Kant, Heisenberg, and the limits of reason

i wrote this in an email but i'll try here too.
what would be your response to the main precept of kant's "critique of pure reason," i.e., that our perception of reality is filtered through our five senses and our consciousness and thus is not a direct experience of reality at all, and so our reason (or rationality if you will) cannot be depended upon to apprehend "truth"?
is the triumph of rationality really your organization's aim, or only the end of religion? because religion is not rationality's only obstacle. what about the Heisenberg uncertainty principle? doesn't that severely limit human reason's ability to "conquer" the universe?
also, i'm a bit confused as to what sapient meant on the nightline debate when he said that the universe is infinite. i admit my knowledge of astro and quantum physics is derived mostly from dr. hawking's writings, but doesn't he demonstrate effectiveloy that the universe is not infinite in a "boundless" sense? or did sapient mean that the universe is cyclical, in the sense of an endless succession of big bangs and big crunches? it seems to me that dr. hawking leans toward an ever expanding universe that will not return to a quantum singularity. so isn't all matter moving in a linear progression toward a sort of freezing death?
i would also be interested to know which version of the big bang sapient endorses: the quantum singularity or the collision of matter and anti-matter.

































There are plenty of responses to Kant's (frankly super-boring) Critique of Pure Reason. I can only speak for myself, but apprehending truth is a lot easier using the scientific method than it is by reading Kant.
Mine is the placement of modern religion next to ancient religion in terms of status. They are equally valid in their assertions and explanations.
No, not really. Uncertainty in that context means the problem becomes probabilistic. Matter is made up of probabilistic parts, so that's just a rational description of matter and our limitations when measuring. There's nothing supernatural or dramatic about that.
I can't speak for Sapient, but his knowledge of the nature of the universe might not be complete. Speaking with an astrophysicist would give you a better idea of the scientific problem of the expanding universe.
Will: no gyration without funkstification.
that's not really a counter to kant, that's more saying you prefer empiricism to kantian idealism as a means of ascertaining "triuth." what is truth? subjective or objective? i think kant would argue that even a widely held truth is still truth colored by human perception and thus ultimately subjective. i'm pretty sure the scientific method was the very thing kant was criticizing. how does the scientific method get us beyond the limitations of our perception that kant observes? is there really such a thing as true objectivity, i.e., "pure reason," untouched by any sort of pre-conceived notions? are kant's posited "limitations" of reason fallacious? if not, how can one really speak in terms of universals at all?
i wasn't implying heisenberg's principle was supernatural. i just recall dr. hawking making a comment in "brief history" that the uncertainty principle makes the idea of a deterministic universe impossible. while this doesn't bode well for theists (of a certain stripe anyhow), it also doesn't bode well for the omnipotence of human reason, which during the enlightenment was taken by many thinkers as a given. i don't propose you or your colleagues take it as a given, i just thought i'd touch on the issue.
"Mine is the placement of modern religion next to ancient religion in terms of status. They are equally valid in their assertions and explanations."
that's very interesting, in that it's the exact opposite of what nietzsche wishes to accomplish, particularly in "the birth of tragedy" and "the gay science."
as for the origins of the universe, i'm afraid i have no astrophysicists handy, but i'm not interested in how it "was." i only wanted a clarification of sapient's remark. of course you cannot provide that.
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
True enough. I suppose I should use the terms "fact" and "fantasy" to make it easier from now on.
The scientific method is actually designed to take us beyond that kind of thinking. For instance, by determining that microbes cause disease. That theory broke through the commonly held beliefs of the time because its evidence became undeniable. Evidence being presented consistently is one of the features of the scientific method that make it so effective. It's now a fact that both bacteria and viruses are the reason for what we now call infection.
The double-blind method. It's an important part of the process to keep exactly Kant's concerns from ruining research.
I don't think so. But that's why we have probability. Fact within a high degree of probability is still fact. It's just fact with built-in humility.
The problem with absolutes and that kind of perfectionism in general is that it requires exhaustive knowledge. There's no reason to think that we will ever have exhaustive knowledge, and so probability is a more "adult" way of dealing with facts.
That's classic Hawking. He's a shit disturber, and he knows exactly what he's saying with statements like that. It's absolutely true that a perfectly deterministic universe is impossible. But that's again where probability comes in, particularly when you're talking about quantum indederminacy (which I think he was).
