You could always email the gut forom the website in this thread,since he thinks absolute morals exist.

http://www.rationalresponders.com/forum/14167

I'm just curiouse, how exactly do you explain the following reasoning:

If murder is wrong at time t for person s, then s ought not to murder person p at time t.

Murder is wrong at time t for person s.

Thus s ought not to murder person p at time t.

It seems most people reason something like the preceeding argument and it is indeed valid to reason about morality this way. Not only that, the reasoning seems to be and can be sound. But if it can be sound how is that not objective and absolute? Granted each premise has been qualified with specifying a time and place and persons, but once we qualified each premise, is that not absolute and objective?

This cannot apply to everyone; not everyone will be person s at time t.  In the terms specified in the OP it cannot be absolute.  Can you think of any situation in which it would be necessary to murder?  If you can, you've invalidated your logic, except at times when your conclusion is true.  If you cannot, you're being dishonest.

I think you missed the point of my post, if moral claims are not absolute and objective then you would have to come up with some method of explaining how we reason about morality and actions. If you don't think murder is wrong, replace it with something else, like torturing an innocent girl for pleasure. I think that's wrong, probably even objectively so, and I reason about it as if it was so. Suppose I am comfronted by a demented individual that proposes that he and I torture some girl for entertainment, I proceed to reason and act as if it was an objective truth that doing so would be wrong. He asks me well why shouldn't we? I reply "it's wrong", if you want a more hearty explanation then I could proceed by justifying this "wrongness" by pointing to the consequences of the action or perhaps that I am violating some ethical duty. I certainly hope you guys aren't disagreeing with me simply because I'm a theist, that wouldn't make my philosophical belief false. Besides, there are plenty of atheist philosophers who defend this meta-ethical position as well; Henry Sidgwick for example.

 As far as the reasoning I provided being trivial, uninformative or devoid of content lets see if this is in fact so.

Obviously if I am right about reasoning about morality the premises I provided are absolute premises and objectively true, or false; so metaphysically my thesis is not devoid of content.

But it seems possible, and one person has suggested, that the first premise could be false in some situations. One can naturally come up with cases where comitting a murder is needed yet still hold that murder is wrong, this case is an exception to the rule. So it seems that it is not uninformative, trivial and without content. The antecedent is confirmed but the consequent is not. Or the first premise is false.

I propose the following situation in response; suppose we looked down on the events in world war 2 and said that It is wrong for Adolf Hitler to murder all of the jews at the time that he did, and concluded that he ought not to have murdered jews at the time he did. Now do you think is it right in for any person at any time to argue that it is right for Adolf Hitler to murder all the jews he did at the time that he did? If you think it is not right for anyone to say such a thing, you have just made a normative absolute, and objective moral commitment.

In addition you've also made an objective moral commitment yourself already, after all you've just asked me to come up with a situation where it is necessary to murder somebody. If I had come up with a situation then this situation also has objective moral comitments; that it is necessary for S to murder P at T in world W.

But even if we think the first premise is false? How do we explain that it is false? Also, how do we explain the following reasoning?

It is wrong for everyone to torture young girls for pleasure, thus S should not have tortured P at T.

It is wrong for everyone to torture young girls for pleasure.

Thus S should not have tortured P at T.

Now we might argue that The above reasoning is trivial and uninformative, we've just stated something normative and positive, but if it's normative and positive, then how is it that these premises are not ojective and absolute? How can we separate the normative and positive from the objective and absolute?

skeptic, morality is very interesting topic to me, and I'm going to go out on a limb and say I am pretty well versed in the science of it.  At present, I don't see much for us to debate about, but I am curious to know what your precise definition of morality is.

With respect to point (1), I never said anything about a time "s", so I'm not sure what you mean by that. I do suggest a time "t", and you can plug in the appropriate time that your making the truth claim about. And I never said that murder was right at time s, I suggested that murder might be necessary at some time t. Thus you can't really avoid not committing a murder, murder is still wrong but you can't really say that you ought not to do it. Again your missing the point of my post, please read my second reply. I think I can get around most of the problems you have with my original post.

