1) Naturalist.

2) Super-naturalism seems very incoherent to me. I define "nature" as "all which exists." If something exists, I consider it to be a part of nature -- whether it "follows the rules" or not. The only rules I think something would need to follow are the rules of logic, specifically ontological logic. Therefore, if the supernatural exists, then it must be natural -- a contradiction. I do entertain the possibility of other universes with different rules apart from ours -- but if they exist they are still natural, still somehow observable, and still explainable.

3) I think that your categorization "atheists, obviously, think naturalism is true" is false. Many atheists are "spiritual," aka. they don't believe in a God, but believe in some sort of super-natural mumbo jumbo. Some atheists also believe in things like ghosts or karma. Atheism is simply the disbelief in a deity. It doesn't entail that you must be a naturalist. The inverse is also true. Naturalistic pantheists, for instance, believe in a natural god. However, I would agree that most atheists are naturalists, and most theists are supernaturalists.

1) Naturalist

2) There simply is no proof of anything supernatural. What we call supernatural at one point in history might be considered natural today. People tend to desire an explanation of things and if they can't find one a god or gods provides an all inclusive answer and provides comfort. One of the most irritating things to me is when a theist will say "Well if there is no god how can you explain X" There is much we don't understand and no one will be able to explain in my lifetime but I have confidence that some point in the future humans will understand more. As for miracles, I saw Criss Angel walk on water. He must be supernatural. Miracle is just another name for something you can't explain but somewhere in there is an explanation. (And if anyone can explain that walking on water trick let me know, it is the only one I can't figure out and everything I find on the net isn't convincing) Even when you see something you believe is impossible there is a rational explanation somewhere.

3) Your categories are as good as any. categorization can never be perfect because there will always be exceptions.

Materialistic Naturalism is the only valid and teneble answer to existence. The very term "supernatural" is broken and incoherent. This will explain further: http://www.rationalresponders.com/supernatural_and_immaterial_are_broken_concepts

1) Yep. I'll let you know when I am posting on a PC and can do so to my satisfaction.
2) Yes, yes, yes, and no.
Let me know when you can do more than make unsupported assertions, straw man arguments, and ad hominem attacks. It might be slightly more interesting.

"Our civilization doesn't yet know all natural laws, this is why some seem to be miraculous." --Luminon

Isn't this simply naturalism?  And, if both worldviews are "natural," doesn't that make you a naturalist?

What are some naturalistic responses to this?  If naturalists are correct in assuming super-naturalism is a broken concept, and super-naturalists can show naturalism untenable, are we just sunk?

That is a difficult question to answer because I can't envision anything that is truly supernatural. As I pointed out in my post even something that appears supernatural to me at the moment can easily have a natural scientific explanation. I'm not sure it would be possible to prove the supernatural. In fact, it seems to me by definition it is impossible to prove the existence of the supernatural because if you could prove it exists, wouldn't it be natural? 

All I can say is that what is often called supernatural is routinely disproven and people just make up something else supernatural. I just think when supernatural claims are disproven time after time it is unlikely that the millionth claim is true.

1)Naturalist.

2)Because the supernatural is not actually an answer for anything at all.

Seriously, quite a few of the so-called proofs for god fail due to the question of “who/what made god?”. However, there is a problem with that logic. Specifically, if it is not an infinite regress, then there must eventually come a point where stuff just happened.

Just for shits and giggles, let's say that

a. There is a god and he made the natural world as we know it. Also,

b. That there is no regression past that point.

OK, now tell me where god lives and where he put the universe? Seriously, that is a problem for the supernatural view. Think about this for a moment, if I build a shed in my back yard, I can define that as not part of my house (and god can call the universe apart from heaven by related thought). However, the shed is still in my world and I am in my world through no miraculous agency. Such must hold true for god as well.

Carrying the idea of who made god back one more step (or ten steps or a few million steps) does not remove this problem. Eventually, one must come to a point where there is a world that just happened. That world must, by any reasonable definition, be the true natural world.

