Yeah, I had figured that this question was probably intended to catch Paisley's eye, but I wasn't quite sure because I posted just last night on this subject in that thread, I thought that maybe your thoughts might be linked to that.

Anyhow, it's always good to get your view on things Magilum, so I'll continue if you don't mind, til Paisley arrives.

It took me a few arguments to get round to the point, there. Basically it hinges on what the best alternatives in the list of last pieces of atomic theory will most likely tell us about the world. I've set it up by challenging the assumption that mind is special or distinct in any way, even as a property. The most compelling indication that we should dispose of this first assumption is that we even have it; that we have referred the sum of our hard earned knowledge only within it.

We all hope for a future discovery, for one reason or another, but I won't say I hope for panentheism to be confirmed by future discoveries, I'm just not that invested in it. What I am invested in is our potential to discover and what potential we might deny ourselves by not questioning assumptions when they have lead us to the end of their tether.

No it's not, Pauli exclusion definitely applies to your finger and keyboard. It is used in chemistry to determine the energy inhabitation of electron shells and the potential for electromagnetic interaction between substances. Electrons are absolutely the Lego bumps of matter and their polarity is the reason for interaction on the macro level, they exist as waves of probability and they are the outer extremity of any macro material object. Yes, on our scale reality is fuzzy at the edges. That it does not, generally speaking, act fuzzy at the edges was the source of some confusion before Pauli advanced the concept of spin numbers.

Just for the record, I'm not advancing a hypothesis of complexity, I'm rebutting hypotheses of complexity.

That quantum information exists in multiple states simultaneously is not a theory it's an empirical observation. The phenomenology of probabilistic fundamental units gives us pause to reconsider whether mind is actually as complex as we imagine, to wit, it looks like having the properties that compose mind is pretty ordinary to an electron. To an electron, it is merely one probable self.