These objections are rather dull and poor anyway. I prefer my own list:

1. Supervenience (the necessity of certain beings and properties to generate higher-order beings and properties and the associated relationship, such as that, for example, atoms can exist without human society, but not human society without atoms). The conclusion which I still retain, to this day, is that such principles necessarily eviscerate the concept of a conscious, intelligent being with control over the physical world yet without constituting a physical being itself).This is a fortiori for #2, discussed below.

2. Monism (The concept in philosophy of mind and neuroscience that the mind, the source of a conscious, intelligent being, does not have a component of a non-physical ontology, so eviscerating the assertion that such a being could be intelligent)

3. Ex Nihilo (the coherency of the theistic suggestion that an eternally existing being is ontologically seperate from the physical universe, such that because it was the entity that created the universe in the first place). My eventual resolution was that the theistic assertion pertaining to the creation of a seperate ontology of physical beings and things, of which this being is not of the same substance with, is an impossible contradiction, and is an assertion that requires the propogation of ex nihilo creation by God, which is impossible. I also used this suggestion to propogate the idea within ontology that existence of some form, bare-order properties of being, are uncaused. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that ex nihilo is not a necessary precondition for the existence of God, but in classical theism, it is, being that the assertion in question is that it is the source of all other things, and no things can exist without this being as their antecedant. This primarily targets the Cosmological Argument, which makes an untenable assertion regarding ex nihilo. 

4. Infinity (the coherency or lack thereof of suggesting the actual infinite nature of this being while at the same time maintaining that it was an entity and being unto itself, with providence and control, hence ontologically discrete from other discrete beings such as the physical universe) (the conclusion which I still retain in this matter is that there is an internal contradiction between the two). In this regard, there needs to be a distinction between pantheism and panentheism, the latter being untenable as a position, since the theistic assertion entails an extrinsic being (which necessarily follows from the assertion that it created the universe).

5. Bare-order property (the question of what substance or property describes a discrete conscious being and agent if it is asserted that such a being has no physical body, and what bundles of properties constituted this being). I eventually resolved that no description was being given, and that the theistic assertion was not giving any ontological properties describing precisely of what this entity is comprised, hence the theistic school of thought is overly vague regarding the assertion that some "intelligent agent" exists, and this is not acceptable in proper philosophical discourse. During this process, I also argued for the philosophical school called reism, which I still hold to.

6. Universe of discourse (The necessity of descriptors of property of an ontology, ie, that the theistic assertion regarding "supernaturalism" was/is untenable because it is ruled from a universe of discouse, and is defined solely by virtue of negation to the physical. If I can prove this (and I did) it strengthens the idea of #5. My resolution is that I still hold to this today.

7. Causality (The coherency of arguing that God is an immutable, unchanging being with the suggestion that it is a conscious agent with a mind with thoughts that acts upon whims and has causal powers over the physical universe). I worked on this one for qa very long time. I eventually argued there was an internal contradiction present in the doctrine.

8. Termination (Self-refuting arguments that rely on special pleading fallacies to bolster the thesis that existence of God is valid by the assignation of ad hoc special characteristics that refute the premise of the argument that establishes them. The Cosmological Argument is especially guilty). My current stand on this is that there is an internal contradiction present in arguments that operate in a similar fashion.