions or propositions of the argument with physical things. Otherwise, your argument becomes pure assertion.

Sorry; I got caught up in the heat of the moment, in the last section.

Aha! Here you conflate the purely epistemic debate ('the testability criterion is necessary if a conclusion is to be justified') with the ontological ('god exists'). In spite of this conflation, the testability criterion has itself been tested. Every scientific advance, based on the testability criterion, proves its worth. Every time naturalistic theology gives us a watchmaker, or a Kalam cosmological argument, or other construct that is shown to be hollow, the testability criterion is proven out. The very effectiveness of the scientific method proves it out.

Naturalistic theology has given us, what, exactly? How has it proven out its epistemology?

There are certain attributes of your examples that are consistent. For instance, in each example as you move from the specific to the general, each general category references that which we've actually experienced. That is, as you move from Seamus to Abyssinian to cat, each level references something specific and actualized at the lowest layer; and it is only this lower layer we can experience, that is real. There is a subtlety that you are glossing over here, though. If all cats were Abyssinian, then we would have no need for the label "Abyssinian cat." Further, if you were to propose a label above "cat" that did not define an attribute not already inherent in "cat," that label would be redundant, and have no ontological reach beyond "cat." Suppose further that this label did include attributes beyond that which defines a "cat," (say, 'has four or six legs.') Yet there is nothing in the universe that fits the definition with six legs. Ontologically, that label is equivalent to "cat," even with the extraneous attributes that are never actualized.

We can conclude that each categorical expansion has a limit. For the cats, it went from specific cat, to type of cat, to all cats, to mammals, to animals, to life in general... and then were, exactly? The outer category would be simply "life." You could go on to object, I suppose, but it would be difficult to expand the categories so that "life" included, say, suns but not planets. Recognizing where the conceptual categories end seems to be ontologically significant, no?

It occurs to me that the concept of "god" is over-reaching in an attempt to broaden a category that is already well-defined at its outer limits.

As for 2):

Absolutely. I've never understood what classical theists mean when they say, "God." And I submit, neither do classical theists. They have taken existence and appended something that neither exists, nor enhances or contributes to the understanding of existence. (In fact, I would argue the very concept of god detracts from our understanding of existence; if you read my rant about the epistemic failure of the god concept, you'll have an idea what I mean.)

You have said that god is that which sustains reality (or existence). But you have not established that the universe requires sustaining, any more than a galaxy requires a spindle. You have provided a poorly-defined solution to an as-yet non-existent problem. This appears to me to be neither ontologically nor epistemically sound.

Also, as with Kalam, you present a non sequitur, followed by a false dichotomy. First, the non sequitur is that the universe needs sustaining. The false dichotomy is that between "nothing" and "god." What about quantum foam? Or the tension of universal expansion? Or any other number of naturalistic (or even supernatural, but non-theistic) explanations?

And again, all this simply underscores both the ontological and epistemic failures of the god concept.

 Tell me Ciarin which has more fatty tissue ...that which is in your chest or that which is in your head?

As far as sucking goes ,I'm considering the source....you probably get passed around more times than a grease monkeys allen wrench at a biker rally!

Sorry I don't think your a whore....I just thought my prejudicial attempt at humor was as about as funny as yours if not just as lame!

Maybe we should just have a forum slinging insults since that seems to be the only course of action some feel they can take since they can't seem to be able to intellectually participate in this discussion!

Is there a name for this paradigm case? I'd not seen this before, that I recall. It sounds interesting.

Pure deductive logic is a poor epistemic model. Take a look at Zeno's paradox. Here's a purely-deductive formulation that almost hit upon the calculus. If the question wasn't posed in such an intentionally-paradoxical manner, it's possible we'd have had a tremendously powerful mathematical tool a couple of thousand (or maybe at least hundreds)  of years before we did.

To me, though, the lesson of Zeno's paradox is, "Philosophers may ask interesting questions, but their answers usually suck." Of course, that's just my general disdain of philosophy shining through.

For some reason, I really find philosophical discussions interesting. Going up against people who know more about it than I do (like you) usually results in an education on my part; so if I'm a bit antagonistic (an often outright wrong), I'm really doing so only because I'm testing my own understanding of philosophy in an attempt to figure out where I'm wrong, or more ignorant than I knew. I make this disclaimer because I can sometimes be an arrogant ass, even when I don't intend to be.

Math is a language, a system of symbolic representation. It is elegant and powerful. Like any sufficiently-powerful language, it is able to express concepts and things that have no actual physical manifestation. The Mandelbrot set does not exist. The concept of the Mandelbrot set exists within the minds of mathematicians and interested lay people. But, as Goedel proved, any sufficiently powerful language can be used to express paradoxes. It seems a natural corollary would be that any sufficiently powerful language can express concepts that have no natural analog. (This assumes there are no contradictions in natural reality, of course.)

