Again, you misconstrue the argument. This argument is only with respect to the creationist argument which states as an ad hoc that God is manipulating the world in order to "test our faith" (or words to that effect". This is similar to the Cartesian Demon thought experiment. This post only addressed this particular creationist argument, which is more or less a form of global skepticism as well as an ad hoc and a total abdication of intellectual responsibility. The only difference between said creationist argument and a normal global skeptic argument is that a skeptic is arguing against the possibility of knowledge based on the possibility that our epistemological faculties our faulty. Creationists who try to use the ad hoc justification of why their propositions have been proven false from an empirical standpoint are trying to argue that said faculties are faulty by employing said faculties, hence shooting themselves in the foot. That was my argument. Perhaps I should change the title.

I'm not denying the principle or Moore's modus tollens. I accept that if S knew q, then S knows ¬SP. That's fine. My argument was that these creationists are asserting that they know that SP is true. But that is logically impossible. If SP is true, then S does not know q, and surely if S did not know q, S could not know SP. It's fine to say that if S knew q, S would know ¬SP, but what I was pointing out was that the ad hoc argument I called the Argument from Trickery suggests that S knows SP. But like I said, that's impossible. It's very well and good to say that if BIV (Brain-in-a-vat) or something to that effect is possible then S knowing q is not. Creationists who appeal to SP are using a meaningless ad hoc justification for their beliefs.

You'll have to refresh me. When I think of the lottier problem I think of the Gettier Counterexample problem (or are you and I referring to the same thing?)

This is now off-topic, but I'll go with it. I'd find it worse to concede that one cannot have contingent/uncertain knowledge. It would present a severe problem for epistemology. Obviously:

For S to know q, S must know q with certainty

S does not know a lot of things certainly

S does not know a lot of things

Under this, only a few statements would be considered knowledge, like Descartes statement. But, I prefer to say that most knowledge claims are contingent, and that the epistemic justificatory force, whatever it might be, can be fallible. A priori reasoning, it is well known, can be both defeasible and fallible (BonJour wrote a lot on this subject) even though many consider it superior to a posteriori reasoning.  Presumably, to know something, it must be true, and you must justify its truth, but even that is not necessarily enough, since you might be lucky to have knowledge that is unrelated to your JTB (justified true belief). So, if I was driving, saw some poodles in a field cut to look like sheep, inferred there were sheep, and happened to be right since there were some sheep hiding out of sight behind some boulders, I would have a JTB, but no knowledge. When we say that most knowledge claims are contingent, it makes life a lot easier since it allows for things like induction and so forth. That's why we have degrees of certainty, like:

I am fairly certain that p

I think that p

Probably p

Maybe p

p could be right

definitely p

p is more likely than not p

etc.