In reply to point (2) I can appeal to the unattractive consequences of murder at time t, or I can point out that it's violating some ethical duty, or that murder impedes on the vitom's personal autonomy. Really it doesn't matter and it's a red hearing to the point at hand. And i have considered other times, just plug in other times in place of t. Again read my second post, I get around this issue.

With respect to the third point the "ought" is coming from a moral and ethical truth, which should be followed unless one is physically incapable of doing so. Really it's not an issue to the point at hand, the point is that there is moral and ethical objective truths that we can reason and think about, follow, and know.

In response to (4) some people might appeal to conscience or "intuition", but a lot of non-realists would say that these intuitions are often and usually wrong. Really, can we say that particular acts are wrong simply because we feel it is so? Or are there acts that are wrong because we KNOW it's wrong? What you seem to be suggesting is that we rely on intuitions, and feelings on what is wrong or not, but beyond that our feelings and intuitions have no connection to an objective fact. At the same time, I'm suggesting that our intuitions about what is right are wrong and how we think about rational acts are that they are objective in some way or another. So if our intuition is wrong about that, as you suggest, they could also be wrong about what actions are wrong or not. And if our intuitions are reliable about what actions are wrong or not, as you suggest, then our intuitions could also be reliable right about moral truths being objective in some way or another.

Alright I'll reply to each point you made. I numbered them so you know where I am on your reply.

In response to (1), I never actually appealed to two opposing views of morality. I distinctly remember using "or" not "and". You can be a consequentialist OR a deontologist, it doesn't matter to me. Both ethical theories have views about what is wrong. And both theories seem to suggest that we can and do reason something like I had suggested.

If X is wrong, I shouldn't do X.

X is wrong.

So I shouldn't do X.

I wanted to know how you explain how we reason about morality if there is no objective moral truths. Nobody really answered my question except by stating that "it just feels right or wrong", or suggesting that "my moral intuition says this is wrong". I suggested that we reason about morality something like I had given, and the reasoning can be both valid and sound; no need invent a "moral intuition" or "moral conscience".

Now, deontologists and consequentialists might disagree but what is right or wrong but I'm not sure that any of them really want to deny that we reason and think about morality something like I had suggested. This is why it's a red herring, it doesn't matter what views you have about what is wrong or right, either one can hold that objective absolute moral truths exist.

There are two of the most famouse consequentialists that agree with me, Henry Sidgwick, and John Stuart Mill. One is a theist the other is not. So your latter claim is just false. Also, I'm not entirely convinced that consequentialists and deontologists oppose one another, Bela Szabados and Eldon Soifer recently argue that based upon Kant's stance on hypocracy he seems to be both a deontologist and a consequentialist. In addition a lot of consequentialists talk about ethical duties, they think that we ought to maximize the good, and "the good" includes moral agents following ethical duties. So, I'm not entirely convinced the two ethical views are polar opposites of one another.

Now onto (2). My question was fairly simple, how do we reason about morality, if there is no moral truths? It certainly seems that we can reason about moral truths? Can't we? We can even know what the right action is, because there is a right action? isn't there? I never said that murder was "okay", I said there are instances where murder is wrong for S at time T. And there are times when murder is "okay" for S at a different time, maybe time T2 (although, this is very rare). You suggest that the action itself is morally neutral. What REALLY matters is S and T. I certainly did not say that S and T don't matter, nor did I suggest that the action is morally neutral. In fact, I think the action does matter, for S at T. If S commits a murder at time T, and it was wrong, he shouldn't have done it. He is morally responsible for his ACTIONS! Now, I think we can look down on his action at time T, and who S was and we can actually say objectively whether his action was right or wrong. How else can we judge whether actions are right or wrong for S at T?

Alright, now (3). You suggest we cannot rely on moral intuitions or conscious. How do we judge what actions are right or wrong? Are there right and wrong actions? It seems that torturing young girls for pleasure is wrong, is it not? It simply will not due to say "we just have different feelings about what is right or wrong", and leave it at that, especially if we think there are right, wrong or rational actions. How do we create any arguments about morality if there are no objective truths regarding morality?