Really, whoppie! So god has a magical universe making machine in his workshop. Still, god is embedded in whatever larger reality that the workshop, the universe machine and our universe also exist inside of. So even with a postulated “higher being” we still have a naturalistic world to deal with.

Obviously people didn't actually read the thread linked to, or they'd have seen the answers to those questions. Fact of the matter is that assuming or positing something other than the natural is begging the question. Not the other way around.

My mistake. I was hasty.  I suppose you are referring to this gem:

"Related Counter Argument: "Materialism begs the question that all there is, is matter."

My Response: You've got it backwards: you're begging the question that there IS something beyond materialism in order to make this very charge. Those who build their case for immateriality by arguing that materialism rules out their claim a priori implicitly concede that there is no way to build a positive case for your claim. "

The author here has made a mistake.  Question begging would be arguing in this way:

Let P represent the sentence: "Naturalism is true."

Let Q represent the sentence: "Super-naturalism is true."

1. P v Q     (assumed)

2. Q-->~P (assumed)

3. Q           (assumed)

4. ~P         (From 2 and 3, modus ponens)

Therefore,

5. Q           (From 1 and 4, disjunct elimination)

I've begged the question in the above argument by assuming super-naturalism is true.  It is (hopefully) the only contentious assumption in the argument.  I'm saying naturalists often make the same argument, but simply assume P instead of Q.   Either argument is bad, and both are worthless in defending a position.

My point is, we must have a reason for selecting p over q.  The author does beg the question, because he provides no evidence for his claim that naturalism is true, other than the fact that super-naturalism is incoherent (Why? Because naturalism is true! )  If you don't think the argument is question-begging, riddle me this: what premise, distinct from his conclusion, does the author provide to support his position?

 Do super-naturalists ever argue as above? Yes!  But that doesn't relieve naturalists of their responsibility to defend their position.  If the question of naturalism vs. super-naturalism is open, then we must have reason to choose one over the other.  If it is a closed question for you, you must have a reason for your choice.  That's the purpose of my question 2 above.  I want to know why someone chooses one over the other. 

Something can be natural to me but not to majority of people. It can be divided even further, something can be familiar to me, but not necessarily natural. For example, I used to smoke cigarettes so they're familiar to me, but I stopped a few years ago and smoking is not natural to me anymore.

Anyway, I don't like these linguistic games. I prefer intuitive understanding of what's going on. It's so comfortable

That's cute.  Are you learning about these in your intro to philosophy class?

I already know the difference.  Both operate under the presupposition that nature is all that there is.  Metaphysical naturalism is the belief that nature is all that exists.  Methodological naturalism is the assumption of metaphysical naturalism in scientific inquiries only, which thereby trivializes any fundamental differences between the two insofar that they both by necessity exclude the possibility of supernatural explanation, since they both accept that all knowledge ultimately derives from scientific investigation.  Thus, there is zero probability that the methodological naturalist is going to accept any supernatural phenomena as being such.  Probably the most fundamental difference is that the methodological naturalist is typically more disingenuous in his approach, pretending that the possibility is left open for supernaturalism, much like a weak atheist will claim that s/he is open to the possibility of God yet will spend the majority of his or her days dissecting any cogent theist argument until it can be refuted.

It's not an assertion.  I support my claim in the very next sentence.  But I would guess that you are just responding to my post without reading it all the way through.

I discuss that in the very next sentence.  Once again, are you reading my post all the way through before responding to it?

If knowledge is a material entity, then you really could not claim to know that the stove caused your hand to get hurt.  In fact, you could not even claim to know that there is a stove or that you have a hand.  Your "knowledge" would simply be some material entity which itself is shaped by some prior physical event, possibly unrelated to the action of your hand touching the stove.  There would be practically no correlation between physical actions and the knowledge that you presuppose to be produced by them.  Your knowledge would simply be a contingent factor of physical processes, which means that you putting your hand on the stove could conceivably give way to you extrapolating a completely false proposition based on that event.

Did you even understand what I've just stated?

Which is self-refuting, since you could never be sure if you could never be sure.

Regardless what one thinks of naturalism, where was "supernatural" actually defined and shown to a viable alternative?