We've grown up a lot since then. Human reason, like all human endeavours, is limited. That's not to say our capacity for discovery can't grow, it's just saying we are limited, which is a fair statement.
I'm not sure I read Nietzsche the same way, there. He was a big fan of classics, and I think (thought I could be wrong) that he equated gods with gods. But I've definitely disagreed with Nietzsche before, so it wouldn't be the first time.
Will: no gyration without funkstification.
i appreciate your candor, though i've never heard hawking called a "shit disturber" before. did you mean "distributor"? do you think hawking has a religious agenda or what?
nietzsche in "the birth of tragedy" lauds wagner because wagner represents a return to classical religion, or what he calls "dionysian" religion. through communal religious festivals and gods that are approachable to humans, we can overcome the fear of death, which is one of schopenhauer's requirements for a proper religion. while of course nietzsche later broke with wagner, one can still see the communal religious trend in later works. i would recommend julian young's "nietzsche's philosophy of religion." he goes against the grain of classic nietzsche scholars in saying that nietzsche, while of course anti-christian, was not necessarily anti-religious, and indeed saw that a return to ancient greek religious modes (in a modern context) would be beneficial for mankind's survival and "evolution" (not necessarily in a darwinian sense; nietzsche hated darwin). it's interesting reading and i agree with many of his interpretations.
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
It might be a local idiomatic expression. It means a prankster or someone who always has that twinkle in their eye like they're messing with you.
Haha - "distributor". That would be funny, but certainly not. I think he was just writing something inflammatory in a book with a popular audience. I honestly wouldn't know if he had a religious agenda, since I'm not familiar with his views on religion.
Oh, I know what you're talking about now. I'm more of a hobby reader of Nietzsche anyway. I find him a fun read, and he may have influenced the way I put my statement about classical and modern gods. It's possible Nietzsche and I disagree on many more things.
I tend to argue (in a tongue-in-cheek way I think Nietzsche enjoyed himself) that having more than one god at least eliminates the tiresome arguments about omnipotence, and makes for better stories. The modern christian seems forced to make a god out of the devil in order to accomplish this goal. But at least that way, there's a battle.
Will: no gyration without funkstification.
then what are your views on pantheism and/or monism? it's well known among classics scholars (it was one of my majors) that at least by the time of the apogee of greek civilization, very few greeks probably believed their myths literally but held them as representations (though not entirely in the sense of what we would call "fairy tales"
of higher truths and that we are actually all "in god." there is also the parallel example of brahman in hinduism.
in fact, is this in substance any different from the typical atheist's position that it is the universe that is (in some sense) infinite and "creates" through observable means? is it absolutely necessary to the atheist position that this universe have no consciousness of its own?
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
We are conscious; we are part of the universe; therefore the universe has consciousness. The question is, did this consciousness exist at the beginning or did it evolve later on. All evidence points to it evolving. Therefore, it is not necessary that the universe did not start out with conscious, but it is rational to believe that it probably did not.
Q: "Isn't it a miracle that the universe/life/consciousness/myself exists?"
A: "No."
----
For any person P, question Q, and concept X
If the asking of Q depends on the existence of X, and P asks Q
Then X exists, and P should not be surprised of that
The main problem I have with pantheism is that it seems to introduce an extra "magic" variable where it's not called for. Please understand: I'm a strong atheist and positivist. My bet is on the scientific method for solving problems of the nature of reality. I may be an extreme example of the views expressed on the site or by atheists in general.
After reading the rest of your post, I'm not sure which "monism" you mean. You mean like "everything is one" or something along those lines?
Yeah, that's the sense I mean. It's also the way I understand modern religions: as representations of hope and fear elaborated.
I haven't seen that assertion, so I'm not sure what you mean. To the best of my knowledge, we've found out that the universe is expanding, but I'm not sure about the creation part.
I'd say so, since the consciousness of the universe is a weak hypothesis. Tell me how this consciousness would work in your theory, and maybe we can discuss it, but I'm having a hard time seeing why an extra-physical "consciousness" is necessary to the explanation of the universe in general.