Sigh *shakes head*

Haha. I'll bite, if only for giggles.

Since you haven't defined anything very well, I'll define everything for you:

1. Let applicable mean "true for."
2. Something that will be true was always going to be true.
3. Thus things that apply in the future are applicable now, quod erat demonstrandum.
4. Let "life" imply "that which is of greatest value to a person."
5. Let "a cheeseburger" imply "a thing of extremely low value when compared to life"
6. It may be true that at 1:30 PM on January 9th, 2024 a woman named Erin Skoodgdonovitch will murder a bank teller in order to steal her cheeseburger.
7. If the event described in 3 occurs, then it was always going to happen and afterwards will always have happened.
8. Thus, the event described in 3 will be applicable for everything in the universe since it would be true for everything in the universe.
9. It is likely that the event described in 3 will be considered immoral at that time since life is of far greater value than a cheeseburger.
10. Thus, the event described in 3 will always be immoral for everything in the universe because it was immoral at the time.
11. Thus absolute morality exists because a single instance of it may definitively exist in the future at some time, quod erat faciendum.

Heheh, thanks. Though, is it still a hazing if the haze-ee knows it is?

You did when I asked what made X wrong.  I might be a stickler but I believe that knowing exactly why something is wrong is kinda important if we are going to start throwing "oughts" and "shoulds" around.

Too bad they directly opposed on what makes something good.  The deontologist believes there is something inherently wrong with that action, thus, it does not matter how much good it results in, you shouldn't do it.  Whereas the Consequestionalist feels that as long as a certain act achieves the maximium good you are obligated to do it.  I fail to see how this does not matter in reagrds to answering ym question of "Why is X wrong?".

The same way we reason over what good food is and bad food is.  Part of it is determining if its detrimental to our health or not, the other part is pure preference.  I challenge you come up with a reasonable argument as to why brocolli tastes good.  You could emphasize its benefit in terms of health but I don;t really care becuase I hate how it tastes.  The same is true with supposed "moral" actions.  Many people perfer not to lie.  You can provide countless examples in whch it is to their benefit to lie but they still refuse to lie.  This is no logner reason.  This is pure preference.  At most, we can say "lie in moderation" but we can say that about any activity (for tyhe most poart) which means the only rule we can come up wioth that will aplly to everyone and everything is "Do things in omderation".  Of course this is the furthest thing form your "Action X is wrong at time t when done to person q".

Didi they just ignore the whole noumenal world and catergorical imperative and how Kant argued that, even if a madman is trying to kill your close friend, you must not lie to the madman?  How exactly did they work consequentialism into these fundamental tenants of Kant's reason?

This seems like a restatement of a question you asked in 1) so my answer is there.

Ok.  tell me if you notice a different type of "moral force with these two statements . ..

Statement 1: Killing Jim at 3 o'clock is wrong.

Statement 2: Killing is wrong.

I bring this up becuase in an above response you changes the second premise from "Killing person p at time t is wrong" to "killing is wrong".  Notice how there is no need to fill in gaps with specifics with the second formulation of the premise?

Again, if you are proposing that it is.  Explain why.  Don't make me argue against myself.  Its your job to provide support for your claims.  That being said, it depends on my mood and how annoying they are. 

Ok then.  As the aforementioned preference discussion implied, we are genetically wired to like some things and not others.  I say this because it is impossible to argue why vanilla tastes better than chocolate or why black looks better on a ZO6 than does metallic green.  All I am saying is, in regards to "morality", that is, actions or dispositions we do not like, work off a similar system.  This means that, simply becuase the majority of American population loves eating hamburgers does not mean that there is some intrinsic goodness in a hamburger that, just becuase lots of people might agree that torturing little girls for fun is wrong, does not therefore mean that it is.

The same way the Greeks reasoned about gravity and levity with no understanding the relationship between density and mass in regards to gravitaional pull and how Descartes reasoned about digestions aith no knowldge of chemistry.  We just talk out of our ass becuase no one really knows.