Alright, I can already tell this discussion is going to make me tear my hair out. 

Nah. Philosophy 100 didn't cover this when I took it. I'm going to take Intro to Logic (120) in about a month though.

I hate semantics. Define supernatural.

I believe that all knowledge of the world is acquired through a mixture of our senses and logic. Scientific investigation is the most unbiased and reliable method of applying these faculties. I think it is definitely possible, even likely, that there are things in the world that we can't understand. However, correct me if I'm wrong, but 'supernatural,' by being "beyond natural," seems to literally be defined by what we can't explain and can't comprehend. Thus, argueing for the validity of "supernatural explanations" is like an oxymoron to me. So, I don't operate under the presupposition that nature is all that there is. More precisely, I believe that all that can be investigated is all that is worth investigating, a very pragmatic approach perhaps.

Aaaww, you're a meany, aren't you?

I didn't say it was a naked assertion. 

Yep, I could be a brain in a vat. Either way, it still hurts, which is all the evidence I need. 

Something along the lines of, "If intelligence, conscience, morality, etc. are merely characteristics of complex physical processes, then I will be really, really sad." Haha, here's what you wrote:

"Knowledge would simply be the result of some natural process, which itself is understood a posteriorically."

Close enough, right? Of course, I added that part at the end, but I thought it was fitting...   

Yuck! Is this a paradox? I'm glad I'm not a philosophy major, fencing with shadows. Hey, it's kind of like the quote, "All generalizations are false, including this one." 

Anyways, I think you're right, but it just doesn't bother me. 

Riddle me this: how does one empirically observe a philosophical position?  That's like saying I mathematically calculated my epistemic position.  Naturalism is a position one brings to experience--one will interpret experience in terms of naturalism.  Science does not, and cannot, prove naturalism, because "Is naturalism true?" is not a scientific hypothesis. 

How would you determine that a computer that solves problems doesn't know something and a human who solves problems does?

You just provided an argument for all things fictional to exist. Congratulations.

Of course it's logically conceivable the Santa could exist! Of course it's logically conceivable that wood elves exist! Don't discount the existence of wood elves!

There really needs to be a fallacy ab teenagero. Because, you know, what can we really know? I mean really?

Let me get some coffee first. It might make me care.

Santa Clause is defined as that big Jolly man who lives in the North Pole.  Therefore, all I have to do to prove that he does not exist is to travel to the North Pole and see that there is nobody there.  If you are defining him differently, let me know and I'll tell you if I can prove to you that he does not exist.

Whereas the claim that everything is material is a claim about the entire universe of discourse, which would require you to travel a million miles across to universe to observe everything in order to verify materiality.

I really don't care if you care or not.

I'm just saying, that if materialistic naturalism is true, then knowledge does not exist. 

Maybe with 'reductionist' materialism, but that is irrelevant to modern scientific naturalism. Also depends how you define 'knowledge' - it is a slippery term.

The philosphical definition "justified, true belief" is absurd question begging. We cannot 'know' which if any of our beliefs are definitely 'true'.

It is better defined by the degree of confidence we have in the truth of the 'information' that the 'knowledge' specifies. It is simply one end of the spectrum of concepts we hold in in our minds, the other end being somewhere in the region of tentative assumptions. It really should not be used in rigorous debate, especially since new discoveries can instantly change the accepted truth value of a particular belief, even if the person is not aware of it, and his whole mental state which stores that 'knowledge' remains exactly as it was before.

It makes it difficult to talk about people in the past 'knowing' things which we now 'know' to be mistaken, even though in many contexts the ultimate truth value of any belief is not relevant to understanding what and why people behave as they do.

To quote myself from a post on another thread

'Immateriality' is a (negative) concept that obviously exists, just like 'number', 'height', 'weight', 'equality', 'velocity', 'complexity', 'law', 'logic', 'contradiction', stupidity', etc.

Just another way of saying not every noun refers to a physical object. Others describe concepts, processes, attributes, qualities, etc, which may or may not be directly attributes of physical objects.