Will: no gyration without funkstification.
i suppose i was speaking of monism in the hindu, specifically advaita vedanta, sense: everything is one, this one is "god" (brahman to the vendantist, which is ultimately impersonal but can manifest itself in personal "god forms," e.g. vishnu, siva, etc.), and it is every being's goal to achieve liberation (moksha) from the cycle of rebirth and become one with brahman. i'm not a hindu, i just wondered what your take on this view would be.
i don't think "consciousness" is at all necessary to an explanation of the universe, but neither do i see how it is detrimental.
please understand me, i'm not presenting or insinuating any "theory" i have. i have none. but i think you will agree with me that there are very few atheists in the world today who can really explain the position of atheism and why a god of any stripe is not only not provable (sic?) and unnecessary, but without a doubt nonexistent. i'll go ahead and show my cards and tell you, i'm just a great big skeptic of pretty much everything. i know your website claims there is no distinction between atheism and agnosticism, but still, you must admit there is a distinction between those who say "i'm not sure there is a god, i've seen nothing to prove that to me" and "i am certain that, despite my lack of comprehensive knowledge of the universe, there cannot possibly be a god." i would just like to ascertain why an atheist such as yourself holds the latter position to be so necessary.
i grill fundies too, by the way. more than any atheist, because there's a helluva lot more of 'em. ever seen "dawn of the dead"? that's how full america is of fundies. i'm glad i moved to europe.
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
natural,
i'm not exactly sure why, but your aphorism strikes me as almost confucian in style. bravo. those are good questions. how does science tell us consciousness evolved? i know fundies say they have no explanation, but do they?
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
Same answer - it just seems kind of "extra".
Do you mean the belief in that explanation would be detrimental? Or just that the consciousness itself might be detrimental? I would rather say it's either "irrelevant" or not there until it presents itself. Until then, it's a non-issue except in the form of cultural artifacts.
But "probably not existent" is surely the grown-up version of "without a doubt nonexistent" isn't it? There's no way to acheive exhaustive, perfect knowledge, so I just suck it up and go with what's probable. Gods just don't seem to have shown up, so until they do, they're not really all that relevant to me.
It's not really "necessary" to disprove leprechans either, is it? Do I have to disprove flying walruses or can we reasonably say there probably aren't any of those either? That's all I'm saying. That's the strong atheist position as far as I'm concerned: probably no flying walruses, and probably no gods.
Will: no gyration without funkstification.
"That's the strong atheist position as far as I'm concerned: probably no flying walruses, and probably no gods."
fair enough. i think i understand your position. still, what would you say to those very respected thinkers throughout history, among them kant, schopenhauer, nietzsche, jung, and eliade, who said that religion is an important human survival mechanism? i believe it was jung specifically who said something along the lines of "every society needs a myth to live." i recall in the nightline debate that sapient said that morality is an important survival mechanism. is it not also true that the majority of humanity cannot conceive of morality without a big daddy to be accountable to? aren't you working against humanity's survival? is everyone ready for the knowledge that there's nothing out there?
in fact, how would you answer camus's big question: why not kill ourselves?
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
He's absolutely correct. Our perception of reality is filtered through our senses. For instance, when we "see" a friend standing in front of us, we are not perceiving him directly. Photons are bouncing off him and striking receptors in our eyes, which are converted to nerve impulses and fed into our brain. This allows our brain to form a "model" of our friend in front of us. This model is further given validity through further senses: we say, "Hello," and our friend responds with, "How's it hangin'?" We reach out with our hand, and we feel them clasp it and shake. This is further verified with our eyes receiving photons that have bounced off his shaking hand.
The fact that all these senses agree leaves us with one of two conclusions: either our mind is playing tricks with us and presenting a coherent model where none exists; or, our sensations are of an objective, perceivable reality. Can we know we are perceiving truth? Not for certain. We might really live in the world of the Matrix. That kind of solipsism leads us nowhere.
So, I assume our sensations of reality are correct, and present us an accurate (though perhaps biased) model of reality.
As Will pointed out, the scientific method has built-in tools to help us with skewed data collection bias.
Then there's the question of the model of the universe we create based on our sensations of reality. Our models are judged on their ability to predict new information that is also perceivable, such as reaching out our hand to our friend, and feeling him shake it. The more observation supports our model, the closer we assume it is to reality.