As for complex numbers, there might be an argument for a kind of second-order existence of an analog, in that complex numbers are useful in expressing relationships between sinusoidals. I'm not up to making that argument, as it's been far too long since I took diff-eq and magnetism, and I'm not sure that's a meaningful addition to the concept of "existence."

As a side note -- what are you using to compose your posts? When I click on "quote," they all show up as a long block of text, rather than as paragraphs. It makes it a little more difficult to reply to you. Also, when quoting others, you can use quote blocks, like this: (quote)This is a quote(/quote). Only, replace the parenthesis with '[' and ']'. Just thought you might like to know.

He'll just ask for and receive his God's forgiveness and promise not to do it again (until he wants to).

Lather, rinse, repeat.

"Is there a name for this paradigm case? I'd not seen this before, that I recall. It sounds interesting."

Absolutely, and I'm sure you have heard of it: it's Aquinas's First Way. As I've been emphasizing, the arguments for God's existence are almost inevitably poorly understood by most atheists. (I blame the internet.) Even atheists with strong philosophical backgrounds often have never been exposed to rigorous and accurate developments of these arguments, and so they dismiss caricatures of them. I'd recommend a recently published, popular level book by professor Ed Feser titled "The Last Superstition" to anyone interested in getting into these arguments in a serious way. Feser demonstrates that the New Atheists have never been exposed to serious philosophical arguments for God (yes, even Harris and Dennet, who are both trained in philosophy), and proceeds to develop a number of arguments for God's existence from the metaphysical ground floor up.

"Pure deductive logic is a poor epistemic model."

That depends on what you're trying to find out. Do you want to know what water is composed of? Well, yeah, pure deduction won't get you very far. But do you want to understand, in a deep sense, what "composition" means, and what it entails? Here, you can't get anywhere without deduction. You have to be sure you fit the tools to the job: you can't cut down a tree with an Allen wrench, but it doesn't follow that the Allen wrench is without use. In its proper context, it's quite useful.

"To me, though, the lesson of Zeno's paradox is, "Philosophers may ask interesting questions, but their answers usually suck." Of course, that's just my general disdain of philosophy shining through."

Again, it depends. I'd agree that philosophers who do science from their armchairs are horrible, but I'd also say that scientists make a fine mess of things when they delve into philosophy. But I'd also say that the line between questions/answers isn't as clear as you suppose here. Good questions, by their very nature, presuppose good answers, and good answers always raise new questions. Further, as any scientist will tell you, the most difficult job is coming up with the right question. And since, as you admit, philosophers come up with good questions, philosophy can't be half as bad as you suppose.

"I make this disclaimer because I can sometimes be an arrogant ass, even when I don't intend to be."

Yeah, I've been accused of arrogance too, but I can't see why...Seriously, you don't strike me as arrogant at all, just as someone deeply interested in these issues who's not afraid to mix it up and provide vigorous arguments to support his positions.

"Like any sufficiently-powerful language, it is able to express concepts and things that have no actual physical manifestation. The Mandelbrot set does not exist. The concept of the Mandelbrot set exists within the minds of mathematicians and interested lay people."

Well, Mandelbrot himself would disagree with you, but that doesn't count for much here. In what sense do concepts exist in the minds of people? And do you identify minds with brains (in any of the various ways this can be done)?

"It seems a natural corollary would be that any sufficiently powerful language can express concepts that have no natural analog."

I agree. The question is whether some of those concepts exist. Another question is why, if it is the case that mathematics is as you say, we have made so many discoveries about the real world in the mathematical realm that have been since corroborated with real world discoveries. It seems to me that there's something deeper going on here than you suggest, and it implies the real existence of mathematical objects (as mathematicians such as Mandelbrot and Penrose -- and countless others -- have argued).

"Also, when quoting others, you can use quote blocks, like this: (quote)This is a quote(/quote). Only, replace the parenthesis with '[' and ']'. Just thought you might like to know."

Thanks!

....That word has actually always confused me. I've been under the impression that it simply describes any organism that reproduces asexually (amoebas, bacteria, certain plants, etc)... but I've also been told that it specifically refers to people who have both male and female reproductive organs. 

What does it mean, exactly?

For a myth to exist it must entirely be fabricated or be without truth. However the Bible clearly outlines actual places, peoples, battles and various other events that have transpired.

So does the Illiad & Gone with the Wind. So I can assume by your definition That these books are not mythological? Just because some part of a story is real doesn't make the whole story real.

 You would have a better chance at sneaking up on your own shadow or reflection in the mirror...but good luck with that!