It appears that Todangst, in association with Deludedgod, has produced a significant roadblock in respect to conversations which involve concepts that have anything to do with the concept of 'supernatural' or 'immaterial'. In other words, it allows T.D. and D.G. to have the basis to say that any discussions concerning the concept of 'God' are meaningless or incoherent because of the conversation's use of an incoherent concept as a vitally crucial part of the conversation.

To begin with, I want T.D. to know that I've considered his challenge for someone to actually provide a difference or distinction between his use of 'supernatural' (pg. 2 of his paper states: "You might also feel that you know of a way to solve the problem: by turning to euphemisms like 'beyond nature' or 'above nature' instead of 'not nature'. However, unless you can show how these distinctions lead to a difference, these euphimisms are all ontologically identical with 'not matter/not nature' - they still all rule out any universe of discourse" ). I think it is important to note that I will not be trying to extend my argument to the concept of 'immaterial'. I find that T.D. arguments against 'immateriality' compelling and I have not been able to come up with any viable challenges to his argument against it. However, I do feel that I have something to offer by way of challenging his argument concerning the concept 'supernatural'.

To begin I would like to focus on what the concept of 'supernatural' actually means. T.D. defines it in his paper as: "Supernatural - defined as 'not nature' or 'above nature' or 'beyond nature'. I will be operating from this same definition. However, I will obviously try to derive a different conclusion.

Definitional Argument

My argument rests on grasping the 'above nature' option of how to conceive the meaning of 'supernatural'. My conception differs from T.D.'s because I don't associate 'above nature' as necessarily outside of nature or 'not nature'. Following this layout, another sense of what it means to be 'above nature' can be seen as something which 'greatly exceeds the normal course of nature'. Therefore, if 'above nature' is conceived in the way that I recommend, then the concept 'supernatural' is not defined solely in the negative; it still retains positive natural properties.

Counter argument: Saying 'greatly exceeds the normal course of nature' is not a sufficient distinction between something that is 'outside of nature'. Therefore, you have merely given a poor semantical description for the same incoherent conception of 'supernatural'.

Reply: The distinction rests on the important involvement of 'nature' in my sense of conceiving 'supernatural'. I am in no way stealing from naturalism because I am conceiving of something which greatly quantifies the normal existing properties of nature. The properties of nature remain firmly intact within my sense of 'supernatural'. Something in this sense would be 'exceedingly or greatly X' where X would be a property of nature and capable of a universe of discourse.

Referential Argument

Just because a concept refers to an empty set does not mean that the concept is meaningless. For example, if I have the set of all Mastodons and look for existing members, then I would quickly realize that none exist. Does this mean that the concept 'Mastodon' is meaningless? No. What it means is that for the set denoting all things that are Mastodons, that set would have no members. The set can be meaningfully understood to delineate properties that a thing must have in order to be a member of that set. The lacking of something already in existence possessing these properties at time X does not mean that the set representing those things which would have those properties would be meaningless.

Counter argument: I see where you're going with this. Even if I grant your argument, Mastodon's are not something which is 'supernatural'. Those sets which represent things which are 'supernatural' would be necessarily empty and therefore meaningless at any time. You can prove that mastodons once existed through the fossil record and science, but where is the proof for your 'supernatural' set members?

Reply: This argument doesn't prove that possible members of a set representing 'supernatural' things is necessarily empty. What it proves is that there have not yet been any members which fit into the set of things which are 'supernatural'. Referential agnosticism does not denote conceptual incoherency.

The challenge from T.D. has apparently been that because the concept 'supernatural' steals from naturalism (under his conception) then any attempts to use the concept, merely renders it naturalistic and therefore, not what it meant to be; therefore rendering the concept 'supernatural' meaningless. However, If my arguments hold, I have been able to overcome his challenge. The concept of 'supernatural' as I have described proudly uses concepts from nature because I don't think that 'supernatural' means outside of nature. Because of this, my argument meets one aspect of T.D.'s challenge. Furthermore, my argument (hopefully) describes a set, which has no existing referent, but still has meaning. If my argument is successful, it is only meant to allow discourse concerning things in the sense of 'supernatural' in the way that I have described.