That doesn't mean the ontology given us by science is necessarily a perfect model of reality. Some philosophers and scientists assume there is more than one possible ontology that fits our data. This has actually occurred, such as when quantum mechanics replaced Newtonian dynamics. You could even say our ontology is nothing more than a "super-theory," that may be replaced by a more-accurate ontology at a later time, a new ontology that more accurately models reality.
So, science has tools to accurately adjust for observational bias; but it also has tools to adjust (eventually) for interpretive bias. Although I believe Kant was correct in pointing this out, I believe he underestimated the ability of science to account for these very-human flaws.
At this point, I think the biggest question we can ask is, "At what point will human conception give out, and fail science?" That is, are we sophisticated enough to understand a model of the universe that accurately reflects all of reality? Or, will we hit a wall of understanding?
As far as "proof" of the existence of God goes -- so far, science is the only epistemology that can demonstrably adjust for human bias. Therefore, any other knowledge, including that of God, is suspect, and susceptible to human bias.
Near as I can tell, the belief in God is especially subject to human bias.
It's true that most of humanity has been conditioned to only accept an externally-imposed morality. However, absent theism, why would they not simply accept natural humanist morality? We have no evidence that external morality is required, just that it's how it is currently.
I think humanity is growing up, and is almost ready to give up our belief in Santa Claus. Almost.
Because life is fun? It's good to have fun? It's good to help others have fun?
nigel,
i appreciate the thoughtful response. i don't think kant necessarily leads to solipsism. maybe a radical interpretation of kant does. we have to remember kant's basic objective: not to argue positively for the existence of a "more real" reality than what our senses can apprehend (i don't think he ever said for sure if he truly believed his world of ideals was different from what our senses perceive), but rather to explore the limits of reason, since we are hopelessly trapped inside our own brains.
the whole point of my initial post was to ascertain just what the RRS is all about: if it is just eliminating religion (or indeed all matters of faith), or arguing for empiricism as the be-all, end-all of what should influence how societies function.
i would also like to hear your take on my last question about religion as a human survival mechanism.
i want to assure you that i am not interested in discussing whether or not god exists, although perhaps i am a bit interested in whether or not we can say with certainty god does not exist. from what i gather, will holds it as a matter of probabilities. i would like to hear other perspectives, if there are any.
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
ah, i see you already nailed it.
"However, absent theism, why would they not simply accept natural humanist morality?"
do you ever think we'll really have a chance to find out?
"Because life is fun? It's good to have fun? It's good to help others have fun?"
why put question marks after those? those are goddamn good responses, and the most honest i've heard in a while. in fact, i think you should've stopped with the first.
there's just one thing baby
that comes from above
when push comes to shove
thank god for self love
--mose allison
That's difficult, considering they all said slightly different things. If you mean the behaviour itself is present in humans, I'll buy that. But to conclude that we require it for survival, or even success, is jumping the gun. At best, it's a statement about behaviour that confuses correlation with causation, and at worst, it's intellectual elitism, where the populace could never survive without guidance from aristocrats with a supernatural endorsement.
But that's different than believing it's true. You can live a myth without outright believing in the supernatural. He was also there commenting on culture in a general sense, and the civilization as hero, etc. In that context, it's not really about the supernatural, but the legendary.
Certainly not. There's no reason to believe that people will behave differently than they always have, in the absence or presence of supernatural entities. We are kind and horrible to each other with or without the immaterial reference. There's no evidence that a god or gods make our behaviour better than the absence of a god or gods.
Was everyone ready for the idea of evolution? No. But it's a fact. We can run away from fact or we can face it. Whether people are not ready for something doesn't make it false.
That question doesn't need to involve an arbitrary supernatural creature either. What if we happen to like being alive? That's a good reason, isn't it? Even outside of reason, many of us have strong survival instincts. We just want to live. Why does that need a reason?
Will: no gyration without funkstification.
I don't believe Kant intended to lead to solipsism. I'm just getting back into philosophy because of the RRS, so I haven't had time to go back and re-read Kant recently. My memory of Kant is about 20 years old, so it might very well be faulty. But, as I recall, he intended to refine an epistemology that allowed for deductions of reality, based on analytic truths, which were based on logic, and on synthetic truths, which were combinations of analytic truths and observation of reality.
It was his innate distrust of the epistemology of the scientific method that led him there, I think. And looking back at the time, no wonder. Science was still in its infancy. Newton had just changed the scientific ontology in the same way that quantum mechanics changed the Newtonian-based ontology a couple of hundred years later. Hume, Locke, Kant, Spinoza, and all the rest were trying to cope with this new ontology. I'm not entirely sure if Kant was trying to refute rationalism and empiricism, or combine them.