Except we don't know empirical 'truths' with 100% certainty, so that leaves what should be regarded formally and strictly as 'knowledge' not definable.

Wrong.

We do not need 100% certainty of anything.

We only need 'working assumptions' to allow us to proceed - "as if" something is true.

Subsequent experience and new information will allow us to either increase our confidence in particular assumptions or maybe abandon them and adopt assumptions which appear to work better. Yes, we have to have initial assumptions, but that doesn't mean they can't be modified in the light of experience.

Your conception of the implications of "materlalism" just demonstrate ignorance, which is understandable, as you appear to be so wedded to a supernatural world-view.

I could adopt your approach and suggest you need to study the alternatives seriously, but that is probably pointless in practice, either way, when the world-views are so different.

Sorry, what was immaterial, ideas? Of course, ideas need a brain, which is material, so ...

Fair enough.  But there is a fundamental difference between universal and singular propositions.  The only universal propositions that we can prove to be true are a priori propositions. The proposition that everything is natural is an empirical proposition.  Any universal empirical proposition is unprovable for the same reason:  We cannot observe the entire universe.

Obviously, you are falling back on the idea that God-belief is not substantiated by any evidence and that atheists are unable to disprove his existence is a moot point because we have the burden of proof.  Right?  Was that the point of your Santa example and the whole "invisible" thing?

Materialist naturalism is the claim that everything is material.  So yes, they are claiming exhaustive knowledge. 

Metaphysical naturalism makes that claim outright, while methodological naturalism assumes it for scientific inquiries, which trivializes any fundamental differences insofar that their worldview doesn't permit knowledge to be acquired in any other manner.

"As defined by philosopher Paul Draper, naturalism is "the hypothesis that the natural world is a closed system" in the sense that "nothing that is not a part of the natural world affects it." More simply, it is the denial of the existence of supernatural causes. In rejecting the reality of supernatural events, forces, or entities, naturalism is the antithesis of supernaturalism."

"As a substantial view about the nature of reality, it is often called metaphysical naturalism, philosophical naturalism, or ontological naturalism to distinguish it from a related methodological principle. Methodological naturalism, by contrast, is the principle that science and history should presume that all causes are natural causes solely for the purpose of promoting successful investigation. The idea behind this principle is that natural causes can be investigated directly through scientific method, whereas supernatural causes cannot, and hence presuming that an event has a supernatural cause for methodological purposes halts further investigation."

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/

So the only evidence you'll accept for God is that which comports with the scientific method, which excludes God by necessity (see methodological naturalism)? 

Just because you are unconvinced does not mean the evidence is not there.  Would you say that there is no evidence for evolution because there is dissent among natural scientists and creationists?

That still seems to be based on reference to physical reality, namely space. Sounds like an electron, which is also conceived of as essentially point-like. That definition doesn't seem adequate to define objects that are not accessible to scientific investigation, which only requires that an thing have some consistent perceptible or measurable influence on physical existence. So that definition doesn't work. You would have to at least add no location in space as well.

In philosophical/metaphysical contexts, 'immaterial' usually refers to minds and ideas in those minds, in contra-distinction to things composed of ordinary matter. I have no problem with this. My list would certainly fit in there. 'Mind' is not a material object in itself, but it is a process intimately connected and bound to a particular physical object. It has no 'extension in space', any more than does 'happiness', or 'desire', etc. 

The sort of thing you seem to be referring to has always struck me as actually still hung up on materialism, just some sort of 'immaterial' material, rather than acknowledging that these things, like mind, etc, are not objects in any meaningful sense, they are a truly different category, like process, etc, referents to the truly 'immaterial', even if intimately connected to or generated by matter/energy processes.

And neither can you be 100% certain you aren't wrong. Non-empirical truths are basically deductive and definitional, therefore we can be 100% certain of them, but without some empirically testable input propositions, they are just word-play. All else is speculation.

You can of course construct statements like "I am certain that we are not able to be 100% certain about the nature of reality or the existence of God", so you have to careful about the structure of the statements to which you are assigning certainty or lesser confidence.

I did not claim in any sense the words I underlined in your response, or that "everything is contingent and potentially alterable". Your example is a basic tenet of logic, therefore explicitly excluded from such contingency. It is not an 'empirical truth'.

Ok so its my assertions vs. yours.

Any reference to God is assertion of the truth of an unproveable proposition.

Yes, massive amounts.

I did not say I am unsure of "the law of excluded middle". It is not a contingent fact, it explicitly follows from the necessary assumptions or axioms of binary (true/false) logic. It really is a corrolary of the basic 'Law of Non-contradiction'. I think of it not so much as a 'law' in the scientific sense, but an essential requirement for the propositions to which basic binary logic can be applied. They must be stated in such a way that only two outcomes are valid. If a proposition allows for a middle state, it has to be re-formulated, or multi-valued logic used.

And by definition of the terms, of course there is a dichotomy between 'right' and 'wrong'. That doesn't mean that we can necessarily be certain about the appropriate label to apply to any particular action, but we can be 100% certain that if an action is judged 'right', that absolutely implies that refraining from the action must be 'wrong', for logical consistency.

No, wrong again.

We can be 100% certain that the results of valid arguments in deductive systems such as logic and mathematics are 100% consistent with the axioms of the system, but that neither implies or requires that those axioms actually correspond to reality.

All that logic can demonstrate is whether some conclusion is or is not consistent with the initial assumptions. Only observation of reality itself can check the initial assumptions, if not with absolute proof necessarily, but at least to assess the confidence we are warranted in regarding them. If the conclusion is not consistent with some other well established observation, then the logical argument tells us that either (or both) the initial assumptions and the conflicting observation are mistaken in some way.

The classic case is in Euclidean Geometry, and the axiom in question is that stating that there is only one line thru a point parallel to another line, ie such that the lines will never meet. That only applies if space is 'flat'. Positive curvature, as in the surface of a sphere and its higher dimensional versions implies that there are no lines which will never meet, while negative curvature, as in a 'saddle' surface, implies that there are many lines which meet that requirement. Our universe, at least in the vicinity of significant mass, appears to be positively curved, following from General Relativity.

We do not need 100% certainty.

"if there is movement in the grass over there, and there is no wind, it probably means there is an animal hiding there, so I should be careful, because I know their are lions around, and they kill creatures like me, and I don't like that idea, because it seems to be unpleasant". No 100%'s require there.

Experience does require a basic apparatus to gather and organize the data, but that in no way requires 100% certainty or accuracy, merely adequate for the purpose.

OK  - I didn't think you had presented any, but I couldn't be sure that something you said was intended at least tangentially as a proof, since I find many of your responses almost pure non-sequiturs, so there is definitely a communication problem here.

I would be curious if you think there are good arguments for God, but I am not gonna hold my breath for a proof...

For example? 

Okay. 

Now in light of your point that we do not need 100% certainty, can you explain how empirical observation and codification is possible without a priori principles such as the law of excluded middle?

What do you mean, "correspond with reality"?  The law of non-contradiction states that nothing can both be and not be at the same time.  Are you saying that in reality, a rock could possibly be, at the same time, a non-rock?

I'm not disagreeing that logic alone can't produce knowledge.  My only point was that we need 100% certainty in order to even begin abstracting propositions from the external reality that we experience.  You have affirmed that we can be 100% certain that logic will be consistent within its own system, which is required for us to take any experience of a particular and codify it in a language or mode of discourse.

Therefore, the relationship between us and the objects that we are sense are actually mediated by knowledge that we already have.  For example, we have the innate ability to discern substance, accident, unity, plurality, etc.  These are all judgments that objects are subjected as soon as they are given to us.  More essentially, these are conceptual realities, themselves universally necessary and not derived from experience.

Let's see:  We have 100% certainty of the consistency of logic.  We have 100% certainty of the spatiality and temporality of the distinct materials, both accounting for the possibility of physical events such as the one in your example.  We have 100% certainty of the existence of the self.  We have 100% certainty that objects will adhere to a structure of substance, accident, relation, modality, quantity, etc. 

Too many to mention.