Well, I think the RRS is different for each of us. For me, it's a place where I can feel as if I'm part of a rational group of people. I also get to engage in intellectual (and some not-so-intellectual) discussions. Such as this one. I learn quite a bit. As I said, my last study of philosophy had been 20 years ago. These discussions are forcing me to go back and re-read -- and re-evaluate based on my greater maturity -- philosophy. And that is good.
Kelly and Sapient have different goals, I'm sure. They certainly want to confront religous beliefs head-on. Near as I can tell, it's not because they are against religious belief per se; it's more that religous belief is hurting our chances to progress beyond our current state. Of course, that's my understanding of their motives. Maybe they just enjoy being snarky.
Insert big grin here.
Will and I seem to be very similar in belief and temperament. He's a bit less snarky than me, but that's mostly because he holds it in reserve for really deserving moments. Me, I just like to be funny.
For me, it's not just probabilities. It's about perception. We have perceived only one realm, the natural reality around us. There are certain arguments for a quantum-computer nature of the universe, which perhaps even allows for a universal consciousness. This is the only definition of God that I can accept as even remotely possible. However, the chances of such a Spinozan naturalistic pantheistic God is so remote, I consider it highly improbable. And until there is some sort of evidence, it is (as Will said about God in general) completely irrelevent. Any further speculation on the nature of God is just that: speculation.
Any other definition of God has to prove something even more unlikely: a realm that is separate from, but intersecting with, ours. The likelihood of that is so remote, it is essentially impossible.
Anyway, that's my position. It's not a convincing argument against God, but for me, it is more than sufficient to give me a hard-atheist perspective.
Hell, no. Not you and me, anyway. It'll be centuries before we get to the point where we understand ourselves enough to finally know that God exists, or know that he does not.
Thanks.
They were rhetorical, certainly. I was merely providing the reasons I don't cash in. I originally did stop at the first, but then I realized that my life isn't just about me having fun, but helping those around me have fun, too. That's partly why I like to be funny when I can. I think it helps people have fun.
Next time, I'll stop with the first, and put a couple of exlamation points after it.
It certainly doesn't carry the weight of an argument based on the reasoning of Russell or Kant, but it suits me.
I really hope Camus was much more fun at a party than it seems he'd be. Maybe he didn't get invited to parties. That'd certainly explain a lot.
Submitted by todangst on April 22, 2007 - 6:00pm.
Why the "Problem of Induction" really isn't a problem. (And why theists don't even get it right)
What is Inductive Logic?
Gregory Lopez and Chris Smith
We can define any type of logic as a formal a priori system (axiomatic) that is usually employed in reasoning. In general, if we feed in true propositions, and follow the rules of the particular system, the logic will crank out true conclusions.
We can define 'induction" as a thought process that involves moving from particular observations of real world phenomena to general rules about all similar types of phenomena (a posteriori). We hold that these rules that we generate are probably, but not certainly, true, because such claims are not tautologies.
Inductive logic therefore, is a formal system that can be distinguished from deductive logic in that the premises we feed into these arguments are not categories or definitions or equalities, but observations of the real world - a posteriori world. Inductive logic therefore, is the reasoning we do every day while working in the real world - i.e. the probabilities that we deal with while making judgments about the world. We can think of it as learning from experience and
applying our prior experiences to new, but similar, situations.
History
Inductive logic is basically a form of probability. While human beings have used intuitive forms of inductive reasoning all throughout history, probably theory was first formalized in 1654 by the mathematicians Pascal and Fermat - during their correspondence over the game of dice! In their attempts to understand the game, they created a set of frequencies - or possibilities that described the likelihood for particular rolls of the dice. In doing this, they accidentally set down the basics of probability theory.
It was only a short time later, in 1748, that someone noticed a problem in probability theory - that it included the presumption that the future would be just like the past, yet this assumption could not in of itself provide a sufficient condition for justifying induction, seeing as there is no valid logical connection between a collection of past experiences and what will be the case in the future. Hume's Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding" is noted, even today, for pointing out this problem - the "problem of induction". However, few realize that a solution to the problem appeared only a few years later: In 1763, Thomas Bayes's presented a theorm that unaware to him, could be used to provide a logical connection between the past and the future in order to account for induction. More recently, Kolmogorv (1933) axiomized probability theory, which means that he gave probability theory an axiomatic foundation. Induction, therefore, while a probabilistic enterprise, is founded on a deduced system:
The three axioms of formalized probability theory:
1. The probability of any proposition falls between 1 and 0.
2. Certian propositions have a probability of 1
3. When there is no overlap, P(P or Q) = P(P) + P(Q)
and the definition of conditional probability:
P(P/Q) = P(P & Q)/P(Q)
If you accept these axioms, you must accept Bayes Theorem. It follows logically from the axioms.
These are the key points to the history of induction as far as the formal origins and formal supports for induction. I will cover these points in more detail below. But first, let's look at the different types of inductive logic.
Types of Inductive Logic
Let's do a brief review of some kinds of Inductive Logic
Argument from analogy . This occurs when we compare two phenomena based on traits that they share. For example, we might hold that Object 'A' shares the traits w, x and y, with with object 'B,' therefore, object A might also share other qualities of object B.
Statistical syllogism. This inductive logic is similar to the argument from analogy. The form of the logic follows: X% of "A" are "B", so the probability of "A' being "B" is X%
Example: 3% of smokers eventually contract lung cancer. John Doe is a smoker, therefore, he has a 3% chance of contracting lung cancer.
Generalization from sample to population The best example of this inductive logic would be a poll. Polls rely on random samples that are representative of a group by virture of their random selection (i.e. the fact that every person had the same chance of being chosen for the sample).
On my website, I will also discuss John Stuart Mill's Method of Causality. For now, let's return to the aformentioned "problem of induction" and take a deeper look both at the problem of induction, and some solutions for this problem.
The problem of induction
You've probably heard about Hume's famous 'problem of induction"
How do we know that the future will be like the past?
Or... more comedically
How do we know that the future will continue to be as it always has been?!
Consider the following example: we observe two billiard balls interact. From this, we observe that they appear to obey a physical law that could be presented in the formula: F=ma - Force = Mass X acceleration. From this observation, we then generate a general law of force. However, the problem then arises: how can we hold that this law will really apply to all similar situations in the future? How can we justify that this will always be the case?
If we argue that "we can know this, because the balls have always acted this way in the past" we are not really answering the question for the question asks how how we know that the balls will act this way in the future. Of course, we can then insist that the future will be just like the past, but this is the very question under consideration! We might then insist that there is a uniformity of nature that allows us to deduce our conclusion. But, how do we know that nature is uniform? Because in the past it always seemed so? Again, we are simply assuming what we seek to prove.
So, it turns out that this defense is circular... we assume what we seek to justify in the first place, that the past will be like the future. So this argument fails to provide a justification for induction.
But this in itself is not the whole story, in fact, if we stop here, we get the story all wrong. You see, the 'uniformity of nature' is in fact a necessary condition for induction but it could never be a sufficient justification of inductive inference anyway. The actual problem of induction is more than this: it is the claim that there is no valid logical "connection" between a collection of past experiences and what will be the case in the future. The classic "white swans" example serves: the fact that every swan you've seen in the past was white means simply that: every swan you've seen has been white. There is no logical "therefore" to bridge the connection "all the swans I've seen are white" to "all swans are white" or "the next swan I encounter will be white".
So, yes induction presupposes the uniformity of nature, but while this is a necessary condition for induction, the UN is not sufficient to justify inductive inferences epistemologically. So, any attempt to solve the problem by shoring up the 'uniformity of nature' will never work to begin with. When the next swan turns out to be black, it shows your statement "all swans are white" had no actual "knowledge" content. What you've done is presupposed nature to be uniform, but not in fact justified any particular inductive inference you may wish to make.
So,solving the 'problem' of induction is more than just trying to find a way out of the 'circle' of uniformity of nature/justifying induction. There is a problem that needs a solution. Interestingly, many critics seem to believe that the story ends here - that there simply is a problem, and that all solutions are merely circular. But this is untrue. There are responses to the problem.
Since it was Hume who first uncovered this problem, let's begin by looking at his response:
Hume's answer was that we had little choice but to assume that the future will be like the past..... in other words, it was a habit born of necessity - we'd starve without it! And, given that there was not